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Foreword 5 
FOREWORD 
Similarly to the previous numbers of the East European Studies series this 
volume provides the reader with an opportunity to have a closer insight 
into researches having been conducted recently on some post-Soviet is-
sues in the Institute of World Economics, which, due to the restructuring 
process within the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS), now consti-
tutes part of the Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the 
HAS. As a tradition, the volume contains studies based on researches in 
our domestic or foreign partner institutions as well. Among the authors 
one can find both experienced researchers and junior research fellows 
since we find it very important to give an opportunity to young analysts to 
publish their first research results. 
Our themes vary widely. Four of the studies deal with relationships of 
individual countries with Russia; it is for this reason that we chose the title 
of the first block: “Russia as a partner.” In this part of the volume the 
reader may find analyses on the bilateral relationships of different EU-
members (such as Italy and six Central-East European states) and post-
Soviet (for example the three Caucasian) countries from political, security 
or economic approaches. A study on the Ukrainian choice related to the 
country’s integration direction fits into this group of studies well. In the 
second part of the book, we publish two challenging studies that are a lit-
tle set apart from this set of themes. The first deals with the understanding 
and practice of Public-Private Partnership in Ukraine, which is a key issue 
in present-day Ukrainian economy. The last article is a real curiosity, 
since it analyses the problem of the Aral Sea not in the widely used eco-
logical point of view but from an economic approach.  
The first study written by Volodymyr Sidenko analyses a very timely 
topic of the past few years. Ukraine, located between the European Union 
and Russia, has been invited to join both the European Single Market 
through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement concluded 
with the EU and the recently launched Russia-led Eurasian Community 
and its core element, the Customs Union. At the time being it seems that 
these two integration directions are mutually exclusive, so Ukraine is 
under pressure to make a very difficult decision. The study gives the pros 
and cons for both ways concluding that any of the two choices causes 
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enormous harm to the other relation and to Ukraine itself. As a solution 
for Ukraine the author suggests the model of a Pan-European Economic 
Space, an intstitutional formation consisting of national and regional 
economic systems that are mutually compatible. An alternative model to 
this is a Pan-European Economic Space with two independent but 
interconnected centres (the European Union and the post-Soviet 
integration), a model the author calls a bipolar Europe model. A third 
solution is the concept of the 'multipolar big Europe' with a big number of 
regional and subregional unions participating in it. 
The second study written by Annamária Kiss deals with relations be-
tween Russia and the three South Caucasian countries. Owing to potential 
political instability, insecurity, economic uncertainty and ethnic conflicts 
caused by a mutual mistrust of these nations (which are mutually corre-
lated), the South Caucasus can be regarded as one of the world’s most 
vulnerable and unstable regions. Russia, as a most prominent actor in the 
region, can play an operative role in finding solutions. Naturally, these 
three bilateral relationships are of a different character, varying from a 
close partnership (Armenia) to a very hostile relationship (Georgia). The 
intent of the article is to present the main contradictions and features of 
the relations with Russia in the fields of security and economy. 
Marco Siddi’s article focuses on the Italian-Russian relationship em-
bracing both the political and economic fields. Italy is one of Russia’s key 
economic partners in Europe while being among its most significant and 
influential ‘friends’ within the EU in a political sense as well. A long pe-
riod of good political relations, which have not been affected by cabinet 
changes either in Rome or Moscow, has contributed to the consolidation 
of the partnership. The author argues that the hugely positive trend in 
economic relations based on very intensive energy relations and a close 
co-operation in other sectors is likely to continue. The study gives impor-
tant details on Italian-Russian trade, investment and energy links high-
lighting most recent developments. 
The last study of the first block written by Zsuzsa Ludvig investigates 
trade relations between six Central East European (CEE) countries (Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and 
Russia focusing on the impact of economic crises on these links, with spe-
cial regard to CEE export performances. The author argues that CEE-
Russian bilateral trade links have been long specific due to historical and 
economic reasons resulting as a rule in deeper declines in trade volumes 
under economic crises compared to other, mostly more advanced eco-
nomic partners of Russia. Moreover, besides common characteristics, in-
dividual CEE-Russian bilateral trade developments showed some specific 
features during the past two decades as well. However, these differentia-
tions in trade links both among them and in a comparison to the eco-
nomically more developed partners of Russia have been recently dimin-
ishing due to the growing presence and dominance of transnational com-
panies in CEE exports.  
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The fifth article deals with the more and more timely and fashionable 
theme of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), namely in Ukraine. PPP has be-
come a popular and useful means of implementing public investment pro-
jects around the world. Governments have been using PPPs to realise huge 
investment projects like highways, power plants, hospitals and other fixed 
assets. The paper written by Ievgen Cherevykov provides a survey on PPP 
practice and implementation in Ukraine considering PPP as a socio-
economic institution. The study highlights Ukrainian peculiarities and 
shortcomings focusing on the institutional background. 
Finally, the volume ends with a very interesting but at the same time 
enjoyable study written by Alpár SzĘke on the catastrophe of the Aral Sea. 
As a novelty the focus of Alpár SzĘke’s article is given to the economic im-
pacts of the environmental change in the Northern Aral region in Kazakh-
stan. The author argues that the Aral Sea region, and the Northern Aral 
Sea in particular is a perfect example that shows how negative external-
ities and mismanaged natural resources resulting in environmental catas-
trophe can turn a prosperous region into an infamous area hit by both an 
economic and a social crisis. After providing a brief overview of the dry-
ing out process and its practical economic consequences based on statis-
tics the study presents not only the measures already taken in order to 
save the lake but their already visible results on the local economic and 
social life as well.    
The authors hope that they could provide the reader with interesting 
and valuable studies and could contribute to the understanding of some 
challenging issues, all of them related somehow to the colourful post-
Soviet region. We offer this volume to both the academic, educational cir-
cles and the administrative sphere interested in post-Soviet studies. 
 
 
Articles were finalised in late 2012. 
 
 
Zsuzsa Ludvig 
editor 
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UKRAINE’S REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
POLICIES: THE EU VERSUS THE EURASIAN 
COMMUNITY 
Volodymyr Sidenko 
Introduction 
The problem of Ukraine’s multivector integration policy has be-
come notorious both within Ukraine and outside it, both in pro-
fessional political and academic circles and in the broader public. 
Despite the evident political losses for Ukraine arising from the 
permanent conflict between the Western and Eastern integration 
vectors, this problem has proved to be amazingly persistent. Thus, 
it would be a gross mistake to attribute its existence to the mere 
political preferences of any factually ruling political groups and 
their lack of desire to make a decisive choice. Evidently, the roots 
of the problem go very deep, branching extensively, and the most 
important task is to reveal them entirely in order to see clearly the 
essence of the phenomenon and find applicable measures to 
tackle it. 
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1) The alternating course of Ukraine’s                          
integration: a retrospective view 
From the very beginning of Ukraine’s independence and for the 
most part of the 1990’s, the above-mentioned problem was con-
cealed by the evident preference of Ukraine to the relations with 
Russia and other post-Soviet states within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). On the one hand, there were frustrating 
results in the attempts to reintegrate the post-Soviet space on new 
market principles caused not only by the domination of national 
state building motivations in a number of new states, but also by 
the lack of mature market institutions needed for this sort of inte-
gration. But on the other side, there was no real alternative at that 
time, as the process of the institutionalisation of relations with the 
European Community was at its initial stage. The latter is proved 
by the fact that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and Ukraine, on the other hand, was enacted only in 
March 1998. Thus we can say that prior to 1998 Ukraine was a 
country pursuing a policy with a rather restrained regional inte-
gration component. In fact, it was more active globally, focusing 
its efforts on obtaining access to the WTO and getting the support 
needed for macroeconomic stabilisation from global financial in-
stitutions.  
The real change in Ukraine’s integration policy came closer to 
the turn of the millennium and it was primarily based on the fol-
lowing two major factors. Firstly, it became evident that the policy 
of reintegration of the post-Soviet space had definitely acquired 
the shape of a hub-and-spoke model, where the hub was repre-
sented by Russia. Apart from economic considerations in Ukrain-
ian business circles fearing the domination of Russian capital,1 it 
caused much wider and more serious concerns in Ukraine with 
                                                 
1 The potential danger of such arrangements in purely economic terms was 
revealed, in particular, in a World Bank study (Schiff and Winters, 2003, 15–
16, 78), where the authors stated that this model enables the hub country to 
reap the bulk of potential benefits arising from integration.  
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regard to the compatibility of such an integration model with the 
country’s national sovereignty. Russia and its allies showed by that 
time the explicit desire to rapidly proceed with and ambitious 
Eurasian integration project which excluded (at least temporarily) 
such hesitating partners like Ukraine. 
Secondly, Ukraine, by the end of 1990’s, was approaching the 
termination of the prolonged systemic transformation crisis and 
thus encountered new objectives of qualitative change in its de-
velopment. This new post-crisis period saw the emergence of 
long-term strategy programmes aimed at creating an internation-
ally competitive economy and achieving European standards of 
life; these tasks required an entirely new quality of public institu-
tions. It is self-evident that under these new strategic objectives 
Ukraine’s policy of regional co-operation shifted from the for-
merly dominating task of ‘the civilised divorce’ in the post-Soviet 
space to the idea of targeting high-ranking development through 
following the beacon of European integration. The new opportu-
nities created this way by the PCA led to the adoption of the Strat-
egy of Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union2 in mid-
1998, followed by the Programme of Ukraine’s Integration into 
the EU,3 and culminating in the official adoption of the country’s 
new development strategy in 2002 unambiguously titled ‘The 
European Choice’.4  
All in all, it seemed that Ukraine had definitely turned towards 
the West and adopted the model of European integration coupled 
with the strategic partnership with Russia and the free trade rela-
tions in the entire CIS space. But it was a premature conclusion, as 
already in February 2003 the Ukrainian president principally 
agreed to enter, together with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
into a new regional integration project called ‘The Common Eco-
nomic Zone’ (CEZ).5 This principal decision was legally finalised 
with the signing on September 19, 2003 of the framework 
                                                 
2 Ibid., (1998). 
3 Ibid., (2000). 
4 Ibid., (2002). 
5 This is the term officially used by the WTO in its notification procedures reg-
istered in the Regional Trade Agreements database, though in some publica-
tions it was named “Common Economic Space” or “Single Economic Space”.  
Volodymyr Sidenko 14 
agreement on CEZ which was ratified by the Ukrainian parlia-
ment on April 20, 2004.6  
The conflict created by this agreement was evident, but it was 
not implied in the alleged violation of the Ukrainian Constitution. 
Though the reservation made during the ratification said that 
Ukraine was to take part in the formation of the CES within the 
limits set by its Constitution, it did not mention any specific arti-
cle. Unofficially, it was made clear that the problem rested with 
the principle of supranationality laid down in the CEZ Commis-
sion acting as a single regulating agency. But it remained unclear 
how the country could be integrated, with such an approach, into 
the EU where the same principle of supranationality is even more 
explicit. Nevertheless, the conflict of two integrations evidently 
existed and it was rooted in the functional impossibility to imple-
ment the Eurointegration course of the country under conditions 
when substantial regulatory competences had been transferred to 
the common regulatory body of the CEZ. 
This conflict was, for the time being, resolved purely by political 
instruments. The election of the new president Victor Yushchenko, 
who was more open-minded toward the West, politically sus-
pended the implementation of the project on the part of Ukraine. 
However, Ukraine did not denounce the framework agreement; it 
merely restrained from signing the package of new draft agree-
ments implementing the framework agreement. It put the country 
into a somewhat ambiguous position: officially it is still a partici-
pant of the CEZ7 but actually does not participate. It looked like the 
country closed the doors before the CEZ project but not very 
tightly, so that it could reopen it, should it be necessary.  
There is a wide-spread perception, both in Ukraine and in the EU, 
that the period of the triumph of the ‘Orange Revolution’ (from 
January 2005 until August 2006 when V. Yanukovych was ap-
pointed prime minister) was the most favourable period for the 
country’s rapid integration into the EU (similar to the way passed 
earlier by East and Central European countries) and that this oppor-
tunity was not used to its full potential and thus was actually lost. But 
despite the popularity of this view, it does not look persuasive.  
                                                 
6 CES (2004). 
7 Ukraine officially notified is participation in the CEZ while entering the WTO 
(WTO Regional Trade Agreements Database).  
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It is true that during the period of the presidency of V. Yu-
shchenko Ukraine and the EU proceeded on a higher level of their 
interaction that was primarily associated with the transition to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and later (in 2009) to the 
policy of the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP). The guiding principles 
of the ENP and especially of the EaP provide for Ukraine the far-
reaching strategic perspective of an actual integration into the 
single market of the EU and an active participation in different 
European policies and thus in the activities of a number of the EU 
institutions. This approach gave priority to real interaction in a 
permanently expanding integration field over implementation of 
a virtual larger integration project. This sort of integration policy 
is fully consistent with the functionalist way of thinking of the EU 
that proved to be rather efficient during the long period of Euro-
pean integration since the 1950’s, and especially it proved its 
relevance for the initial stages of the European integration proc-
ess. Nevertheless, in the case of Ukraine it failed to receive an 
adequate internal political and public support. Very indicative of 
this restrained attitude was the official position implying that 
Ukraine treats the EaP only as a supplementary instrument that 
enables the acceleration of Ukraine’s integration into the EU and 
that Ukraine would support this policy as long as it does not sub-
stitute the prospect of the EU membership and the further 
enlargement of the EU.8,9 
It was quite clear that Ukraine expected from the EU the above-
mentioned ‘larger integration project’ and not the policy of small, 
even though multiple real steps. Ukraine did not want to wait for 
long-term prospects; its officially declared foreign policy objective 
was to follow a quick integration progress. And this official plat-
form, supported by many political activists, academic researchers 
and experts who are open-minded to the West, demanded a new 
agreement with the EU, which would be similar to the European 
agreements concluded in the 1990’s with the future EU members 
from Central and Eastern Europe. Interestingly, this escalation of 
integration expectations on the part of Ukraine happened on the 
                                                 
8 It is noteworthy that later the Ukrainian government made its official position 
regarding EaP somewhat more flexible, as it no longer links its support of this 
policy to the prospect of EU membership; however, it stresses the auxiliary role 
of EaP to the format of bilateral relations with the EU (Government of Ukraine 
2012).  
9 Government of Ukraine (2009). 
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background of quite serious problems with the implementation of 
the bilateral ENP Action Plans in some crucial areas, i.e. pertaining 
to the quality of existing regulatory environment, rules of competi-
tion, independence of the judicial system, etc.  
The era of Viktor Yushchenko actually revealed the country’s 
dualism with regard to European integration which one can no-
tice in the exacerbated contradictions between the virtual Euro-
pean integration expectations and the country’s socioeconomic 
reality. This dualism reached its extreme point with the advent of 
the global financial and economic crisis in 2008, which showed 
the vulnerability of the existing Ukrainian economic model, 
whose systemic characteristics are non-competitive and hostile to 
innovation but rent-seeking economic behaviour of the big busi-
ness coupled with ever-growing foreign indebtedness needed to 
support internal demand. As a matter of fact, the rule of President 
Yushchenko was the period of extensive pro-European diplomatic 
activity but of a rather controversial policy of internal social and 
economic transformations. The European integration course of 
that period, not backed with proper change in the internal institu-
tional environment of the country, turned to be very shallow and 
to a great extent formal and declarative.  
The widening split between escalating pro-European expecta-
tions and declarations, on the one hand, and the reality of a stag-
nating approach to the European social and economic standards, 
on the other hand, has created a serious challenge for the future 
of Ukraine’s relations with the EU. In spite of this, the parties em-
barked on the path leading to a new far-reaching agreement im-
plying political association and economic integration, including 
the creation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area 
(DCFTA). The initial idea of this step was, supposedly, that it 
might stimulate the needed internal change within Ukraine (the 
way it really did for the new EU entrants in the 1990’s and the 
early 2000’s) and thus create additional basis for the further ex-
pansion of the integration process. But this idea did not work be-
cause of the following three potent factors.  
Firstly, the internal development of Ukraine under the new 
president (Viktor Yanukovych), despite some partial economic 
achievements in raising the rates of economic growth and infra-
structure development, has been diverting from the EU standards 
in a number of areas embracing both the functioning market 
mechanism (growing violation of ownership rights, including 
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raider attacks at profitable private entities, abuse of dominating 
monopolistic position at different market sectors, oppressive taxa-
tion of small and medium-sized businesses) and the public sphere 
(especially mismanagement of public finances, politically biased 
court decisions and the surge of corrupted practices in the judicial 
branch on the whole, attempts to curb democratic procedures and 
the freedom of the media, etc.). In some important aspects (first of 
all, political democracy and the freedom of the press) there was an 
evident reversal from the trends inherent in the Yushchenko era.  
Secondly, the European Union, facing a most severe financial 
tension in a number of Eurozone members, has come to a di-
lemma: whether to continue a risky course of further enlargement 
or concentrate on internal stabilisation and deepening of integra-
tion within its present frontiers. In any case, its unwillingness to 
accept new problematic members is beyond doubt. The EU seems 
to pursue the policy of keeping Ukraine within the range of its 
political and economic influence but without giving any binding 
commitments as to a possible membership. 
Thirdly, since 2010 the efforts of Russia to pull Ukraine into 
the Eurasian integration communities, contrary to the EU re-
strained policies, have seriously intensified, based on huge finan-
cial resources derived from Russian energy exports and the 
strengthened Russian transnational corporations seeking a new 
field for their expansion.  
All in all, these three factors have brought Ukraine’s integra-
tion policy to a position of a stalemate, when former multivector 
(as a matter of fact, alternate vector) integration policy has actu-
ally transformed into a ‘vectorless’ one.  
2) Economic dilemmas of Ukraine’s integration 
policy 
Since 2010, Ukraine has been showing signs of a rising pragma-
tism in its integration policy which is characterised by an evident 
prevalence of its economic aspects over other considerations: 
‘value’, not ‘values’ have come to the forefront. This change re-
flects the dominating philosophy of Ukrainian big businesses that 
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now rule the country. At first, this transformation looked more 
favourable for an eastward integration. But very soon this view 
proved erroneous because of the intrinsic economic nationalism 
of the new Ukrainian government. It became aware that regional 
integration, whatever its model might be, is fraught with not only 
potential gains but certain losses and risks as well.  
Thus, in the course of negotiations with the EU on the future 
DCFTA, Ukraine faced serious impediments originating from the 
overtly protectionist stand of the EU in the agrarian sector, its re-
fusal to grant Ukraine a more or less free access to the European 
single agrarian market in the fields which are mostly interesting 
to Ukrainian exporters. Practically all key items of Ukrainian 
agrarian and foodstuff exports (except sunflower seeds and rape-
seed needed for bio energy) were practically excluded from the 
free trade regime, as free trade was granted for them only within 
minor tariff quotas set at the level sometimes less than 0.1 per 
cent of the annual value of sales in the EU internal market.10 Out-
side these quotas, the EU has extremely high (actually prohibitive) 
import tariffs for many agrarian products and foodstuffs: the tar-
iff peaks for animal products soar to 191 per cent, dairy products 
to 172 per cent, fruit, vegetables and plants to 119 per cent, 
grain, cereals, and preparations to 118 per cent, sugars and con-
fectionary to 106 per cent. In the aggregate, the simple average 
applied agrarian tariff rate under most favoured nation regime 
equalled in 2010 12.8 per cent in the EU, while in Ukraine only 
9.8 per cent.11  
DCFTA with such parameters limits growth prospects for the 
agrarian sector of the Ukrainian economy and actually blocks the 
process of its penetration of and consolidation on the EU market. 
Moreover, it may, in fact foster undesirable structural side effects 
such as the spontaneous structural adjustment of agricultural pro-
duction in Ukraine aimed at the substitution of foodstuff produc-
tion with the output of raw material for European bio fuel capaci-
ties, causing the progressive degradation of Ukrainian land and en-
suing the radical decrease of land productivity in the long run.  
                                                 
10 Calculations made by the researchers of the Institute for Economics and 
Forecasting of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, including the au-
thor in the course of negotiations. 
11 WTO (2011). 
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At the same time, the full opening of the EU market of indus-
trial products has a rather limited potential impact on Ukraine, 
because the simple average import tariff rate for non-agricultural 
products in the EU, according to the WTO data valid for 2010, 
was only 4 per cent, compared to 3.8 per cent in Ukraine.12 
Ukraine faces the problem of overcoming the structural barrier 
on its way to the European markets of industrial goods with 
higher value added and technology-intensive goods. It requires 
prolonged periods of adaptation during which sizeable invest-
ments, not only into physical but also human capital, are to be 
made. Access of Ukrainian exporters to high-tech European mar-
kets is now blocked not by the existing import tariffs but by the 
incompatibility with the European standards and technical regu-
lations, low level of involvement into the formation of the trans-
national production value chains and industrial co-operation, un-
derdeveloped networks of permanent commercial presence at 
priority segments of the European single market.  
Of course, the very process of European integration has certain 
positive impact on internal development due to the new, more 
demanding institutional standards of the EU. But as the present-
day practical experience of some EU member states proves, they 
cannot prevent failures in economic policy. It is also important to 
take into account that the expected effect in terms of institutional 
development can be attained only in the long run, while consider-
able adaptation expenses may prevail in the short- and medium-
term. Regarding the existing scale of the ‘institutional lag’ in the 
case of Ukraine, it is clear that the amount of state budget re-
courses needed to tackle these problems may exceed the limited 
capacity of the Ukrainian public finance by far.  
This problem may even exacerbate, provided Ukraine’s enter-
ing the DCFTA with the EU is to cause a negative response on the 
part of the Customs Union (CU) of Russia, Belarus and Kazakh-
stan. In fact, the newly enacted (in 2012) multilateral free trade 
agreement of the CIS states has a reservation which enables the 
above-mentioned partner states to initiate a revision of the list of 
exclusions from the free trade regime should the DCFTA cause a 
substantial inflow of imports to the customs territory of the CU. 
Should this happen, the net trade effect for Ukraine might be not 
positive but rather negative in the short- and medium-term per-
                                                 
12 Ibid., (2011). 
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spective, as exports, under such conditions, would suffer consid-
erable losses. Apart from this, some negative side effects might 
follow for Ukraine in other areas as well, i.e. in the field of in-
vestment flows, international labour migration, co-operation in 
science and technology, transit transportation services, etc. 
Under the existence of the above-mentioned limitations arising 
from the Eurointegration course, the Eurasian alternative seems to 
offer a number of ready solutions. The most powerful among 
them is the Russian offer to substantially revise the price forma-
tion for Russian natural gas supplies and suspension of export du-
ties for Russian oil and petroleum products. According to some 
estimates presented by the government officials the gas formula 
revision might result in a USD 4.5 billion yearly gain for Ukraine, 
and the oil export duty suspension in another USD 3.5 billion in 
surplus per year.13  
These preferences might be augmented with more active de-
velopment, under unified Eurasian market regimes, of scientific 
and production co-operation creating a potentially substantial 
economy of scale effects. Apart from this, Ukraine might benefit 
from the access to Russian development programmes that are 
rather abundantly backed by financial resources, not only directly 
but through regional development institutions (i.e. the Centre for 
High Technologies of the Eurasian Economic Community – 
EurAsEC) as well. Last but not least is the factor of the possible de-
creasing of the threat arising from the Russian projects of con-
structing bypass gas transportation routes. 
But, on the other hand, the Eurasian alternative is not free from 
severe challenges to the Ukrainian economy. The risks are linked 
not only to the real threat of a failure of the entire system of 
agreements that have been reached so far with the EU and the in-
evitable regress in their mutual relations (including the regime of 
access to EU programmes and financial resources). Ukraine, un-
der that alternative option, would surely fall into unilateral de-
pendence on the actual level and rate of modernisation in the 
Eurasian member states.  
One might predict the pending erosion of price preferences on 
Russian energy supplies produced by the shift of their extracting 
                                                 
13 Muntijan (2011). One should take into account that these figures are based 
on present-day price and cost situations.  
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base to distant regions, with much more difficult natural condi-
tions and therefore much higher costs. 
But for Ukrainian big business the most serious concern is as-
sociated with a possible side effect of the participation in the 
Eurasian integration communities: the integration of capital mar-
kets within it might easily boost inflows of Russian capital to seize 
control in certain areas which are of strategic interest to Ukrain-
ian business, including aircraft construction, pharmaceutical 
production and other R&D-intensive industries, the energy sector, 
ship-building, communication, computer and engineering ser-
vices. Ukrainian business community has an evidently mixed atti-
tude to this question: a want of extra investments from Russia ver-
sus the fear of Russian investors.  
As the above analysis shows, both alternatives – the EU and the 
Eurasian – need to find a balanced approach in terms of potential 
gains and losses or risks. Though this overall balance taken strate-
gically seems to be more in favour of the EU integration, it is a 
major question how to reach these strategic gains if they are asso-
ciated with considerable medium-term expenses.  
It is beyond doubt that Ukraine could benefit most from such a 
regional integration arrangement, which would combine the 
benefits offered by the two options and simultaneously offset the 
risks hidden in both of them. That is why the Ukrainian govern-
ment seeks the expansion of the field of available opportunities. 
There are several directions along which this search is being per-
formed.  
Firstly, Ukraine tries to expand the network of free trade 
agreements beyond the dilemma of the EU versus Eurasia. Thus, it 
has a valid FTA with Macedonia since 2001, and one within the 
GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) since 2003. 
Of great potential importance is the June 1, 2012 enactment of 
the FTA with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that had 
been signed in June 2010. By its contents, the latter is a DCFTA, in 
many aspects similar to the contents of the agreed DCFTA with the 
EU. Apart from this, Ukraine conducts negotiations or consulta-
tions on FTA with a number of other countries, including Canada, 
Israel, Morocco, Syria, Singapore, and Turkey. By implementing 
this ‘diversification policy’ Ukraine tries to expand its field of 
freedom and facilitate manoeuvre in its relations with its strategic 
partners – the EU and Russia.  
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Secondly, Ukraine is trying to involve China in its strategic 
economic relations, so that a counterpart to any dominating part-
ner should be present. China is acquiring a growing part as 
Ukraine’s foreign source of finance. During 2012, Ukraine re-
ceived two large loans from China totalling more than USD 6.6 
billion (USD 3.656 billion for the programme of substitution of 
natural gas with Ukrainian coal, and USD 3 billion for the im-
plementation of development projects in agriculture).14 And in 
June 2012 a 3-year swap deal for USD 2.36 billion was signed 
between the central banks of the two countries. And at the end of 
August 2012, the Ukrainian President declared Ukraine’s interest 
in acquiring an observer status in the Shanghai Co-operation Or-
ganisation (SCO), in order to take part in the ongoing integration 
processes within this organisation. Moreover, in September 2012 
the President of Ukraine15 added the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) to the list of priorities in regional co-operation.  
Thirdly, Ukraine tries to push through its own vision of co-
operation with Eurasian economic structures which is based on 
the concept of the so-called ‘3+1’ formula. For this reason, a 
Working Group on the matters of development of Ukraine’s inter-
action with the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Rus-
sian Federation was set up by the President of Ukraine in June 
2011.16 Its main task was to work up a strategic paper on this 
matter based on the ‘3+1’ concept. The Working Group proposed 
a strategic vision of this interaction based on sectoral and project 
approaches rather than institutional adaptation. This platform, if 
adopted by all the partners, could provide for far-going coopera-
tion within the Eurasian common economic space, but without 
participation in supranational institutional structures. Unfortu-
nately, this approach was not accepted by the Russian Federation. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be dismissed as a subject for future nego-
tiations, should political and ideological approaches modify.  
Despite all the significance of the above-mentioned institu-
tional and political solutions, the most promising one may be 
connected to the idea of a formation embracing both the EU and 
the Eurasian community. However, a wider pan-European eco-
                                                 
14 However, these were so-called “tied loans” that is with Ukrainian obligations 
of using Chinese supplies, services and technologies. 
15 President of Ukraine (2012). 
16 Ibid., (2011). 
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nomic space may be regarded only in the strategic perspective, 
and is not looking viable under the present geopolitical competi-
tion of Russia and the EU over the spheres of political domination.  
Thus, Ukraine’s regional integration policy has come to a 
crossroads. On the one hand, it almost finalised the process of 
shaping a DCFTA with the EU. But this process, being an integral 
part of an association agreement, has rather vague prospects for 
its official enactment and implementation under the present cir-
cumstances of political development in Ukraine. But even if it 
comes into force, its real effectiveness would be rather question-
able, taking into account the massive distortions in the general 
market environment in Ukraine, mostly because of a huge divide 
between Ukraine and the EU in the quality of their institutions.  
On the other hand, the turn towards the Eurasian Community 
that at first sight, might look easier from an institutional point of 
view, is also questionable because it is seriously restrained by 
Ukrainian fears of being dominated by Russia, with its utterly 
pragmatic and far from excessively co-operative attitude towards 
its partner countries.  
And involvement of third parties like China is also a risky af-
fair, taking into account China’s ability to conquer foreign mar-
kets, not to mention dependencies arising out of indebtedness. At 
that, Russia might be envious of Ukraine’s flirtation not only with 
the EU but with China as well, its rather problematic global ally 
and competitor. 
3) Pan-European Economic Space as a possible 
solution for Ukraine 
The Pan-European Economic Space (PEES) may be imagined as an 
institutional formation consisting of national and regional (or 
subregional) economic systems that are mutually compatible 
though not identical and whose development is co-ordinated via a 
permanent process of economic policy interaction at various lev-
els in the presence of a relatively high level of liberalisation for 
the interflow of economic factors.  
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The basic components of PEES, being a very extensive economic 
space, may comprise of the following:  
 Co-ordination (harmonisation) of the local (regional) regimes 
of liberalisation for the flows of goods, services, investments, 
labour and knowledge – with a possible shaping of a single 
agreement on these issues valid for all PEES participants. 
 Harmonisation of trade policy measures (in addition to the ex-
isting WTO norms) as well as of investment, innovation, labour 
market, and macroeconomic stabilisation policies. 
 Closing the most evident divergences in institutional parame-
ters relating to the development of business, and implementa-
tion of an agreed programme to minimise transaction costs in 
mutual relations. 
 Implementation of common measures aimed at large infra-
structure projects of Pan-European significance, including 
transcontinental transport, communications and ecology con-
trol systems.  
 Support for shaping and functioning of large common projects 
for the development of international production chains, mainly 
in high-tech areas, that require the pooling of resources to 
share the risks associated with high costs.  
The initial stage of PEES development, which is to set up the 
necessary basic prerequisites, is to be characterised, first of all, 
with mutual adaptation and formation of a network of formalised 
relations between various regional and subregional organisations 
and economic unions – to embrace and institutionally link the EU, 
CIS, EAEC, GUAM, SCO, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) – to determine principles, areas and instruments of co-
operation in the solution of common problems.  
At this initial stage, it would be extremely important to deter-
mine correctly a set of major transnational priority projects, 
which would be, on the one hand, large-scale in order to create a  
substantial long-term link of interests, and on the other hand, op-
erable enough to be implemented within acceptable terms and 
without excessive financial burden.  
Should the initial stage prove successful, a more multifarious 
stage of PEES might follow. It would be associated with the forma-
tion of Pan-European institutions regulating transnational eco-
nomic activities, including the creation of a Pan-European Free 
Trade Area (or, possibly, Euro-Asian Free Trade Area), and the 
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gradual (and possibly with certain restrictions) liberalisation of 
capital and labour movement. Regarding the latter, it might ini-
tially be the abolition of the existing visa regimes, and later the 
introduction of a mechanism to regulate migration and employ-
ment. Substantial progress would be needed during this stage to 
create a format for closer economic policy co-ordination, espe-
cially regarding global anti-crisis policy.  
If the above-mentioned stage of PEEC formation proved to be 
successful, it might launch a new stage to finalise the process. It 
would cover the most sensible areas of interaction that require 
prolonged preparatory periods. One could imagine here a com-
pletion of the process of full liberalisation of capital movement 
(perhaps with certain minimal exclusions, if needed) as well as 
the far-reaching liberalisation of labour movement. Among other 
institutional measures, one could imagine an unfolding of the 
network of Pan-European organisations needed for the common 
regulation of key areas of transnational interaction, i.e. in key 
power generation technologies of the future, ecology and transna-
tional communications. One cannot exclude an adoption of a 
common framework pan-European agreement on trade and eco-
nomic issues.  
Of course, the above-mentioned outline has now a rather 
speculative character. To a great extent, the real content of the 
process of establishing a broad pan-European economic structure 
would be dependent on the model employed. And one could 
imagine different alternative models through which the PEES may 
progress.  
The EU seems to follow the political ideology which is based on 
the well-known principle of ‘concentric circles’, or its various 
modifications. The latter, going back to the ideas of Jacques 
Delors, the former President of the European Commission, formu-
lated as far back as 1990,17 regards the EU and primarily its ‘core’ 
member states as a centre around which the whole structure is to 
be built. The peculiarity of this model is that it predicts the weak-
ening of interaction as the distance from the core grows, but it 
preserves its homogeneity due to basic principles emanating from 
the ‘core’. The contemporary ENP may, on the whole, fit well into 
the concept of this ideology, as it calls for the formation of a belt 
                                                 
17 A more recent version of this idea was presented by former French Prime 
Minister Balladur (2005). 
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of the EU Eastern neighbour countries with their active involve-
ment, but not as member states, into European processes.  
However, ENP and EaP proceed from the principle reading that 
granting certain opportunities to the neighbours (partners) is 
linked to the level of progress in the adaptation of the EU regula-
tions within the country. It results in different relations with the 
EU, which cannot but complicate the formation of a broad com-
mon space. Under these conditions, the more a neighbour (part-
ner) country advances on its way towards the EU the more it puts 
at risk its co-operation with post-Soviet regional unions, and thus 
causes counteraction on their part. Apart from that, any forma-
tion of a broad economic space based on the principle of unilat-
eral expansion on the side of the EU is doomed to produce asym-
metric regional structures and, sooner or later, will face the bar-
rier of limited resources causing damped influence of the EU in 
this process.  
An alternative model for the formation of the PEEC might look 
like balanced reciprocal movement towards a common space, 
with two independent but interconnected centres (bipolar Europe 
model). This model takes into account Russia’s self-identification 
as an Eurasian power which is independent in relation to the EU 
and does not obligatory follow in the wake of European legisla-
tion. Nevertheless, if the four common spaces of the EU and Russia 
are to be successfully implemented, it would considerably ap-
proach the solution of many basic problems associated with the 
PEEC formation. However, the model of a bipolar Europe also fails 
to reflect the entire reality of the post-Soviet space, namely its 
complicated and highly differentiated structure. Therefore, taken 
in its pure form, it might not be sufficient for efficient formation 
of a common pan-European economic space. 
Under the condition when a number of regional and subre-
gional unions (organisations) have already spread across the post-
Soviet space, one cannot ignore their more or less active part in 
the process of PEEC formation. Thus, the model of a growing in-
teraction between multiple European regional and subregional 
spaces (multiregional big Europe) seems to be more viable. This 
would require a full manifestation of the principle of openness on 
their part to other countries in Big Europe and their ability to co-
ordinate their activities in order to achieve better synergies. The 
problematic aspect of this model is rooted in the difficulty of se-
curing the sufficient integrity of the thus created common space. 
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To overcome this difficulty, or at least diminish it, a more co-
operative approach would be needed on the part of key partici-
pants, namely the EU and Russia.  
That is why the most realistic way to shape the PEEC is to use a 
sort of an eclectic approach based on a certain pragmatic combi-
nation of the three above-mentioned models, with various pan-
European institutions set up so as to make the process more or less 
cohesive.  
It is also very important to see a wider perspective for the pro-
posed PEEC, which may well evolve into a broad Euro-Asian eco-
nomic space (BEAES) spreading from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It 
would be possible if the SCO were to be involved in the process. 
The SCO has already proclaimed, in its latest summits, its future 
role as a transcontinental bridge between Europe and Asia. There 
are certain signs that the EU is also searching for new approaches 
aimed at achieving synergy between the now segmented actions 
of the EU in three areas of relations – with Russia, EaP member 
countries and Central Asian countries, with the latter playing the 
role of a strategic bridge between Europe and China.18 
For Ukraine, the PEEC model would represent a way out of its 
deficient ‘multivector’ policy – through substituting the present 
geopolitical dilemma of ‘West vs. East’ with the formula ‘both 
West and East’. And the country might play an active role in the 
formation of the proposed PEEC as an essential link connecting 
the EU and the Eurasian space. But to implement this role, it must 
be successfully developing in terms of economy and social sphere, 
thinking strategically and being consistent in its policy. 
 
* * * * * 
                                                 
18 Emerson et al., (2009). 
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RUSSIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: 
MANAGING CONTRADICTIONS 
Annamária Kiss 
1) Overview – The post-Soviet South Caucasus  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world community 
experienced the realignment that has never been before. The 
three republics in the South Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia – declared their freedom as a breakaway from the 
“Kremlin’s imperium.” The whole region was in turmoil. Hopes of 
ordinary people for a better and restful life immediately evapo-
rated. The incongruence between their expectations and reality 
that was coming about in the wake of independence was large 
enough to swap the concept of a “bright future” for a “bright 
past”.1 Their striving for independence and national liberation 
was not what they were looking for… Inexperienced and insular 
politicians and ruling elites had totally neglected civil society-
making, social modernisation, and they were unable to use inter-
nal resources for the benefit of their nation and secure regional 
environment during the years of transition. In the brief period of 
1918–1921 of their independence they already had a chance to 
build viable states, which ultimately failed, but have not disap-
peared without a trace. Notwithstanding, three years seems to be 
                                                 
1 Markedonov (2007). 
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too short for shaping the national awakening into a stable, sound 
state, but that was enough to be a reference point for two coun-
tries in the region. The previous constitutions of Georgia and 
Azerbaijan were renewed in the first half of the 1990’s; ostensibly 
in order to demonstrate a deeply rooted democratic instinct and a 
struggle against oppression.  
After the break-up, the huge discrepancy between state borders 
and nationality borders could not be glossed over anymore; the 
republics had to face the tremendous reality of never-ending wars 
and national animosity.2 As the consequence of ethnical clashes 
and armed conflicts a drastic decline in living standards was seen 
in the eyes of the South Caucasian nations as an outcome of de-
mocracy targeted reforms.3 The Soviet past proved to be nicer, 
better and more convenient; thus, its traditions had been embed-
ded not only in memories and thoughts of the elder generation of 
the Caucasians, but in the behaviour of the ruling political elite. 
To date, authoritarian political culture persists in public opinion 
as in practice. Additionally, Transcaucasian republics’ adherence 
to medieval values as tradition and hierarchy is the evident legacy 
of the past. The “shadow” economy in Soviet times worked well, 
the organised corruption flourished and merged with the political 
system. Kinship played an important – if not the most important – 
role in social traditions, lucrative clan bosses did not hide their 
clout over politicians under the bushel.  
In the history of the South Caucasus two factors played major 
roles in both periods of independence: the strong-handed leader 
and clan consciousness. Although, twenty years had passed after 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the region barely experi-
enced peaceful transitions of power from the government to the 
opposition. In contrast to uncertainty, leaders represented contin-
uum, stability and some kind of “timelessness.” It is deeply rooted 
in the social tradition that people in the Caucasus consider their 
leader to be a person who makes decisions for them, pacifies poli-
tics and guarantees socio-economic stability and national security 
vis-à-vis the anarchy and chaos of the transition years. Nonethe-
less, there is an important difference that distinguishes the first 
independence of 1918 from the second one in 1991: their sover-
eignty was internationally acknowledged in 1991. However, the 
                                                 
2 Hintba (2011). 
3 De Waal (2010). 
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recognition was not satisfactory for state building since people 
were inexperienced in decision-making and democratically 
formed institutions were brittle, if they existed at all.4 Political, 
social and economic dangers together with the legacy of the So-
viet past had to compete with the new trends of international re-
lations, and particularly with the process of globalisation. 
In 1991 the change was fundamental also for Russia: the em-
pire became a post-Imperium.5 At the end of the 20th century 
Russian policy tried to find answers for – apparently evident – 
questions such as “What is Russia?” and “Who is Russian?” Terri-
torial integrity tightly interlinked with the problem of Russian na-
tional identity and its self-identification as an empire (even if the 
Russian term ‘imperia’ now transformed into ‘velikaya derzhava’) 
resulted in that political discourse has shifted from “socialistic re-
alism to geopolitical surrealism,” as Aleksandr Rondeli found out.6 
The fall was unexpected, Russia had not have a strategy concern-
ing how to deal with its ex-member states as completely inde-
pendent entities.  
Russia’s aspirations to spread its interest in the South Caucasus 
countries hold many contradictions. One of them is the term 
“near abroad” constructed in the early 1990’s as a base of a new 
political rule established for ex-Soviet states. The core problem 
was that the ‘atlantist group’ of politicians of these years at the 
same time admitted the primacy of international law and the sub-
ordination of “near abroad” to the Russian Federation.7 Today it is 
more about how one can distinguish legitimate interests of the 
Russian state in the former Soviet republics from illegitimate and 
monopolistic, particularly when it is undoubtedly no longer only 
“Russia’s” sphere of influence. James Nixey – the Head of the Rus-
sia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs – in his latest paper emphasised one of the most prominent 
contradictions in Russian-South Caucasian relations. He argues 
that Russian influence in the cultural and economic sphere is 
higher in those countries where there are no significant resources 
and obvious security interests as in Armenia (and Kyrgyzstan in 
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Central Asia).8 Another contradiction can be found in the Russian 
mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the question of 
whether Russia is interested in a resolution at all. Moreover, Ma-
muka Tsereteli9 bears out that diminished Russian influence in 
Georgia after the 2008 war appears to be ostensible as Russian 
state companies still own remarkable energy infrastructure in the 
country (through Inter RAO UES),10 while they have continued to 
acquire a notable share in the Georgian telecommunication, 
banking and mining sector.11 Remittances regularly sent home 
from Russia by Armenian and Azeri migrant workers contain a 
notable share in their country’s GDP. Contradictions have 
emerged because Russia could not evoke any of its past experi-
ences, due to the fact that it has never had any independent 
neighbours. All through the early 1990’s uncertainty determined 
the Russian security discourse, and the primary task was to hold 
the Russian Federation together. 
Owing to a potential political instability, insecurity, economic 
uncertainty and ethnic conflicts caused by the mutual mistrust of 
these nations (which are mutually correlated), the South Cauca-
sus can be regarded as one of the world’s most vulnerable and 
unstable regions. The level of security, the success in peace reso-
lution and conformity to global economy will determine the fu-
ture of the South Caucasian countries. The republics should con-
tinue to deal with two major issues: strengthening regional secu-
rity and bolstering economic veer. Russia, as the most prominent 
actor in the region, can play an operative role.   
The intent of this paper is to present the main contradictions of 
the relationship between Russia and the three South Caucasian 
countries in the fields of security and economy, in order to under-
stand its limitations. It aims to show the complexity and uncer-
                                                 
8 Nixey (2012). 
9 Mamuka Tsereteli is a Director of the Centre for Black Sea-Caspian Studies at 
School of International Service at American University and also the Executive 
Director of the America-Georgia Business Council. He previously served as an 
Economic Counsellor at the Embassy of Georgia in Washington, covering rela-
tionships with US agencies, international financial institutions and the private 
sector. 
10 The RAO UES – the Unified Energy System of Russia – is one of the largest and 
most important entities in the Russian electricity industry. The Inter RAO is a sub-
sidiary of RAO UES, its most shareholders are Russian state-owned entities.  
11 Tsereteli (2009). 
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tainty of these ties while tries to find out how, if at all, Russian in-
fluence has been transformed from unilateral dependence to in-
terdependence. There is no question of Russian influence waning 
or not, as it is enough to mention the fact that the Russian lan-
guage is becoming more and more unpopular among the younger 
generation of these countries, books in Russian are simply not 
borrowed from the libraries, etc.12 There is an uncertainty of 
whether Russia becomes a responsible or a reluctant stakeholder 
in the region. Even if it is hard to measure the economic and po-
litical influence, since investments are always hidden to some ex-
tent, the question is still important: with the empire gone, how 
long does its influence remain? If in one field the influence is 
waning, will it necessarily spill over into another in the case of 
Russia? 
2)  Political and security challenges 
Security deficit has emerged in the region in recent years.13 After 
the Russian–Georgian war in August 2008 it became clear that 
the West (and first of all the United States of America) is reluctant 
to defend its interests and to invest in the region as Russia, Turkey 
and China in recent years have been doing so. After more than 20 
years the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still causing a headache 
for regional powers; there is a regulation, but not a solution and 
tensions seriously blow up from time to time. Energy security and 
pipeline politics are on the table of everyday discussions, similarly 
to the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces. It concerns not 
only the territories of non-recognised entities, but usually raises 
the question of the need of a Russian military presence in the re-
gion. Although the impartiality of Russian peacekeeping opera-
tions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is doubtful, there are many 
examples of Russia giving up its position. For instance, after long 
negotiations Moscow has demonstrated that it can give up its 
struggle for military presence in the post-Soviet space by with-
drawing from the Azeri Gabala radar station if terms are not satis-
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factory for the country; however, at the same time this step would 
not necessarily harm bilateral relations with Azerbaijan.14 A com-
prehensive, well-targeted and deliberative policy of the European 
Union in co-operation with the concerned regional powers could 
shift the situation from a stalemate but not in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Especially, considering that without Russian approval any 
arrangement has Buckley’s chance to succeed. Western powers 
and Russia should understand that the same denouement cannot 
be reached in different countries with different traditions and 
roots; since ambitions do not necessarily meet conditions. By do-
ing so, they get one step closer to overcoming the deadlock of mu-
tual misunderstanding.  
The three republics located at the crossroads of three regional 
powers (Russia, Turkey, Iran) had no alternative but to deal with 
major changes not only concerning foreign policy, but urgent in-
ternal problems15 too. Suppressed, indigenous tensions between 
nations and nationalities blew up immediately after the break-up. 
Four (Armenian–Azeri, Georgian–Ossetian, Georgian–Abkhaz, 
Georgian civil war) out of eight military conflicts in the post-
Soviet space took place in the Caucasus. Furthermore, three out of 
four “frozen conflicts” existed on its territory (Nagorno–
Karabakh, South Ossetian, Abkhaz), the fact that demonstrates 
well why it still can be named as a crisis prone region. In the early 
1990’s grievous wars escalated between Georgia and South Os-
setia (1991–1992) and between Georgia and Abkhazia (1992–
1993), while the struggle over Nagorno–Karabakh between Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan continued for several years with the aim of 
changing or maintaining the status quo. At the same time, sup-
porting separatist movements in the South and stifling them in the 
North Caucasus (Chechen wars in 1994–1996 and 1999–2000) 
                                                 
14 Markedonov, Sergei. Gabala ne rassorit. 16.12.2010. Accessible:  
http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/content/article/24799824.html  
15 In Georgia first a coup d’état took place – against the authoritarian style of 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia‘s leadership – in January 1992, and for three months the 
country was ruled by rebels. Georgian internal policy split into two, in 1993 a 
civil war broke out. In Azerbaijan three presidents (Ayaz Mutalibov, Ebilfaz 
Elchibey, Heydar Aliyev) followed each other in a rather short period of time, 
since the independence until June 1993. Yerevan was engaged in open conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the change in political course towards the settle-
ment with Baku led to Levon-Ter Petrosyan’s resignation. It seems that in all 
three countries the stability of the state and the popularity of their leaders were 
dependent on the development of ethno-political conflicts. 
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was a tremendous contradiction of Russian foreign as well as do-
mestic policy. One cannot disregard the disruptive potential of the 
North Caucasus, which is strongly interlinked with its South, 
forming what is known as “the Big Caucasus.”16 This means that 
whatever happens in the North, has a direct effect on the South. 
Intentions to unite the South Caucasus in political terms have 
never existed17, thus sub-regional co-operation dealing with se-
curity questions is inefficient. Obstacles such as a brittle govern-
ment and authoritarian leadership, the absence of solutions to the 
conflicts, clan-oriented thinking, postponed or inefficient eco-
nomic reforms, the problem of refugees and IDPs18 are all famil-
iar to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.19  
2.1. Non-recognised entities 
The “predictably unpredictable” situations – to use Thomas de 
Waal’s term – gave birth to a post-Soviet peculiarity called the 
“frozen conflict.”20 These protracted conflicts arose in newly in-
dependent states after the beginning of the post-Soviet era, where 
the directly involved parties were not satisfied by the status quo. 
The resolution is delayed, the escalation of the conflict is limited, 
but there is a high probability of a renewed war. The more these 
secessionist states or entities seek to be widely recognised by the 
international community, the most likely the revisionist approach 
would run into a bloody, lasting armed conflict.  
The existence of non-recognized or partially recognized states 
in the Caucasus should compel one to think about its conse-
quences, since each of its collisions could easily spill over from an 
intra-state conflict into a disruptive, long-term and omnipresent 
                                                 
16 Quoted by Sergei Markedonov. In: Mankoff (2012).  
17 Apart from a short-lived Transcaucasian Federation in 1918. 
18 Internally displaced persons are persons who have been forced to leave their 
homes as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts or serious 
human rights violations. Definition given by United Nations in Guiding Princi-
ples on Internal Displacement (1998). Accessible:  
http://www.idpguidingprinciples.org/  
19 Merlin (2011). 
20 De Waal (2012). 
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danger for the whole region. “Frozen conflicts” can easily turn 
into an open armed conflict, as it happened in the case of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It goes without saying that the so-
called “five-day war” turned to boil not without antecedents. As 
mentioned already, between 1991 and 1993 Georgians fought a 
war against Abkhaz and South Ossetian secession (and at the 
same time a civil war), then the Georgian revisionist claims inten-
sified again in 1998 and 2001 towards Abkhazia and in 2004 
towards South Ossetia. Contradictions of territorial sovereignty 
and the right of a nation for self-identification can be found in the 
core principles of the respected United Nations, as Markedonov 
argues.21 The requirement of self-identification on ethnic grounds 
is becoming more pronounced in recent years, and it concerns 
also smaller nationalities (as Abkhaz or Ossetians) and titular na-
tions such as Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis.  
Russia – as the main guarantor of relative peace during the So-
viet era – does not seem to be as successful as it has imagined in 
securing the three republics under a Russian-led security um-
brella such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO).22 The three republics are going on they separate ways, 
for instance, Armenia is a member state in CSTO whilst Georgia 
and Azerbaijan are not (but the last two are members in 
GUAM).23 Geographic location spurred each country to balance 
its external relations or simply countervail Russian presence with 
the help of other countries; thus, seeking membership in regional 
and international (not only military) organisations became a pri-
mary goal. The reason of joining them was the strong expectation 
of economic and political benefits, notably a support in territorial 
disputes.24 
 
                                                 
21 Markedonov (2012).  
22 Sammut–Paul (2011). 
23 GUAM is an acronym for the organisation of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan 
and Moldova. 
24 Bishku (2011). 
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2.2. The “five day war” and the Russian–Georgian                       
relations 
In the late 1980’s the context of a secessionist idea was rather 
ideological, afterwards it acquired a legislative overtone about 
status. Antagonism turned into armed conflict between January 
1991 and June 1992. Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital was 
stormed by Georgians many times during the conflict and the 
proximity with North Ossetia had a direct impact on Russian se-
curity by giving way to tens of thousand refugees to its territory, 
whose presence caused a serious headache for the government. 
With the signing of the Dagomyss (Sochi) agreement in June 
1992 the conflict was “frozen” until May 2004. At that time, 
Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili announced the possibility 
of renouncing the ceasefire agreement, and shortly after shootings 
and attacks occurred.25 
In August of 2008 – when probably almost the whole world’s 
attention focused on the Olympic games – two “frozen conflicts” 
not only resurfaced but boiled over after two decades of mutual 
misunderstanding and enmity. The five-day war significantly dif-
fered from previous armed conflicts. Russia participated in mili-
tary actions, the West and a CIS country (Ukraine) was actively 
involved as well, and this time the war stepped out from the re-
gional framework and became truly global. The five-day war 
stemmed not only from the hostile relationship between Georgi-
ans and Ossetians; it was more the unavoidable consequence of 
the tense Russian–Georgian relationship.26 Russian–Georgian re-
lations worsened significantly during 2006, when Tbilisi detained 
four Russian officials on spying charges and made a political 
scandal out of it. The Russian response was a ban on Georgia’s top 
export products of wine and Borjomi mineral water in 2006 and 
the cutting out of road, rail, air and sea links between the two 
countries were unequivocal signs of isolation and preludes of the 
war in 2008. After the Revolution of Roses, in the presidential 
elections the main promise of current president Saakashvili was to 
                                                 
25 Markedonov (2008). 
26 Sharashenidze (2012).  
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restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, instead of increasing social 
welfare by decreasing unemployment. Russian backing of Aslan 
Abashidze’s “personal little kingdom” inside Georgia (and the 
presence of Russian troops in Batumi) impeded the centralising 
Georgian government’s dream about a “united Georgia” coming 
true. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have also restrained the unity. 
Hostility already surfaced during the second Chechen war when 
the Russian government blamed Georgia for being a transit coun-
try for supplies entering Chechnya.  
The brief war had long-term effects. It became obvious that 
settlements ensuring the status quo do not work anymore. More-
over, Georgia was forced to give up its project of a “united Geor-
gia” while its top foreign policy priority (NATO membership) 
since the Revolution of Roses was removed from the agenda. Fol-
lowing the August 2008 war the Georgian government has had to 
manage the housing of an estimated 22,000 new internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) who were not able to return to their homes, 
according to the data of the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre.27 This problem dates back to the 1990’s. The political so-
lution of the problem required a large amount of money due to 
the need for a long-term housing solution of an estimated 
270,000 IDPs.28 Russia recognised that its project of CIS does not 
work smoothly; moreover, the CSTO is weak and premature ow-
ing to a lack of collectivity among its member states and the lack 
of clarity regarding joint reactions.29 The five-day war (as well as 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) illustrates well the different reac-
tions of the organisation’s member states, since Ukraine had a 
pro-Georgian rhetoric, and Moldova was cautious in choosing a 
side.30 Russian clout both in military and economic terms became 
widespread over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia was back in 
the region as an ultimate guarantor of peace as in the Soviet 
times. However, it served as more of a “helping hand” in destroy-
ing security that had not been stable even in those years. Over and 
                                                 
27 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, figures in Georgia (19 March 
2012) http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/ 
(httpEnvelopes)/C38CFB59E6593F79C12579C6006DCACC?OpenDocument#
19.2.1  
28 Ibid. 
29 Tolipov (2009). 
30 Markedonov (2008). 
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above, Russia may have the illusion that military strength is a 
primary source of influence in the region.31  
There are several lessons to learn both for the European Union 
and the United States from the conflict of August 2008 and their 
role as reliable stakeholders. Their influence was only limited in 
conflict resolution, in spite of the fact that this is the core task of 
the OSCE. There was not a common strategy or united position 
established. This can be attributed to the fact that the US had a 
strong pro-Georgian policy under George W. Bush, who called 
the country “a beacon of democracy”, while President Obama, 
elected in 2008, rarely discussed publicly the Russian predomi-
nance over partially recognised states, probably in order to avoid 
angering Russian government. 
For Russia, the August 2008 conflict was of course in the one 
hand about teaching Georgia a lesson, but in the other about the 
West more generally. Moscow demonstrated that it would not lag 
behind the events anymore and will step ahead when its vital in-
terests – as the stability in the North Caucasus – are at stake. The 
two countries going on their separate ways, so even if economic 
ties could be recovered, the shadow of disapproval will remain. 32 
2.3. The Nagorno–Karabakh conflict 
The disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh remains the “last 
frozen conflict” in the South Caucasus which has the potential to 
explode as a volcano. Preludes of this conflict go back almost 100 
years and are deeply rooted in the self-identification of both na-
tions, especially in the Armenian remembrance of the Genocide in 
1915. Under the Soviet rule Nagorno-Karabakh was established 
as an autonomous entity within the Azerbaijan SSR in 1923, not-
withstanding it had an Armenian majority population. However, 
this brought the tensions to the surface in 1988, and the bloody 
war lasted six years. Thousands died and were wounded, hun-
dreds of civilians are missing and around 800,000 Azerbaijanis 
from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and 250-300,000 Arme-
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Lukyanov (2012). 
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nians from Azerbaijan and the Armenian border territories were 
forced to flee their homes. Besides indirect consequences, cross-
border shootings remain an everyday problem. 
Armenia – suffering from the long-lasting blockade by Azer-
baijan and Turkey – has a powerful friendly country to rely on: 
Russia. Besides providing economic assistance Russia renewed its 
military presence in August 2010 on Gyumri base until 2044; 
Armenia is the main partner of Russia in CSTO. These facts of de-
pendence undermine the Russian role of an honest broker. Even 
the bright picture of the United States as an impartial mediator is 
challenged. One has to keep in mind that Section 907 of the Free-
dom Support Act bans any kind of economic and military support 
from the United States to Azerbaijan except in certain fields of 
non-proliferation and disarmament. Since the 1994 ceasefire 
agreement Russia – despite of its commitment to Armenia – has 
played a leading role in negotiations within the framework of the 
so-called Minsk Group co-chaired by the United States and 
France. There was a glint of hope for future normalisation 
through the more active mediation of Russia and personally of 
Dmitri Medvedev between 2009 and 2011. At this peak of nego-
tiations 9 trilateral summits were held. Nonetheless, the main ne-
gotiation platform, the OSCE seems to fail on presenting visible 
results; it had not been able to help effectively build up the re-
gional stability leading to a durable peace. The main reasons of 
the failure of the OSCE are to be found in internal disagreements 
over presence and in the lack of a political will to reshape the 
current geopolitical space.   
As regional conflicts intensified, military spending sharply in-
creased especially in Azerbaijan and Georgia. The military budget 
of Georgia not only sharply increased first in 2005 (from 117 
million USD in 2004 to 310 in 2005) but almost doubled in the 
next year. Azerbaijani military spending in 2006 exceeded the 
amount of 1000 million USD, and in 2012 already reached the 
amount of 2,794 million USD. Moreover, this spending on the 
military is by far the largest in the region and is even larger than 
Armenia’s entire national budget.33 
Yerevan finds threatening the high level of Baku’s defence 
spending.34 According to several reports on crisis watch, tensions 
                                                 
33 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. 
34 Nixey (2010). 
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have recently escalated; shooting across the so-called line of con-
tact between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan took place in 
early June 2012. The possibility that tensions will rise further is 
particularly high. The perspective to reopen the Khankendi air-
port (near the capital city of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert) 
only aggravated their uneasy relationship.35 An OSCE representa-
tive warned against the use of force, but the threat of shooting 
down civilian (Armenian) airplanes was constantly voiced by 
Azerbaijan.36  
Figure 1 
Military spending of South Caucasian states, 1992–2011 
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Source: SIPRI military expenditure database. 
2.4. The Safarov case 
The consequences of the Ramil Safarov case – the Hungarian gov-
ernment’s decision to transfer the Azerbaijani murderer of an 
Armenian soldier to his homeland – are far-reaching and may 
trigger the escalation. It not simply harmed Hungarian-Armenian 
relations, but affected Hungary’s international position as well. 
Strengthening economic ties with Azerbaijan – as, for instance, 
the Hungarian–Azerbaijani Intergovernmental Commission and 
                                                 
35Valiyev (2012). 
36 http://news.am/eng/news/130071.html  
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the Hungarian Economic Centre established in Baku indicate – is 
one of the top foreign-policy priorities within the context of the 
government’s so called “Eastern Wind doctrine.” It is obvious that 
a sovereign country can act as its national interests require. None-
theless, experts critical of the Orbán’s administration, such as 
Dariusz Kaáan in the Polish Institute of International Affairs, ar-
gue that the reason of the extradition was a “friendly gesture” 
from the government, which sequentially rejects conditions for a 
new IMF loan while offering to the Azeri government the pur-
chase of Hungarian public bonds within a short time period. 
Kaáan suggests that Budapest subordinated its foreign policy goals 
to short or medium-term economic benefits.37 Others argue that 
the extradition was based on the 1983 Convention of the Council 
of Europe and Azerbaijan violated international law when it uni-
laterally, without the consent of its Hungarian counterpart, par-
doned Safarov.38 Whether the letter that the Hungarian Ministry 
of Public Administration and Justice received from the Azeri Min-
istry of Justice contained no clear guarantees that Safarov would 
remain in prison – as Péter Balázs stated39 – or Budapest simply 
hoped for the best and was misled, remains unclear for the pub-
lic.40 The fact is that Baku already rejected to buy Hungarian pub-
lic bonds, in addition to the criticism of the Hungarian govern-
ment by the United States. The risk of increasing tension in Na-
gorno-Karabakh concerns all the responsible stakeholders of the 
region, mostly the two most important members of the OSCE 
Minsk Group, the U.S. and Russia. Hungary’s action, whether it 
was conscious or unconscious of the outcome, became another 
step back from the rapprochement between Armenians and Azer-
baijanis.  
One can say that containment policy and delimitation is unten-
able, even though Armenians and Azerbaijanis are both intransi-
gent in their position on Nagorno-Karabakh. What matters most 
is that their idea of a “resolution” is completely different. For Yer-
evan it means to play the “time card” with the aim of gaining full 
                                                 
37 Kaáan (2012). 
38 Tör× (2012). 
39 https://cens.ceu.hu/news/2012-09-04/peter-balazs-about-the-extradition-of-
ramil-safarov-in-atv and the written letter received from the Azeri Ministry: 
http://mno.hu/belfold/itt-a-bizonyitek-hazudtak-az-azeriek-1102783  
40 http://hvg.hu/itthon/20120905_Nemeth_tisztaban_voltunk_vele_hogy_Safaro  
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recognition for the entity, whereas Baku strongly demonstrates 
that it has the confidence and readiness to recover its sovereignty 
over the disputed area. However, intimidation remains intimida-
tion. In all likelihood Azerbaijan does not want to launch a full-
scale war tomorrow, it will be too dumb a step to take. Baku 
knows that besides its military capacity the absence of strategi-
cally important resources – such as an informational and lobby 
campaign – are arguments for avoiding getting stuck in a long 
war.41 The potential reconstruction of a railroad – what could 
help Armenia loosen its grip on the blockade – from Georgia 
through Abkhazia has prompted Azerbaijan to immediately pro-
test against it.42 Neither Azerbaijan, nor Armenia is willing to re-
linquish the “politics of hatred” in the foreseeable future. This fact 
became abundantly clear in the light of recent events. There is 
neither war, nor peace. 
Every question in the Big Caucasus becomes harshly political 
and the sides grab every opportunity to come up with their “na-
tional egoism”43 to blackmail or threaten the other side. These 
steps can easily tilt the situation from a stalemate, but unlikely in 
the right direction. The existence of a negotiation process itself is 
a guarantee for peace. It keeps both sides in dialogue and Minsk 
Group maintains the status quo within the framework of the 
OSCE.44 Nevertheless, the stability of the South Caucasus depends 
on the level of trust and willingness of the opposing parties, not 
only of regional stakeholders.  
2.5. Peripheral instability as a threat: the North Caucasus  
The northern side of the Caucasus – seven republics that are in 
majority Muslim45 – pose a direct security threat to the Russian 
Federation. On its far southern territory Russia should deal with 
acute problems in the North Caucasus such as political crises, bad 
                                                 
41 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1593251.html  
42 http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/analytics/Abkhaziya-snova-zheleznaya-doroga.html  
43 http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/content/article/24774140.html  
44 Guidetti (2011). 
45 The seven republics from West to East: Adygea, Karachay-Circassia, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan.  
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governance, a large degree of corruption and armed resistance 
groups (abductions, ill-treatment, homicides, hostage-takings, 
etc.). The marginalised problem of Islamist mobilisation based on 
the brittle structures in the neighbouring republics became inter-
connected within the republics and spread throughout the region. 
The increasing number of terror attacks is significant, but so far 
this is not the only factor causing the diffusion of violence in the 
region.46  
Many Russians feel a kind of mistrust and even xenophobic atti-
tudes are growing towards Caucasian people; they are scared of the 
increasing number of terror attacks in Moscow.47 The association 
“Caucasus-Islam-Terrorism” is far-reaching within the Russian 
population, some experts worry that it exacerbates the alienation of 
the North Caucasus from the Federation.48 Most (in total 68 per 
cent) of the Russian population is afraid of a terror attack and even 
if 39 per cent think that secret services can “more or less protect” 
them from a terror attack, 35 per cent of them think they “rather 
cannot.”49 60 per cent of the respondents answered in 2012 that 
the situation in the North Caucasus was tense and would not 
change in the years ahead.50 Chechnya receives a large amount of 
money from the federal budget as 74 per cent of the North Cauca-
sian republics’ budget is coming from federal resources.51 The rela-
tive peace and stability of Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechnya has its 
price: a tremendous scale of corruption and violation.  
Suspiciousness and fear of Russians spread into the xenophobic 
movement of “Stop Feeding the Caucasus!” (“Hvatit kormit 
Kavkaz!”) in September 2011, and it questioned the existence of 
the North Caucasian republics within the Russian Federation. This 
is well indicated by an opinion poll where 28 per cent of those 
questioned whether they support the slogan or not answered 
                                                 
46 Halbach (2010). 
47 Such attacks as the bombing of the Nevsky Express train in November 2009, 
the suicide bombing of the Moscow subway in March 2010 or the January 
2011 bombing in the arrival hall of Moscow’s busiest airport, Domodedovo. 
48 Dzutsev (2010). 
49 Opinion poll of the Levada Center, March 2012. http://www.levada.ru/30-
03-2012/rossiyane-o-svoikh-opaseniyakh-po-povodu-terroristicheskikh-
aktov-i-situatsii-na-severnom  
50 Ibid. 
51 Kolosov (2010).  
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“definitely yes” and 34 per cent “rather yes”.52 For more than 20 
years the vital interests of Moscow have not changed: to keep to-
gether the Federation and not let the “separatist disease” infect 
other republics and spread throughout Russia. To let the North 
Caucasus go on its own way will not reduce the migration or stop 
the allocation of federal aid. On the contrary, the country would 
pay much higher bills for the chaos. Consequently, it cannot be 
questioned whether Russia should or should not keep the North 
Caucasus within the Federation. It is not a question of choice, but 
of necessity.53 
Moscow’s counter-terrorist campaign against the Caucasus 
Emirate (or Emarat Kavkaz) and personally Doku Umarov54 is un-
compromising. The separatist, radical Islamist terrorist organisa-
tion committed many terror attacks against Russian civilians and 
threatens the existence of the Russian Federation. The Russian 
Federation itself facilitated the spread of violence and extremism 
from Chechnya into all regions of the North Caucasus with its 
cruel actions in the two Chechen wars. The ideological base of the 
Emarat Kavkaz was transformed from a Chechen separatist 
movement to a radical Salafit55 movement. Its strategic goal is to 
fight against everybody who declares war against Islam and Mus-
lims and the notion of establishing an Islamic state based on 
Sharia law in the North Caucasus.56 Moreover, in July 2011 the 
organisation was added to the list of formations associated with 
al-Qaeda by the United Nations Security Council Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban Sanctions Committee..57 Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the Russian government grabs every opportunity to declare its 
                                                 
52 http://www.levada.ru/15-12-2011/rossiyane-ob-obstanovke-na-severnom-
kavkaze-natsionalizme-politike-i-finansirovanii-regio  
53 Markedonov (2011). 
54 It is a self-proclaimed virtual state entity, which was officially announced in 
2007 as partially a successor to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The leader of 
Chechen rebels and the current president is Dokka Umarov. As an Islamic state 
required by Sharia law, it rejects democracy as a system of governing and bans 
every rebel to co-operate with Western countries or negotiate with the Russian 
government. Umarov said that his movement had bases “from Azerbaijan to 
Abkhazia.” 
http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/30/9148.shtml  
55 The Salafit movement is similar to the Wahhabi. 
56 Jihad in Russia (2012). 
57 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE13111E.shtml  
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tough measures in fighting against terrorism. It also emphasizes 
its own success, especially in a decade when Russia shall be a host 
country of many international events, among which the most im-
portant is the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. In October 
2012 Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting and 
stressed the importance of continuing the effective collaboration 
of federal security services with local departments of counter-
terrorist organisations.58 They have an undisputed reason to be 
prepared.59 For the Russian counter-terrorist authorities and the 
Kremlin itself this worldwide event, the 2014 Winter Olympic 
Games will be a litmus test. In addition to conducting a high qual-
ity event, it is more important to guarantee its safety. As a matter 
of fact, it is not enough to prevent a terrorist attack during the 
Olympics, the Russian government should convince the interna-
tional community that there is no reason for any fear. Half-empty 
hotels can cause great harm on Russia’s prestige as well.  
3) Economic challenges 
In terms of economic potential the three South Caucasian coun-
tries did not have the same chances to develop their own economy 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Armenia lacks Georgia’s big 
agricultural potential as well as the large hydrocarbon reserves of 
Azerbaijan. Since 1993 its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan 
have remained closed. Moreover, these countries’ economic struc-
tures were subordinated to Soviet needs. Thus, immediately after 
gaining their independence they have faced a sharp economic de-
cline and recognised the essential need for searching for new 
trade partners to accelerate the diversification of their national 
economies. 
This part of the study seeks to conceptualise how Russian influ-
ence can be detected in the economy of these three countries. Af-
                                                 
58 http://kremlin.ru/news/16658 
59 The Federal Security Service (FSB) in May 2012 found a significant amount 
of weapon caches in Abkhazia. Probably they wanted to be used in terror at-
tacks in Sochi planned by Dokka Umarov.  http://www.interfax.ru/society 
/txt.asp?id=244998  
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ter describing their general economic situation, it examines, 
where it is possible, Russian positions among the top trading part-
ners. Secondly, it analyzes the flow of foreign direct investments 
and credits and Russian shares within them. As a third field, the 
amount and significance of remittances sent home by South Cau-
casian workers from Russia will be studied. Forth, we try to show 
how each country controls its energy industry, the significant 
shares Russian companies have in the gas and oil business or in 
hydroelectric- and/or thermo plants. Next, each country’s case 
study will picture the means and the effects of recent world eco-
nomic crisis. Finally, we will conclude the strength and tendencies 
of Russian presence in the particular South Caucasian economy. 
3.1. Armenia 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan has had a direct 
impact on Armenian economy. A land-locked country with em-
bargo on its economy and post-independence transformation 
problems of the 1990’s had limited routes to choose from. Even 
though an agreement was signed in October 2009 by Ankara and 
Yerevan to establish bilateral diplomatic ties, nothing has 
changed.60 The blockade has necessarily made the country more 
dependent on Russia (and on Iran at its Southern borders) and 
traditionally good relations have been transformed into strong 
economic ties, more precisely into a unilateral dependence on 
Russian commercial support. The Russian airline company owns 
70 per cent of the Armenian Armavia airlines, and the Russian 
Vneshtorgbank has the same percentage of shares in the Arme-
nian Saving Banks. The Russian Railways owns the South Cauca-
sian Railway as its subsidiary and it has been running the Arme-
nian Railway from 2008 onwards.61 Investments in the Armenian 
telecommunication system through the presence of Beeline are 
also notable.62  
                                                 
60 Bishku (2011).  
61 http://www.ukzhd.am/ru_about_company.html  
62Soft Power? ( 2010). 
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Figure 2 
Armenian real GDP growth rates 2000–2011 
(per cent) 
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Source: National Statistical Service of Armenia; http://www.armstat.am 
 
 
Armenia experienced a double-digit economic growth in the 
past years until the global economic crisis hit the country. The 
real GDP dropped by 14.15 per cent in 2009. It was one of the 
deepest declines worldwide, with the nadir of decline in July 
2009 at 18.5 per cent, mostly generated by the decrease in the 
construction industry.63 The nominal GDP decreased in all of the 
three South Caucasian states, but not as sharply – by 30 per cent – 
as in Armenia. Although Yerevan, just as Baku, devaluated its cur-
rency, the costs of previous interventions were high for the Cen-
tral Bank of Armenia.64  
Yerevan’s main export partner is the EU27 with a share of 54 
per cent in 2010, while Russia has 13.3 per cent and Germany 
15.8 per cent in Armenia’s exports.65 The European Union ranks 
first as import partner closely followed by Russia with its 22.6 and 
                                                 
63Khachatrian–Mikaelian (2011). 
64Despite the notable Russian loan, the IMF remained Armenia’s major creditor. 
Statistical Bulletin of the Central Bank of Armenia (2009). 
http://www.cba.am/Storage/EN/publications/statistics/monetary_stat_manu
al/vichtex_09_eng.pdf  
65 Khachatrian–Mikaelian (2011). 
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Turkey with 11 per cent shares. The trend seems to be obvious: 
Russian economic influence measured in trade figures moderately 
dwindled whilst the European Union stepped to the front as a 
trading partner.66  
Figure 3 
Share of major countries of origin 
in cumulative FDI in Armenia in 2010 
(per cent) 
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The level of foreign direct investments (FDI) often correlates 
with the trends of the GDP. So in Armenia, there was a significant 
fall in the amount of FDI in 2008 and 2009 as well and it contin-
ued to slowly decrease even in 2010 and 2011.67 The government 
does not have an easy job attracting foreign direct investment to 
Armenia as the high transport tariffs and cargoes – the direct side 
effects of the blockade – often discourage potential investors.68 
Besides significant amounts of Russian FDI, the Russian Federation 
ensured a 500 million USD loan for the Armenian government. In 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Khachatrian (2011). 
68 Ibid. 
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bilateral means Russia remains Armenia’s main creditor concern-
ing its external public debt stock.69  
Table 1 
Yearly foreign direct investments in Armenia by countries of origin 
(USD million) 
 
 Pre-2003 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Russia 191 68 52 13 154 340 735 385 195 
France 67 9 28 20 16 19 84 197 147 
Greece 134 10 43 49 35 0 0 0 0 
Germany 1 2 39 97 48 67 25 19 22 
US 95 11 12 17 38 31 24 13 6 
Argentina 0 4 24 11 34 18 88 48 30 
Lebanon 4 2 3 12 1 83 19 14 11 
Cyprus 21 5 3 10 16 12 64 7 12 
Canada 111 11 3 1 18 0 0 0 0 
UK 53 6 2 2 3 7 1 0 4 
Switzerland 21 7 0 7 0 2 4 9 11 
Luxembourg 29 1 2 1 3 4 7 22 5 
Italy 13 0 0 0 1 0 0 33 5 
Ukraine 0 0 0 4 4 5 0 0 0 
Netherlands 5 2 2 4 1 2 5 5 4 
Belgium 7 0 5 5 1 1 4 1 2 
Above together 752 138 218 253 373 591 1060 733 454 
Total FDI 876 218 235 304 437 675 1118 752 483 
Source: Armenian Economic Association; http://www.aea.am/econdata.html 
 
 
In 2010 Russia remained the largest foreign direct investor in 
the country, followed by France. Large French investments in the 
telecommunication system seem to continue in the near future.70 
                                                 
69 Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis on Armenia (November 28, 
2011). Accesible: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/dsacr11366.pdf  
70 France Telecom-Orange has invested a sum of 250 million EUR into its Orange 
Armenia subsidiary since its foundation in 2009.  
http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2012/01/26/o
ranges-armenian-investment-tops-eur250m-plans-new-services-for-2012/  
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Figure 4 
Net non-commercial money transfers of individuals  
through commercial banks in 2004–2011 
(USD million) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Armenian Economist, 2012. 
 
 
Remittances play a key role in Armenian economy.71 The share 
of remittances in the GDP was 12.6 per cent in Armenia, the 
highest among the South Caucasian countries in 2011.72 The na-
dir of the non-commercial money transfers of individuals was in 
2009. However, in 2010 the amount of money transfers had 
risen, and almost reached their pre-crisis level.73 Remittances, 
undoubtedly, come to a great extent from Russia. Russian share 
reached 83 per cent in all remittances in 2012 while money 
transfers coming from the USA – where there is a significant 
number of Armenians – was only 5.3 per cent.74  
Between 1998 and 2008 many companies were privatised, es-
pecially in the energy sphere. In 2005 with the aim of repaying 
external debts the government privatised the electricity distribu-
                                                 
71 The Armenian Minister of Economy declared the reality of high amount of 
remittances as more of a challenge than a fostering factor for Armenian 
economy: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/170745/  
72 It was 7.7 per cent in Georgia and 3 per cent in Azerbaijan according to 
2011 data. Annual Remmitances Data of the World Bank, inflows: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS
/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:4
76883,00.html   
73 http://www.cba.am/EN/SitePages/statexternalsector.aspx  
74 http://www.regnum.ru/news/1573269.html  
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tion system which was bought by Russia’s RAO-UES. In April 
2010 the Yerevan Thermal Plant, also with Russian participation, 
was completed and has been activated.75 The Russian state-owned 
company, Inter RAO UES is the sole electricity supplier; through 
Armenian Electric Networks it has 950,000 suppliers in the coun-
try, and also disposes over the Razdansk Thermo Power Plant.76 
The economic crisis hit Armenia strongly; the poverty rate in-
creased to 38.8 per cent in 2008 and it has not changed spectacu-
larly since then.77 Unemployment is particularly high in the South 
Caucasus. The data can vary widely, for instance, for the year 
2011 the percentage was 5.9 according to the CIA World 
Factbook78 and 18.4 according to the National Statistical Service 
of Armenia.79 Russia provided a helping hand to Armenia by 
granting a preferential loan of 500 million USD.80  
Summarising Russian economic influence in Armenia, we 
could undoubtedly ascertain that Russia has a great amount of 
share in almost every field of Armenian economy from import-
export activities, remittances, energy supplies to credits. Although 
there are some examples for significant European involvement, 
such as strong trade links and investments in Armenia and the 
prospects for increasing investments through European Unions’ 
DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement) are 
good, Russia will determine the economic path of Armenia in the 
foreseeable future. 
3.2. Georgia 
In late 2008 the Georgian government had to face a dual crisis of 
an economic downturn and the deterioration of investor confi-
                                                 
75 The CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/am.html  
76 http://www.interrao.ru/activity/foreignact/  
77 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/armenia/overview  
78 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html  
79 http://www.armstat.am/ru/?nid=126&id=08010&submit=%D0%9F%D0% 
BE%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BA  
80 Nixey (2012). 
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dence – mainly due to the August “five-day war” – that resulted 
in the sharp decline of the county’s GDP and FDI figures. Agricul-
ture remains an important sector in Georgian economy as more 
than 55 per cent of its population works in this sphere giving al-
most the fourth of the country’s exports.81 However, its share in 
the GDP has seriously declined since the 1990’s reaching only 8.8 
per cent in 2011, in contrast to the 60 per cent share of the ser-
vice sector.82  
Figure 5 
Real GDP growth rates in Georgia, 1997–2011 
(per cent) 
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Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia; 
http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=119&lang=eng 
 
 
Imbalances could be witnessed in the banking sphere as well, 
since many Georgian banks received loans from American banks, 
bolstering an immediate spread of the crisis to Georgia, and forc-
ing the country to roughly devaluate its national currency, the 
lari.83 
After a record high foreign capital inflow in 2007 – which was 
mainly attributed to the successful fiscal and institutional reforms 
and fight against high-level corruption of the Saakashvili gov-
ernment with the aim of constructing a business-friendly climate 
                                                 
81 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/georgia/overview     
82 The tendency of decline of the agriculture share of total GDP: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/geo_aag.pdf  
http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/269-georgia-gdp-
country-report.html#axzz2EjTUVUJF 
83 Khachatrian – Mikaelian (2011). 
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in the country – the FDI in Georgia has gradually been declining 
in the past years and reached its record low level in 2009 since 
2006 (Figure 6). In 2007 the Czech Republic, the Netherlands 
(engaged in energy and financial sector investment), Britain, Cy-
prus and Turkey were the main sources of FDI inflow.84 In 2010 
the Netherlands became the top investor with its 143.3 million 
USD investments, followed by the United States and Russia with 
its significant investments in Georgia’s transport and communica-
tion system.85  
Figure 6 
Yearly FDI flows to Georgia, 2004–2012 
(USD million) 
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Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia;  
http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=140&lang=eng  
 
 
Russia is not represented among the top export and import 
partners due to the Russian economic sanctions introduced in 
2006 on Georgian economy. In 2011 Georgia’s direct neighbours 
represented the top three export partners, led by Azerbaijan and 
followed by Turkey and Armenia. The list of top export partners 
can be continued with Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the United States, 
while Russia is far behind them and its share even in Georgian 
imports is not significant. 86 In 2012 the order seems to remain 
the same, as Figure 7 illustrates below. China and Germany are 
also among major import sources. 
                                                 
84 Edilashvili (2011). 
85 Ibid.  
86 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html  
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Figure 7 
Share of the top partners of Georgia in total imports and exports, 
January–October 2012 
(per cent) 
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Remittances from abroad play a significant role in Georgian 
economy as well, owing to the fact that the amount of money 
transfers increased almost by a fifth and constituted 6 per cent of 
the country’s GDP in 2011 based on official Georgian statistics. 
200,000 Georgians work in Russia – out of the 250–300,000 
people (according to several sources it can be 1 million as well) 
who work abroad. A notable 65 per cent of all remittances come 
from Russia. What matters most, remittance flow was barely re-
duced during the economic crisis and immediately recovered in 
the post-crisis period.87 
Table 2 
Remittances to Georgia, 2003–2010 
(USD millions) 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inward remittance 
flowsa 236 303 346 485 695 732 714 824 
of which   
Workers’ remit-
tances 64 64 94 153 245 305 317 - 
Compensation of 
employees 168 236 247 315 406 419 391 - 
Migrants’ transfers 3 3 5 17 45 8 5 - 
a) For comparison: net FDI inflows USD 1.6 bn, net ODA received USD 0.9 bn, 
total international reserves USD 1,5 bn, exports of goods and services USD 3.7 
bn in 2008. 
Source: World Bank database; www.worldbank.org 
 
 
Prior to the 2008 five-day war Georgia had a serious presage 
to a grave break with Russia after 2006, as it has been mentioned 
already. Admittedly, the Russia-Georgia 2008 war has caused a 
long-lasting setback on Georgian economy directly and indirectly. 
The country successfully reshaped its energy supplies by renovat-
ing its hydropower plants and increasing its natural gas imports 
coming from Azerbaijan – instead of Russia – through the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and oil imports via the alternative 
                                                 
87 The Role of Remittances in Georgian Economy (2011). 
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route of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.88 Although the physical 
damage of the pipelines in the five-day war was not significant, 
the war undermined Georgia’s reliability as a responsible, well-
functioning energy-transit state and has questioned the future 
pathways of the European energy system even if for a relatively 
short period of time. The mistrust seems to have diminished. 
However, contrary to what one would expect, investments of Rus-
sian state-owned RAO UES in the Georgian electricity system are 
still significant, nothing has changed since the open conflict. 
Tsereteli rightly emphasises that the signing of a memorandum of 
joint management over the Enguri Hydroelectric Power Plant 
(HPP) in December 2008 had seriously diminished the chances 
for the Georgian government to diversify its electricity supplies.89 
The main problem is that even if the Georgian officials argue that 
the Enguri HPP is in their hands, the fact that the electricity pro-
duction plant is located in Abkhaz territory (therefore, controlled 
by Russian authorities) undermines statements like this.90 This is 
supported by the fact that Inter RAO UES also has management 
rights on Khrami HPP-1 and Krami HPP-2, both located in South-
ern Georgia and operating even now.91 Furthermore, the Tbilisi 
Electricity Distribution Company (Telasi) was sold to the same 
Russian company in 2003, so Russia owns and operates a com-
pany which supplies electricity to the Georgian capital and has 
466,895 suppliers throughout the country.92 This demonstrates 
the high level of unilateral energy dependency on Russia.  
The 2008-2009 financial crisis led to an increase of budget 
deficit and government debt coupled with a decline of exports, 
foreign investments and the current account balance in Georgia, 
too. Decline in remittance flow was not notable, while the rapid 
deterioration of the exchange rate jeopardised macroeconomic 
stability.93 
                                                 
88 Even though according to the World Bank only 12 per cent of its hydro-
power potential has been utilised to date. 
89 Tsereteli (2009). 
90 http://dfwatch.net/enguri-hydro-power-station-is-still-on-georgian-hands-49699  
91 http://www.georgianews.ge/business/147-khrami-2-back-to-operation-
after-12-years.html  
92 http://www.interrao.ru/activity/foreignact/  
93 Rahmanov–Valiyev (2011). 
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All in all, Russian influence in Georgia has diminished consid-
erably since the fall of the Soviet Union, but by contrast it has in-
creased to a high extent in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia 
no longer imports Russian energy for domestic use, however, Rus-
sia still has important investments in the Georgian energy sphere 
even though after 2008 some contracts were delayed. Hostility in 
political relations has its impacts on the economy, even though it 
has never been an excluding reason for investment interactions. 
3.3. Azerbaijan 
Russia’s influence and penetration in the economy of Azerbaijan 
cannot be felt as much as in the other two countries of the South 
Caucasus because of its relatively low degree of dependency in 
energy sphere since the BTC was opened in 2003 and began ex-
porting in mid-2006.  
 
Table 3 
Main trade partners of Azerbaijan in 2010 
(USD million) 
 
 Turnover % Import % Export % Trade balance 
Italy 7 215.5 25.8 118.3 1.8 7 097.2 33.3 6 979.0 
France 1 992.6 7.1 136.1 2.1 1 856.5 8.7 1 720.4 
Russia 1 918.5 6.9 1 145.0 17.3 773.5 3.6 -371.4 
Israel 1 804.2 6.5 59.4 0.9 1 744.8 8.2 1 685.5 
USA 1 744.8 6.2 206.3 3.1 1 538.6 7.2 1 332.3 
Ukraine 1 354.1 4.8 465.5 7.1 888.6 4.2 423.2 
Turkey 942.2 3.4 771.3 11.7 170.9 0.8 -600.4 
China 926.0 3.3 587.2 8.9 338.8 1.6 -248.3 
Croatia 789.1 2.8 1.9 0 787.2 3.7 785.3 
Indonesia 788.5 2.8 6.4 0.1 782.2 3.7 775.8 
Total above 19 474.9 69.6 3496.6 53 15 977.9 75 12 481.3 
Total 27 924.1 100 6 599.3 100 21 324.8 100 14 725.4 
Source: State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan; http://www.azstat.org 
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Azerbaijan’s high hydrocarbon reserves were the main reason 
for the significant inflows of foreign investments during the 
1990’s, which contributed to the country becoming the largest 
recipient of FDI in the South Caucasus region. Furthermore, Azer-
baijan’s FDI per capita was twice larger compared to the CIS and 
Central European average through 2010.94 According to UN Con-
ference on Trade and Development data, foreign direct invest-
ments to Azerbaijan sharply declined in 2007 and hardly recov-
ered in recent years (Figure 8). About 88 per cent of the total FDI 
went to the oil industry, while the fact that non-oil FDI inflow 
showed a rough decline in the past decade is also important.95 As 
it is seen in Table 4, Russia is not among the top countries of 
Azerbaijan’s non-oil FDI sources. 
Figure 8 
Yearly foreign direct investments to Azerbaijan, 2000–2011 
(USD million) 
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Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), WIR 2010 
 
 
Baku’s potential of natural gas production is huge and after the 
start-up of the Shah Deniz gas-oil field the country became a net 
gas exporter in 2007. The share of the Russian company, Lukoil in 
the consortium is not substantial, but with the Russian govern-
ment doubling its gas imports from 1.5 to 3 billion cubic meters 
starting from 2013 Russia will become the second biggest gas im-
porter of Azerbaijan after Turkey.96 Oil exports to Russia via 
Baku-Novorossiysk are also complicated because of an ongoing 
dispute over transportation tariffs between SOCAR and Transneft. 
                                                 
94 Hübner (2011). 
95 Ibid. 
96 http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2012/january/article128158/  
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According to the Energy Information Administration approxi-
mately 45,000 barrels/day were transferred through this pipeline 
in 2010.97  
Table 4 
Yearly non-oil FDI and accumulated FDI in Azerbaijan 
by major countries of origin, 1993–2010 
(USD million) 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1993-2010 (%) 
Turkey 96.2 136.6 109.2 60.8 76.8 81.1 29 
USA 24.8 70.0 78.0 108.8 117.6 124.2 18 
UK 39.5 39.1 80.0 146.4 160.0 169.0 16 
Germany 21.5 17.4 22.9 48.2 38.8 41.0 5 
UAE 5.7 18.3 12.3 38.5 43.2 45.6 4 
Other countries ... ... ... ... ... ... 28 
Source: Caucasus Analytical Digest 
 
Figure 9 
Real GDP in Azerbaijan, 2000–2011 
(USD billion) 
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Source: State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, http://www.azstat.org 
 
 
As a consequence of the downfall of oil prices in 2009 tax re-
ceipts also decreased. Therefore, as it can be seen in Figure 10, the 
State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) increased its contributions 
to the state budget in recent years in order to accelerate economic 
growth. 
                                                 
97 Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Brief (2012) 3. 
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Figure 10 
SOFAZ transfer as a percentage 
 of state budget revenues, 2003–2011 
(per cent) 
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Source: State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, www.oilfund.az (Annual Report, 2011) 
 
 
Given the facts that Azerbaijan’s potential is essential for the 
international community as an oil and gas exporter country and 
the era of high economic growth of 2006–2008 seems to be over, 
the Azeri government should bolster non-oil economic develop-
ment and diversification of its economy to avert its rough conse-
quences.98 
Among the top 10 trade partners of Azerbaijan Russia ranked 
third in 2010; it was the main source (with a 17.3 per cent share) 
of imports, and a relatively low (3.6 per cent) share in exports 
according to the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan.99 
A strong recovery in remittances after 2009 occurred in Azer-
baijan, but there is a meaningful discrepancy between official fig-
ures of the State Statistic Committee of Azerbaijan and the Central 
Bank of Russia as a Centre for Economic and Social Development 
(CESD) survey found out. According to CESD experts, the amount 
of remittances is no less than 2 billion USD per year. More than 
                                                 
98 In order to read a comprehensive, deep analysis of Azerbaijan’s energy sector 
and problems of its reliance on energy exports see: Szigetvári Tamás: Azerbaj-
dzsán gazdasága és az energiaszektor (Kelet-Európa Tanulmányok 4. szám, 
2008. MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet)   
http://www.fakprojekt.hu/docs/Szigetvari%20-%20Azerbajdzsan.pdf  
99 http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2011/en/018.shtml  
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80 per cent of total remittances come from Russia.100 This seems 
to be confirmed by the EBRD reports on remittances, stating that 
the overwhelming majority of non-commercial money transfers 
was accomplished from Russia in 2006.101 
Azerbaijan has managed the recent global crisis much better 
than Georgia and Armenia due to high oil revenues. However, 
although the country had successfully avoided a budget deficit, 
the high growth of external debt, the serious fluctuation in the 
current account balance, the sustainability of the positive trends is 
challenged by the fluctuation of oil prices and the forced extrac-
tion at the same time.102 The Azerbaijani budget was in surplus in 
spite of the worldwide recession, while its government debt also 
increased similarly to Armenia and Georgia in 2009.103 
 
Figure 11 
General government fiscal balance in South Caucasian countries 
(per cent of GDP) 
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Source: Rahmanov-Valiyev (2011). 
 
                                                 
100 Remittance From Russia to Azerbaijan Increased (Centre for Economic and Social 
Development, 22 May, 2012) Available: http://cesd.az/new/2012/05/remittance-
from-russian-to-azerbaijan-increased/  
101 European bank for Reconstruction and Development: Survey on Remittance Flows 
(last updated 22 June, 2010) http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/where/etc/sur-
vey.shtml  
102 Rahmanov–Valiyev (2011).  
103 Ibid. 
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As opposed to Soviet times, Russia has little direct control in 
Azeri economy nowadays. Russia is still representing the main 
source of imports, and remittances sent home from Russia are no-
table. Nonetheless, Russian-Azeri ties are not as tight as they were 
two decades ago, Baku takes great advantages from its growing 
energy export potential. However, Russia will become Azerbai-
jan’s second biggest gas importer from early 2013 onwards.  
4) Conclusions 
The empire is long gone, but consequences of its fall remain and 
shape the current Russian policy towards the South Caucasus. 
Whilst in our globalised world of cross-border interactions when 
the physical borders are gradually eroded and the supranational, 
multithreading “networks” covering almost the whole planet are 
gaining more and more ground, for Russia this seems to be incon-
gruous. Trans-border threats are more likely to emerge on its ter-
ritory when international crime is rising, migration and illegal 
arms trafficking flourishes and the spread of radical Islam is ac-
celerated.  
It is particularly hard to distinguish valid interests of a nation 
state from desirable dominance. Russia demonstrates the use of 
“hard power” and “soft power” at the same time. A good example 
of the use of the “hard power” was the Russian-Georgian “five-
day war” when Moscow made it clear what it was not for but 
against. Russian “soft power” as a tool of influence is more about 
shaping identities and increasing economic presence.104 In the 
South Caucasus it can be witnessed undoubtedly in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. This kind of power includes the so-called “passpor-
tizatsiya,” beneficial extensive contracts and agreements with the 
separatist governments, investments in tourism and the healthcare 
system, the purchasing of real estates. Cultural promotion is 
probably its main content; increasing Russian language learning 
in schools encourages feelings of familiarity. Moscow is ready to 
give legal assistance to non-recognised states and many Russians 
                                                 
104 Soft Power? (2010).  
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were sent to work in the administrations of the separatist gov-
ernments etc. Thus, two entities are fully dependent on Russia.  
A government sometimes makes bad decisions while following 
the country’s national interests, nonetheless, one should take into 
consideration that the Kremlin is also able to recognise its own 
limitations. Russian pullout from the Gabala radar station was not 
the first sign of Moscow’s willingness to give up military presence 
on the territory of one former Soviet republic that can be a posi-
tive trend to continue. 
A comprehensive resolution of the South Caucasian economic 
and security problems rests on the political will of the three af-
fected countries and the main stakeholders. Russia should recog-
nise that ambitions of an empire do not coincide with today’s 
conditions; tactics of the Soviet era towards ex-republics will not 
fully work when they are internationally recognised, sovereign 
states. Moscow can play a dominant role in those spheres of these 
countries, where they are not strong or independent enough as 
energy in Georgia or almost in every field of the vulnerable Ar-
menian economy and security. A huge dependency on pipeline 
and land routes still remains, but it is decreasing related to Azer-
baijan (and even becomes a benefit of Baku in gas supply). Rus-
sian influence is also increasing through the South Caucasian 
Railway with a potential to build up the infrastructure in the 
whole region. With the start of the negotiations between the 
European Union on the one hand, and with Georgia and Armenia 
on the another, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agree-
ment (DCFTA) can bring not only liberalisation of trade but it also 
contains long-term objectives of harmonising trade-related legis-
lation to meet EU standards. But this process is very slow. Al-
though Russia needs to accept a more limited role, it also 
launched its projects on post-Soviet reintegration, affecting per-
haps most of Armenia from among the three countries. The effec-
tiveness and outcome of both initiatives are hard to be evaluated 
at the moment. The other regional stakeholder, Turkey – having a 
huge and growing economic potential – can help develop me-
dium-sized businesses in the South Caucasus countries.105 
Direct security threats represent a great concern to a post-
Imperium such as the Russian Federation, obviously because it is 
                                                 
105 De Waal (2012). 
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afraid of turmoil as it was after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Hence, Moscow is not truly interested in a resolution of the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict. Naturally, a full-scale war would not 
have any winners, the result could only be a long-lasting up-
heaval where Russia should take a side and would have to make 
many financial sacrifices. A mutually acknowledged resolution 
does not seem to be reachable in the foreseeable future. The 
struggle to guarantee Abkhazian, South-Ossetian and Armenian 
security means a lot in the context of fighting against North Cau-
casian disengagement. To hold the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States (CIS) together or at least most of its ex-members re-
mains the number one foreign policy goal for Russia. In addition, 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a regional 
security organisation and the forming economic integration with 
the aim of creating the Eurasian Union could benefit from the re-
maining ties of the Soviet legacy. These two regional integration 
groupings are of outstanding importance for the Kremlin.  
Economic ties could recover more easily than political ones. 
They are still very strong due to the legacy of the Soviet past and 
recent Russian intentions to acquire considerable positions in the 
three economies. However, the more attractive Western values 
and conceptions compete with usual and well-established old 
Russian ones, the South Caucasian countries should choose the 
most beneficial path in favour of their economic prosperity and 
political stability. 
 
* * * * * 
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ITALY-RUSSIA RELATIONS: POLITICS,                       
ENERGY AND OTHER BUSINESSES 
Marco Siddi  
Introduction 
Italy is one of Russia’s key partners in Europe. Although Rome has 
been part of Western economic and military integration struc-
tures since the immediate post-war period, it has always main-
tained a positive dialogue with Moscow, resulting in numerous 
economic partnerships and friendly bilateral relations. Within 
NATO and the European Union, Italy often advocates policies 
which take into account Russian interests and attempts to include 
the Kremlin in discussions concerning the main European security 
issues. In the energy field, Italy is one of the main supporters of 
co-operation with Russia, as shown by the active involvement of 
the main national energy company ENI in numerous joint ven-
tures with Gazprom and other Russian partners. Also when the 
political forces in power in both countries changed, Italian-
Russian relations witnessed remarkably little variation in quality 
and substance. A further improvement in the relationship took 
place during the Putin era, mostly due to Russia’s economic 
growth and the new opportunities for Italian entrepreneurs to 
make business in the large and still growing Russian market. 
This analysis argues that economic ties constitute the core of 
the partnership between Rome and Moscow. The mutual interest 
in economic co-operation and the lack of controversial political or 
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historical issues greatly facilitates bilateral relations. Cultural co-
operation and several civil society initiatives have recently con-
tributed to the increasing interest of many young Italians and 
Russians in each other’s country. For instance, 2011 was the year 
of Italian language and culture in Russia and the year of Russian 
language and culture in Italy. In both countries, celebrations for 
the event were accompanied by a considerable number of cultural 
and economic initiatives.1 
The quality of Italy-Russia relations has inevitable repercus-
sions in the multilateral forums where the two countries are rep-
resented. Italy is the fourth largest economy in the European Un-
ion after Germany, France and Britain.2 It is also one of the found-
ing members of both the EU and NATO. Russia is the largest econ-
omy and a main military actor in the post-Soviet space and is also 
considered a member of the BRICS, a group of large and fast-
growing economies that includes also Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa. For Moscow, Italy is a very friendly and pro-Russian 
member of the European Union, which constitutes the world’s 
largest economic bloc and is also by far Russia’s main trading 
partner. For Rome, Russia is the pivot of the Italian economic 
strategy in the entire post-Soviet space, as well as a key factor in 
European security matters. The recent development of Russia-led 
integration structures in the post-Soviet space, most notably the 
Customs Union and the Eurasian Union, has reiterated Moscow’s 
importance for all external actors that plan to do business in the 
region. Italy’s co-operative approach to Russia is promising in 
terms of its future involvement in this area, which is one of the 
world’s richest in fossil fuels and natural resources. 
1) History and political relations 
History does not play a major role in current Russian-Italian rela-
tions. This is due to the lack of unresolved controversies from the 
past and the geographic distance between the two countries 
which led them to orient themselves towards different areas of 
                                                 
1 Special issue of The Moscow Times (2011). 
2 World Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund 
(2011).  
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influence throughout the majority of their history. The last mili-
tary confrontation between Italy and Russia took place during the 
Second World War when Fascist Italy sent an army to support the 
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Italy’s participation in the ag-
gression did not leave a lasting impact on either Russian or Italian 
collective memories, except for the waning recollections of veter-
ans who had taken part in the disastrous rout of the Italian Royal 
Army.3 Unlike many East-Central European countries, Italy does 
not challenge Russia’s foundational narrative of the ‘Great Patriot-
ic War’, which celebrates Moscow’s contribution to the defeat of 
Nazism and the liberation of Europe. 
At the end of the Second World War, Italy did not experience 
Soviet occupation and was solidly anchored in the Western mili-
tary and economic camp. Due to its distance from the main sce-
narios of East-West confrontation, its geopolitical role during the 
Cold War was not of primary importance. The existence of a 
strong Italian Communist Party – it was the second political party 
for number of votes from the 1950’s to the early 1990’s – consti-
tuted a considerable political link to Soviet Russia, notwithstand-
ing the fact that Italian Communist leaders had been gradually 
distancing themselves from Moscow in the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
Furthermore, political differences were not a hindrance for the 
establishment of friendly relations. Christian Democratic govern-
ments in Italy and businessmen such as ENI’s founding father En-
rico Mattei were eager to seek economic co-operation with the 
Soviet Union from the 1950’s onwards. To mention just two ex-
amples, the Italian energy company ENI accessed the Russian 
market back in 1969, as one of the first Western companies to 
conclude an energy supply contract with the Soviet Union.4 The 
Italian automobile manufacturer FIAT began its production of cars 
in the USSR in 1970, when its factory in Togliattigrad delivered 
the first Zigulis. The FIAT Zigulis would become the symbol of the 
‘car age’ in the USSR.5 
The political chaos following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the economic slump of the Yeltsin years temporarily hindered 
                                                 
3 The most well-known biographical account of the event is the one authored 
by Mario Rigoni Stern (2005). 
4 The 40th anniversary of Russian gas supplies to Italy, Gazprom’s official website.  
5 “Togliatti e l’auto di massa. La Ziguli’ invade l’URSS.” La Repubblica,  
http://www.repubblica.it/online/auto_prima/fiat100anni/sei/sei.html 
(accessed on 22 October 2012). 
Marco Siddi 76 
the development of the economic partnership between Moscow 
and Rome. A swift improvement of political relations and a steady 
increase of bilateral trade took place with the advent of the Putin 
era. Political stabilisation and especially the rapid growth of the 
Russian economy attracted Italian investors. Simultaneously, Putin 
developed a tight personal relationship with Italian Prime Minis-
ter Silvio Berlusconi, who became one of the most ardent advo-
cates of co-operation with Russia within both the European Union 
and NATO throughout his career in power (2001-2006 and 
2008-2011).6 In the early 2000’s, Italy facilitated Russia’s ap-
proximation to NATO security structures. At a summit held at 
Pratica di Mare (near Rome) in May 2002, NATO and Russia es-
tablished the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The Council provides a 
forum for consultation, consensus-building, joint decisions and 
actions, where individual NATO member states and Russia co-
operate as equal partners on a wide spectrum of security issues.7 
 The summit at Pratica di Mare created an atmosphere of co-
operation between Russia and NATO, which Italian leaders later 
labeled as the ‘Pratica di Mare spirit’. Berlusconi took special 
pride in having hosted the event and made the consolidation of 
good relations between Russia and NATO one of his main foreign 
policy goals. He renewed his efforts in this respect in the months 
that followed the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, 
when tensions between NATO and the post-Soviet Russia reached 
an unprecedented peak. The success of Berlusconi’s diplomatic 
efforts is highly disputed, mostly due to Italy’s and his own limited 
influence within the Atlantic Alliance. However, the fact that he 
was the only head of government to attend and speak at the 
NATO-Russia summit at Corfu in June 2009, where a reset of the 
relationship was discussed, is evidence of his personal commit-
ment to the topic.8 
Berlusconi’s career as Italy’s Prime Minister had come to an 
end in November 2011, when his government was replaced by a 
cabinet of technocrats headed by former EU Commissioner Mario 
Monti. Prior to his appointment, Monti had expressed critical 
views on Italy’s bilateral relations with Russia and declared his 
                                                 
6 See also N. Arbatova (2011) 13. 
7 “NATO-Russia Council.” NATO website. 
8 “Vertice NATO a Corfù. Berlusconi media tra i grandi.” Il Tempo 28 June 2012. 
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preference for policies agreed upon at EU level.9 Nevertheless, 
once in power he did not alter the substance of the partnership 
between Rome and Moscow. During his visit to Russia in July 
2012, Monti supported ENI’s commitment to build the gas pipe-
line ‘South Stream’ in a joint venture with Gazprom, a project that 
met with considerable criticism at EU level. He also supervised the 
signature of several agreements that should enhance economic 
partnership in the banking and insurance sectors and in fields 
such as tourism and the construction industry.10 In September 
2012, Rome and Moscow went as far as organizing a 10-day joint 
military exercise, a remarkable example of security co-operation 
between Russia and a NATO member state.11 
2) Economic relations 
2.1. Trade volumes 
Over the last ten years, Italy-Russia trade relations witnessed a 
remarkable increase, the only exception being a serious contrac-
tion at the start of the 2008 financial crisis. In 2002 the total val-
ue of bilateral trade had stood at 11,715 million euros; by 2007 it 
had doubled, and it reached a peak of 26,557 million euros the 
following year. Due to the crisis, trade decreased by nearly one 
third in 2009 (down to 18,574 million euros), but started grow-
ing again – at an even faster rate than before the crisis – in 2010. 
Already in 2011 the peak of 2008 was exceeded, with a recorded 
27,357 million euros of trade. The data for the first eight months 
                                                 
9 “Mario Monti – La Russia e il ricatto energetico.” Interview with La 
Repubblica, 17 January 2007, available at  http://video.repubblica.it/ 
copertina/mario-monti-la-russia-e-il-ricatto-energetico/6227/8653 
(accessed on 22 October 2012). 
10 “In Russia, Monti rafforza la partnership col Cremlino.” Meridiani Relazioni 
Internazionali 24 July 2012. 
11 Similar maneuvers involving reconnaissance units took place also in 2011 in 
Russia. “Russia, Italy start joint reconnaissance drills.” ITAR TASS 12 September 
2012. 
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of 2012 show a further increase of 908 million euros compared 
with the same period of 2011.12 
 Figure 1 shows the data for Italy-Russia trade, divided into 
goods exported from Italy to Russia and goods imported into Italy 
from Russia. The volume of export from Russia to Italy has con-
stantly been much higher than the other way around, and the gap 
widened at a greater pace in 2010 and 2011. This difference is 
shown by the continuous line in the graph, which highlights the 
problem of negative balance of bilateral trade for Italy. In 2011 a 
peak deficit of 8,727 million euros was reached. 
 
Figure 1 
Yearly volumes of trade between Italy and Russia 
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As emerges from the analysis of the 2011 data, this difference 
is entirely due to the size of Italian energy imports from Russia. 
Gas and oil imports constitute 41.2 per cent and 28 per cent of 
total Italian imports from Russia, respectively. A further 13.7 per 
cent comes from other oil products and another 1.9 per cent from 
anthracite. All energy and energy-related imports combined ac-
count for 84.8 per cent (15,402 million euros) of total Italian im-
ports from Russia. The remaining 15.2 per cent of imports comes 
mostly from the Russian steel industry (4.4 per cent), metals and 
                                                 
12 Rapporti economici Italia-Russia (2012) 2. 
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nuclear fuel (3.5 per cent) and chemical products (3.3 per cent). 
Between 2010 and 2011 the value of energy-related imports in-
creased: gas imports increased by 39.1 per cent (from 5.3 to 7.4 
billion euros), oil imports by 13.7 per cent (from 4.4 to 5 billion 
euros) and the imports of other oil products by 19 per cent (from 
2 to 2.4 billion euros). Imports of chemical products also regis-
tered a remarkable 42.4 per cent increase (though the figures 
were much smaller, from 0.4 to 0.6 billion euros), but imports of 
steel products and metals/nuclear fuel dropped by 3 per cent and 
16 per cent, respectively (from 0.82 to 0.8 billion euros and from 
0.65 to 0.55 billion euros).13  
Italian exports to Russia are more diverse. In 2011, various 
types of industrial machinery accounted for 26.9 per cent of total 
exports (2,502 million euros), followed by products of the cloth-
ing industry (15.9 per cent, 1,478 million euros), furniture (6.4 
per cent, 596 million euros), cars, commercial vehicles and relat-
ed equipment (5 per cent, 467 million euros), machinery for do-
mestic use (2.4 per cent), other metal products (2.2 per cent) and 
pharmaceuticals (2 per cent). In the same year, most sectors rec-
orded an increase in the value of exports, with a +68.6 per cent 
in pharmaceuticals, +24 per cent in industrial machinery, +21.9 
per cent in the clothing industry, +17.6 per cent in cars, com-
mercial vehicles and related equipment and +11.1 per cent in ex-
ports of furniture.14 
Overall, fossil fuels make up most of the trade from Russia to 
Italy and recent trends show that their weight is further increas-
ing. Although industrial machinery and manufactured products 
together account for 42.8 per cent of the total trade, trade from 
Italy to Russia is more diversified and the different categories are 
growing at a similar rate. The type of goods traded highlights the 
complementarity of Italy’s and Russia’s productive systems: Rome 
relies heavily on imports of fossil fuels from abroad, whereas 
Moscow needs Western technology (such as industrial machin-
ery) to modernise its economy. 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 3. The increase in value of energy-related imports was due mostly to an 
increase in volume (as opposed to a simple rise of oil and gas prices). The polit-
ical crises and instability in North Africa during the Arab Spring, an alternative 
supply region for Italy, explain these variations. 
14 Ibid. 3. 
Marco Siddi 80 
2.2. FDI 
Italian foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia increased expo-
nentially during the last decade. In 2004 it was only 57 million 
euros; by 2010 it had reached 972 million euros. The peak of Ital-
ian FDI in Russia was reached in 2008, with 1,183 million euros. 
Russian FDI in Italy also grew considerably, from a mere 1 million 
euros in 2004 to 865 million euros in 2008. However, following 
the beginning of the crisis it dropped to 343 million euros in 
2009 and to only 74 million euros in 2010. If we sum up the data 
for Italian and Russian FDI in the respective partner country for 
the period between 1992 and 2010, we can observe that Italian 
FDI in Russia (2,861 million euros) was approximately twice as 
much as Russian FDI in Italy (1,427 million euros).15  
Based on the yearly data of 2011, Italy was the second European 
Union country (after Germany) in terms of foreign investments in 
the Russian market, accounting for 4.58 per cent (13.6 billion euros) 
of total foreign investments in Russia. If all foreign state actors in the 
Russian market are taken into account, Italy ranked fourth; it was 
preceded by Germany (15.35 per cent), China (13.9 per cent) and 
Ukraine (6.57 per cent), but was ahead of countries such as Japan 
(4.23 per cent), France (3.19 per cent) and the United States (2.96 
per cent).16 As Figure 2 shows, the size of business (turnover) of Ital-
ian firms or firms with Italian investments active in Russia increased 
drastically between 2006 and 2011, rising from approximately 2 
billion euros to 41.4 billion euros. Around 38,000 people are em-
ployed in these companies.17 
                                                 
15 Data provided by the Italian Ministry for Economic Development (Ministero 
dello Sviluppo Economico), 1992-2012. The reasons for the greater size of Ital-
ian FDI are likely to be linked with the desire of Italian entrepreneurs to open 
firms in a country where labour is cheaper than in Italy and which offers a 
large market for Italian goods. 
16 Rapporti economici Italia-Russia (2012) 4. 
17 Ibid. 7. 
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Figure 2 
Turnover of Italian companies 
and companies with Italian participation in Russia 
(EUR million) 
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Source: Istituto Commercio Estero (ICE) and Politecnico di Milano, 2012. 
 
  
 
However, the volume of Italian FDI in Russia is still limited if 
we consider the potential opportunities offered by the comple-
mentarity of the Italian and Russian productive systems. It is likely 
that Italian FDI in Russia will increase if Moscow carries out legal 
and judicial reforms in order to improve the business environ-
ment and if visa liberalisation between the two countries takes 
place. Ideally, visa liberalisation with Russia should take place at 
EU level and eventually lead to the abolition of the visa regime. 
Meanwhile – as suggested by Italian ambassador to Russia Anto-
nio Zanar di Landi – Italy could use the flexibility allowed by the 
Schengen treaty and undertake bilateral initiatives, such as grant-
ing multiple-entry visas covering a progressively increasing 
timespan.18 With regard to Russian involvement in the Italian 
economy, 65 companies with Russian participation were active in 
2011; they employed 16,136 people and had revenues for 14.2 
billion euros. The main Russian companies operating in Italy are 
the aluminum giant RusAl; Severstall, Evraz and Novolipetsk in 
the steel and metal industry; Lukoil in the energy sector; 
                                                 
18 The Moscow Times (2011), Special Issue 4. 
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VimpelCom in telecommunications and Russkiy Standard in wine 
production.19 
2.3. The Russian-Italian energy partnership 
In 2011 Italy was the second largest buyer of Russian exports 
within the EU and the seventh most prominent supplier of foreign 
goods on the Russian market. Energy co-operation continues to 
play a leading role. In 2011 Italy imported 24 per cent of its natu-
ral gas and 13 per cent of its crude oil consumption from Rus-
sia.20 The state-controlled ENEL group, Italy’s largest electricity 
operator and the second biggest utility in Europe in terms of in-
stalled capacity, controls 56.4 per cent of Ogk-5, a company 
which manages four power stations in Russia, and 45 per cent of 
RusEnergoSbyt, which operates in the energy-trading field. ENEL 
also signed a memorandum of understanding with RosAtom, Rus-
sia’s federal agency for nuclear energy, in order to develop the 
electric and nuclear power generating system in Russia and East-
Central Europe, possibly including participation in the construc-
tion of a nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad enclave.21 To-
gether with ENI, ENEL also has shared ownership of SeverEnergia, 
which operates in the Yamal-Nenets region in western Siberia.22 
In April 2012, ENEL signed a strategic co-operation agreement 
with Rosneft, which has recently become the biggest oil-
producing company in the world, for joint ventures in the explo-
ration of fossil fuel resources in the Black and Barents Seas.23 
                                                 
19 Rapporti economici Italia–Russia (2012) 9. 
20 M. Comelli (2012) 72. 
21 “EDF, Enel in talks with Rosatom on nuclear plan.” Reuters 23 May 2011 
(accessed on 3 November 2012). While ENEL’s participation in the construc-
tion of the Kaliningrad nuclear plant is still uncertain, the company’s website 
confirms its general co-operation with Rosatom “in the joint development of 
new plants.” “ENEL’s nuclear power activities.” ENEL website, 
http://www.enel.com/en-GB/group/production/nuclear_power/enel/ (ac-
cessed on 3 November 2012). 
22 “La Russia dopo la crisi.” (2011) 9. 
23 “Eni: firmato con Rosneft l'Exploration Loan Facility Agreement per le attività 
congiunte nel Mare di Barents e nel Mar Nero.” ENI website 23 July 2012, 
http://www.eni.com/it_IT/media/comunicati-stampa/2012/07/2012-07-
23-firmato-Rosneft.shtml (accessed on 3 November 2012). 
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Most importantly, the Italian company ENI has become the main 
international partner of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy 
giant. In November 2006, during the last Prodi government, ENI 
and Gazprom signed a strategic agreement that set up a strong, 
long-term alliance. In particular, they agreed on extending sales 
of Russian gas to Italy until 2035 and identified major projects 
that would be jointly owned.24 ENI’s strategic plan for the period 
between 2012 and 2015 stressed co-operation with Russia for the 
extraction of gas in the Yamal region as one of the key elements of 
the company’s growth strategy.25 
 The Blue Stream pipeline and the South Stream pipeline pro-
jects stand out as examples of the ENI-Gazprom partnership. Blue 
Stream, connecting Russia and Turkey via an offshore route in the 
Black Sea, was completed in 2003. ENI played a key role in the 
project, as its subsidiary SAIPEM built the offshore part of the 
pipeline (385 kilometers at a maximum depth of 2,150 meters), 
thereby compensating for Gazprom’s lack of capacity in offshore 
technology. The Italian energy company will also build the off-
shore part of the South Stream pipeline, an ambitious project that 
should bring Russian gas to Italy and Austria through the Black 
Sea and the Balkans by 2015. A second branch of the pipeline 
reaching Southern Italy via Greece and an offshore route in the 
Mediterranean were also discussed (Figure 3).26 
The origins of the South Stream project date back to June 2007 
when ENI and Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
to build a pipeline that would ship gas to the European Union and 
bypass problematic transit countries such as Ukraine. The energy 
crisis between Russia and Ukraine and the consequent shortage of 
gas in several South-Eastern European countries in January 2009 
confirmed the necessity of an alternative route for energy supplies 
from Russia. South Stream appears as the ‘mirror project’ of Nord 
Stream, which started operating in November 2011 and ships 
Russian gas to Germany via the Baltic Sea, bypassing Belarus and 
Poland. According to the current project, the capacity of South 
Stream would be larger than that of Nord Stream, reaching 63 
                                                 
24 “La Russia dopo la crisi.” 14; “Eni and Gazprom sign new agreements.” ENI 
website 16 February 2011, http://eni.com/en_IT/media/press-releases/2011 
/02/2011-02-16-gazprom.shtml (accessed on 22 October 2012). 
25 “Eni announces its 2012-2015 Strategic Plan.” ENI website 15 March 2012 
(accessed on 22 October 2012). 
26 “La Russia dopo la crisi.” (2011) 18. 
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billion cubic meters of gas per year. Gazprom estimates that the 
proposed pipeline would match Europe’s increasing gas demand 
in the following years, which would be accompanied by a decline 
in the EU’s domestic gas production due to the gradual depletion 
of North Sea resources.27 
Figure 3 
The proposed route of the South Stream gas pipeline 
 
 
Source: south-stream.info 
 
 
In early March 2012, ENI and Gazprom discussed actions for 
the expedited implementation of the South Stream project that 
will start in December 2012.28 Meanwhile, no progress was made 
in plans for the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, which is 
supported by the European Union and the United States. The 
Nabucco project aims at diversifying EU energy imports away 
from Russia and is seen by many analysts as a competitor to South 
Stream. It would draw on gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
and reach the European Union via the South Caucasus, Turkey 
and the Balkans. However, so far the project has remained in the 
European Commission’s drawers, which has also increased the 
                                                 
27 A. Bini (2011) 4. 
28 “Eni and Gazprom reach agreement on gas supply contracts and discuss ac-
tions for the expedited construction of the South Stream gas pipeline.” ENI 
website 1 March 2012, http://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/press-releases/ 
2012/03/2012-03-01-eni-gazprom-contract-south-stream.shtml (accessed 
on 22 October 2012). 
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odds for the full implementation of South Stream. As leaked US 
government cables have revealed, the strategic partnership be-
tween ENI and Gazprom has been so successful that Washington 
was becoming deeply concerned about its impact on Europe’s in-
creasing dependence on Russian gas.29 Critics of the South Stream 
project argue that undermining Nabucco and keeping Europe 
hostage to Russia’s energy policy are its main aims.30  
Gazprom and ENI reject this interpretation. According to Paolo 
Scaroni, chief executive officer of the Italian energy company, 
marginalising Russia in the European energy market is unrealistic. 
Hence, it is best to invest resources in joint ventures that strength-
en existing energy security structures, as opposed to developing 
alternative routes of dubious economic viability. For Europe, bind-
ing Russian supplies to its own energy market through long-term 
projects is of essential strategic importance also because emerging 
powers such as China may become tough competitors for the pur-
chase of available Russian gas. From this perspective, South 
Stream is functional to vital European interests. To emphasise the 
European dimension of the project, ENI and Gazprom have suc-
cessfully involved Électricité de France (EdF) and Wintershall, a 
subsidiary of the German group BASF, in the joint venture. The 
two companies will take part in the construction of the offshore 
section of South Stream. In 2011 each of them purchased 15 per 
cent of shares in the joint venture from ENI; the Italian company 
now controls 20 per cent of the shares, whereas Gazprom has re-
tained its initial 50 per cent.31  
ENI and Gazprom hope that the involvement of a German and 
a French company would improve South Stream’s standing in the 
European Union, in particular through its recognition as an EU 
top-priority project. Gazprom is also attempting to have South 
Stream exempt from the rules of the EU’s third energy package in 
order to retain ownership of the pipeline; the EU has already 
granted a similar exemption for the Nord Stream pipeline. Fur-
thermore, the joint venture hopes that the recognition of the pipe-
line as an EU project will contribute to drawing much-needed 
funds. The cost of building South Stream is estimated at 19-25 
                                                 
29 Wikileaks website, http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/04/08ROME 
451.html# (accessed on 30 March 2012). 
30 Bini (2011) 5. 
31 Ibid. 5. 
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billion euros and can be compensated only by the buyers’ and 
suppliers’ long-term commitment to keeping it operational.32 
According to the advocates of energy co-operation with Russia, 
the issue of costs shows that Moscow is also taking considerable 
risks through the implementation of Europe-oriented energy pro-
jects.33 If European companies stepped out of the current projects 
and refused to buy Russian gas, Moscow would not be able to off-
set the cost of building the pipelines. Hence, the EU-Russia energy 
relationship is best described as one of mutual dependence. Bilat-
eral energy deals between Italy and Russia reflect this: Russia is 
Italy’s first gas and second oil supplier. At the same time, the Ital-
ian market is very important for Russian energy exports. Gazprom 
is dependent on the co-operation with ENI for the implementation 
of its offshore projects and for access to lucrative energy markets 
such as Libya.34 Furthermore, in order to make projects such as 
South Stream lucrative, Gazprom needs Italy’s and its other Euro-
pean partners’ commitment to buy the gas that will be channeled 
through the pipeline. 
2.4. Co-operation in other sectors and recent                                
developments 
Russia has an interest in co-operating with Italy in many other sec-
tors too, particularly those that are crucial for its technological 
modernisation. The economic co-operation of the Cold War years 
has extended to many other fields, including aeronautics, industrial 
machinery, telecommunications, credit insurance and recently also 
to the development of infrastructure for the 2014 Olympic games 
in Sochi. In the automobile sector, IVECO produces 50 per cent of 
its armored vehicles in Russia. In December 2010 it was commis-
sioned to produce 2,500 Lince military vehicles on Russian soil and 
sell a part of these to the Russian army.35 In March 2012, FIAT and 
the Russian bank Sberbank signed a letter of intent for the creation 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 6–7. 
33 Ibid.  
34 “Eni, Gazprom Neft Resume Work in Libya, Margelov Says.” Bloomberg 2 
November 2011. 
35 “Russia to buy 10 Italian armored vehicles.” RIA Novosti 3 December 2010. 
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of a joint venture that will produce cars and light commercial vehi-
cles starting in 2013.36 The Russian transport sector witnessed an 
increasing involvement of the Italian conglomerate Finmeccanica. 
In November 2010, Finmeccanica signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding for a joint venture with Russian Railways to develop 
automation, signaling, telecommunication and safety technology 
for the Russian rail network. Thanks to this joint venture, 
Finmeccanica may also be able to obtain strategic access to the 
networks of other post-Soviet and Baltic states – where railways 
operate in similar extreme climatic conditions – when they decide 
to upgrade their railroad traffic.37 
In addition, from 2007 onwards Finmeccanica has participated 
in the international marketing of the new Russian regional jet 
Sukhoi Superjet 100, thanks to the establishment of a Venice-based 
joint venture between its member company Alenia Aermacchi and 
the Sukhoi Holding. Also in the field of aeronautics, Finmeccanica 
paired up with Russia to construct helicopters. In June 2011, 
Agusta Westland (a company of the Finmeccanica group) signed a 
joint venture deal with Russian Helicopters for assembling AW139 
civil helicopters in Tomilino, near Moscow.38 
The co-operation between Italian and Russian businesses has 
recently expanded to new areas, most notably to the credit insur-
ance sector. In February 2012, the Italian export credit agency 
SACE, which is controlled entirely by the Italian Ministry of Econ-
omy and Finance, won an advisory contract to train the personnel 
of EXIAR, the Russian agency for export credit and investment in-
surance. The co-operation between SACE and EXIAR will be 
strengthened further by a memorandum of understanding that 
aims at boosting commercial and investment opportunities in 
their respective national markets and in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.39 In July 2012, SACE guaranteed an invest-
ment of 276 million euros made by the Russian bank VTB and the 
Italian banks Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and Intesa San Paolo.40 
                                                 
36 “Fiat-Sberbank, c'è l'intesa.” Russia Oggi 1 March 2012. 
37 “Russian Railways forms JV with Italian Major Finmeccanica.” BSR Russia 29 
November 2010. 
38 “Russian Helicopters, Augusta Westland sign 20 million euro JV deal.” RIA 
Novosti 22 June 2011. 
39 “Garanzia italiana sugli investimenti russi.” Russia Oggi 17 February 2012. 
40 “In Russia, Monti rafforza la partnership col Cremlino.” Meridiani Relazioni 
Internazionali 24 July 2012. 
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New commercial agreements were concluded during Monti’s lat-
est trip to Russia, in July 2012. The Italian company Rizzani de 
Eccher signed a 1 billion euro deal with its Russian counterpart 
North Caucasus Resorts for the construction of touristic infrastruc-
tures in the North Caucasian mountain range.41 The deal aims both 
at developing the facilities that will host the 2014 Winter Olympics 
in Sochi and at stabilising the region (one of the poorest and most 
volatile in Russia) through the creation of local employment. Also 
during Monti’s last visit to Russia, the Italian company Selex Elsag, 
Poste Italiane and Russian Post agreed to strengthen their strategic 
partnership. Furthermore, Gazprombank and Intesa San Paolo 
planned the establishment of a common fund to support Italian and 
Russian companies in their respective countries. 
Currently, over 500 Italian companies operate on Russian ter-
ritory. Among the main companies not mentioned so far, Pirelli, 
Martini & Rossi, Indesit, Parmalat, Ferrero and Candy also feature 
in the Russian entrepreneurial landscape. Most of these compa-
nies are based in the area around Moscow, but some have opened 
branches also in other parts of the Federation, for example, 
Parmalat in Yekaterinburg and Candy in Kirov. Easier communi-
cations and visa facilitation may contribute to the further expan-
sion of activities in other parts of Russia in the coming years.42 
3) Conclusions 
Bilateral relations between Russia and Italy have been very friend-
ly for over a decade and are based on a tradition of co-operation 
that dates back to Cold War times. During Berlusconi’s premier-
ship, they were strengthened by the Italian leader’s personal 
friendship with Vladimir Putin and his frequent calls for a closer 
partnership between the European Union and NATO on one side 
and Russia on the other. Following Berlusconi’s demise, relations 
have not changed substantially. Monti’s trip to Russia last July 
showed that the new Italian Prime Minister is keen on economic 
                                                 
41 L. Alexandrova. “Italy to join tourist cluster project in North Caucasus.” 
ITAR-TASS 23 July 2012. 
42 The Moscow Times, special issue on ‘Year of Italy in Russia’, No. 3/17 (May 
2011) 8-9. 
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co-operation with the Kremlin. Despite the crisis, trade between 
Italy and Russia grew by 25 per cent during 2011, reaching 27.3 
billion euros. During the last decade, Italian FDI in Russia in-
creased exponentially, from 57 million euros in 2004 to 972 mil-
lion euros in 2010. 
Energy sales are the most important category in trade exchang-
es. In 2011 Italy imported 24 per cent of its natural gas and 13 
per cent of its crude oil consumption from Russia. Due to the de-
pletion of domestic EU resources, instability in North Africa and 
the Middle East and the abandonment of nuclear power projects, 
the share of Italian energy imports from Russia may increase in 
the coming years. Italian-Russian energy co-operation has been 
successful since the Cold War period when political tensions in 
Europe were much higher than today; hence, Italian companies 
and governments do not shy away from further deals with post-
Soviet Russia. Presently, the main Italian and Russian energy com-
panies are involved in strategic joint ventures. The Gazprom-ENI 
joint ventures for the construction of the Blue Stream and South 
Stream pipelines constitute the most important examples, particu-
larly if the significance of South Stream for Europe’s energy secu-
rity is taken into account. Furthermore, Rosneft and ENEL have 
recently signed a strategic co-operation agreement, which sug-
gests that the Italian-Russian energy partnership may soon in-
volve other national energy giants more deeply. 
Over the last five years co-operation developed in numerous 
other sectors too, including the construction and automobile in-
dustries, aeronautics and military vehicles. The recent develop-
ments in the credit insurance sector, together with Russia’s acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization (WTO), will probably lead 
to an increase in Italy–Russia bilateral trade and investments in 
each other’s markets. As a result of Russia’s WTO membership in 
July 2012, important hurdles for the country’s external economic 
relations will be lifted. Italian presence in the Russian market, 
particularly in the form of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
would increase further if the Russian legal system became more 
reliable and if rules on Russian customs duties became more 
transparent. Furthermore, Italian activities in Russia will receive a 
boost when the visa and work permits regimes are loosened or 
abolished. Negotiations with the European Union regarding the 
abolition of the visa regime are of primary importance for Mos-
cow, but they are proceeding at a slow pace due to the current 
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bad state of EU–Russia relations.43 Prominent European officials 
criticised the Russian leadership during the anti-Putin demonstra-
tions in Moscow in the winter at the turn of 2011 and 2012 and 
the Syrian crisis. In October 2012, the European Parliament’s de-
cision to impose sanctions against Russian officials involved in the 
incarceration and death of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who had 
been working on a corruption scandal involving high-ranking 
Russian civil servants, further contributed to the deterioration of 
relations.44 Nevertheless, at the EU level Italy is one of the 
staunchest supporters of visa liberalisation with Russia. Besides 
allowing the free movement of entrepreneurs and workers, visa 
liberalisation would also increase the already growing flow of 
Russian tourists to Italy.45 
In 2013 Italy–Russia economic relations will likely continue to 
develop positively and play an important role in the broader Eu-
ropean context. The construction of the South Stream pipeline 
will drive the debates on the future of European energy security. 
Although it will not decrease Europe’s energy dependence on Rus-
sian gas, South Stream will create an alternative supply route that 
bypasses Ukraine and contributes to shelter EU countries from 
potential new energy crises between Russia and Ukraine. On a 
broader level, the post-2009 trends of trade volumes suggest that 
commercial relations are likely to see a further boost in the com-
ing years. After a short period of serious contraction in 2009, the 
Russian economy has continued to grow and its market now of-
fers invaluable opportunities for many crisis-ridden Italian com-
panies. Finally, co-operation with Italian companies in a broad 
range of sectors will help Russian enterprises to become more ac-
tive in foreign markets and cope with the increased competition 
that will result from Russia’s adoption of WTO trade rules. 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
43 “La Russia fa gola alle aziende.” Russia Oggi 13 February 2012.  
44 “European Parliament recommends Magnitsky sanctions.” RIA Novosti 23 
October 2012. 
45 In 2010, the Italian general consulate in Moscow alone released 436,000 
visas; the figure for 2011 was between 600,000 and 700,000 visas. Russians 
already make up the largest group of foreigners at the renowned Bocconi Busi-
ness School in Milan. N. von Twickel. “Italy’s ambassador: from the Vatican to 
Moscow.” The Moscow Times (May 2011) 3-4. 
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RUSSIA AND THE CENTRAL-EAST EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES – IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC CRISES 
ON THEIR TRADE RELATIONS 
Zsuzsa Ludvig 
Introduction 
Since the early nineties the new international actor called the Rus-
sian Federation faced three major economic crises. None of these 
can be considered a purely ‘Russian crisis’, since all were deeply 
rooted in the international economic environment. The first was 
the lasting crisis of transition with its deep decline in economic 
performance and serious social consequences between 1992 and 
1996/1997. This type of crisis was characteristic of all post-
Socialist countries. The so-called Russian financial crisis broke in 
August 1998 due to both internal and external factors and spread 
rapidly to the real economy. Contrary to the then widespread in-
ternational expectations, although this crisis was really deep, it 
was shortly overcome and followed by almost a decade of inten-
sive growth. As a spill-over of the world economic crisis later 
named as the ‘Great Recession’ Russia faced its third deep eco-
nomic crisis starting in 2008 and with hitting bottom in 2009. All 
the three economic crises were accompanied by a dramatic de-
cline in the volume of Russian foreign trade. This study aims at 
giving a brief overview on the impact of these crises on Russian 
foreign trade with Central-East European (CEE) countries that all 
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had their own transition crises during the nineties and were hit 
hard by the Great Recession as well. Unfortunately, the Russian 
financial crisis in 1998 also had extremely bad negative impact 
on trade with the CEE region or some individual economies of the 
region in comparison with general Russian trends. In this study 
the CEE region includes the Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Romania and Bulgaria. They 
used to be major economic and trading partners of the Soviet Un-
ion and some of them kept their leading position in trading with 
the Russian Federation in wide CEE even today. The focus is put 
on the export performance of CEE countries on the Russian mar-
ket. The article aims at giving some explanations why CEE exports 
were usually hit more strongly than exports of Russia’s other trad-
ing partners in general and in some particular cases as well. The 
EU15 is often taken as a reference country grouping.  
For the past two decades Russia has often been seen as a coun-
try where business is over-politicised. To put it simply: on a coun-
try level this would mean that countries having good political re-
lations with Russia have better chances of developing business 
contacts with it. As this study will show, the reality is not so sim-
ple and CEE countries are peculiar in this respect.  
1)  Trade impacts of the transition crises of the 
1990’s 
Russian-CEE trade relations of the 1990’s were featured by a mu-
tual turning away. Starting with 1990 CEE countries and later 
Russia turned to the West and tried to strengthen its economic 
links with its Western partners. In the case of CEE this process can 
be seen as part of their European integration ambitions and initia-
tives. Naturally, besides the integration intentions the need of 
these economies for modernisation was another important motive.  
It has been widely discussed whether the break-up of the So-
cialist economic block and their traditional trading system within 
the CMEA caused the long-lasting transition crisis of the CEE re-
gion or on the opposite, the deep transitional decline led to the 
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dramatic shrinkage of trade links.1 All in all one can point to this 
period as to the era of foreign trade crisis in the post-Socialist 
world. 
It is also worth mentioning that already before the break-up of 
the Soviet Union and the start of the Russian transition process the 
geographic structure of Russian foreign trade went through sig-
nificant changes. During the late 1980’s Germany, Japan, Finland, 
Italy (in 1988 already the USA) were among the major Soviet 
trade partners just like the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Po-
land, Romania and Yugoslavia from among the Socialist block.2 
According to Soviet data the share of CMEA member countries 
both in Soviet exports and imports was around 60 per cent in 
1988, while the proportion of so called ‘industrially developed 
capitalist countries’ reached a bit more than 20 per cent.3 Com-
pared to these geographical patterns of the late 1980’s, CEE coun-
tries experienced a really dramatic loss of position at the begin-
ning of the 1990’s. 
On the other hand, CEE countries’ trade partners were chang-
ing to a great extent in a similar way. For example the share of 
developed countries in Hungarian exports and imports in 1988 
already exceeded 30 per cent, with the Soviet Union possessing 
less than 20 per cent from a total of approximately 40 per cent 
share of all Socialist countries.    
CEE export performance was extremely poor in Russia at the 
very beginning of the nineties with a permanent tendency of de-
cline. CEE products and producers were soon displaced by West-
ern ones on the Russian market. CEE–Russian trade reached its 
bottom in 1993 with Russian imports from the region shrinking 
more than by half. Interestingly, the same year Hungary was the 
first on the list of CEE exporters to Russia exceeding even Poland. 
The share of the six CEE countries in total Russian imports totalled 
to 6.1 in 1993 and reached only 6.8 per cent in 1997 in spite of 
the constant rise of CEE export value between 1993 and 1997. 
(1996 was the only year when CEE exports declined.)  At the 
same time the share of the European Community (EU15) in Rus-
sian imports rose from 31.1 in 1993 to 36.8 in 1997.  
                                                 
1 Köves–Oblath (1994). 
2 See, for example, figures of Direction of Trade Statistics (1993).  
3 Vnesniye ekonomiceskiye svyazi SSSR v 1988 (1989). 
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At that time the commodity structure went through some sig-
nificant changes. Table 1 shows the commodity pattern of Hun-
garian exports to Russia during the 1990’s. Food and animals rep-
resented the most important product group making up around 
one third of all exports to Russia, followed by the declining, but 
still significant proportion of machinery. Chemicals (within it 
primarily medicines) showed the most remarkable growth both 
regarding their shares and values. Other CEE machinery exports 
showed a similar trend of reduction, except for the Czech Repub-
lic, both as a direct consequence of the end of the co-operation 
within the CMEA and the penetration of West European firms into 
the Russian market.  
Table 1 
The commodity structure of Hungarian exports  
to Russia (SITC classification), 1990–1999 
(per cent) 
 
SITC  1990* 1995 1997 1999 
0 Food and live animals  21,8 38.9 29.3 32.3 
1 Beverages and tobacco  2.8 8.2 6.8 1.2 
2 Crude materials, inedibles, except fuels  2.9 1.7 0.3 0.7 
3 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials  0.3 0.4 0.3 1.4 
4 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and 
waxes  0.1 1.9 8.1 7.7 
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.  11.4 14.9 20.0 27.5 
6 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material  5.1 2.6 4.0 6.5 
7 Machinery and transport equipment  41.8 24.9 24.2 16.4 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles  13.3 6.5 5.7 6.3 
9 
Commodities and transactions not classi-
fied elsewhere in the SITC  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Figures for the Soviet Union. 
Source: based on the Hungarian Central Statistical Office database. 
 
 
However, Russian exports to the CEE countries were not hit as 
hard as CEE supplies to Russia due to a very simple reason. These 
countries continued to import energy from Russia since the al-
ready existing infrastructure (pipelines) made this import source 
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to be the cheapest and most rational choice. Oil and gas imports 
from Russia secured a certain, not too low level of Russian sup-
plies to the CEE region. (1994 was the worst year regarding Rus-
sian exports, when Russian exports decreased by 25 per cent 
compared to the previous year.)4 But the Russian export structure 
went through a very unfavourable modification; energy exports 
began to constitute the overwhelming part of all Russian exports. 
There are two major reasons for this change. Firstly, the physical 
volume of other products declined dramatically in parallel with 
the increasing level of imports of CEEs from the West. Secondly, 
changes in international oil prices also influenced the structure of 
these exports; the average oil export prices were on the rise be-
tween 1994 and 1997. Altogether, the share of the six countries 
in Russian exports fell to a small extent, from 12.1 per cent meas-
ured in 1993 to 11.3 per cent in 1997. In this respect the dra-
matic turning point was already over, as it had appeared in the 
early 1990’s similarly to the import side. 
As a consequence of the dramatic fall of CEE exports to Russia 
and the relatively modest decline of the value of Russian supplies 
into CEE countries the growing trade deficit became the most im-
portant and problematic feature of CEE–Russian trade. This deficit 
has often been described as the ‘energy bill’ in the CEE region. It is 
true that the energy supplies and oil prices have been playing a 
most significant role in the development of these trade deficits.  
Nevertheless, it is worth making a country-to-country analysis 
on the CEE export performance in Russia during the 1990’s. Po-
land achieved a spectacular export growth on the Russian market 
since 1994 while export performances of all the other CEE coun-
tries were not that impressive. (Figure 1) Poland increased its 
supplies considerably to Russia year by year until 1997, except for 
1996 when several new Russian import regulations were intro-
duced affecting some of the major Polish (and other CEE) export 
products. Yearly Polish export increases to Russia were above the 
general Russian trends of import growth. This was the time of the 
so-called ‘food for gas’ programme of the Bartimpex Group led by 
an excellent Polish businessman, Aleksandr Gudzowaty.5 One 
could say that Gudzowaty ‘privatised’ the Polish trade with Russia, 
concluding lots of good business contracts, with many of them 
using barter techniques. This happened just in an area when bi-
                                                 
4 Ludvig (2011a). 
5 Ibid. 
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lateral Polish-Russian political links were already burdened. Not-
withstanding, in 1997 Russia was the second most important des-
tination for Polish export products. 
Figure 1 
CEE exports to Russia, 1992–1999 
(USD million) 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Hungary Poland Czech Republic
Slovakia Romania Bulgaria
Source: based on Rosstat 
 
 
Other CEE exports were lagging behind the Polish one, but fol-
lowing a similar trend. A permanent ranking list of the six coun-
tries’ export performance in Russia between 1994 and 1997 was 
as follows: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria 
and Romania. At the same time trade relations between the EU15 
and Russia were on the rise. EU exports to Russia more than dou-
bled between 1993 and 1997 with an almost similar increase in 
imports. EU15 turnover with Russia reached its highest figure 
precisely in 1993, the poorest year in the case of the CEE–Russian 
trade.  
1997 was the peak year in CEE exports to Russia since 1993 
with Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Romanian record levels as 
well, while Slovakian and Bulgarian exports reached their highest 
value in 1995. This slightly promising trend of increasing CEE 
exports was suddenly broken by the August 1998 Russian finan-
cial crisis.  
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Table 2 
EU15 trade with Russia, 1993–2002 
 
 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Exports                 
Million ECU/EUR) 11476 19093 25539 21170 14726 19916 27961 30465 
Russia's share in 
total (%) 2.7 3.1 3.5 2.9 1.9 2.1 2.8 3.0 
Previous year=100 201.0 118.1 133.8 82.8 69.6 135.2 140.4 109.0 
Imports                 
Million ECU/EUR) 14778 23299 27037 23172 25977 45724 47688 47729 
Russia's share in 
total (%) 3.6 4.0 4.0 3.3 3.3 4.4 4.6 4.8 
Previous year=100 172.0 106.7 116.1 86.0 112.1 176.0 104.3 100,1 
Source: Eurostat database. 
 
 
CEE–Russian bilateral political links remained modest and 
rather muted during this transition period except for the peculi-
arities of the Meciar era in Slovakia. The Euro-Atlantic integration 
process was the number one CEE foreign policy priority, and CEE 
politicians were reluctant to encourage relations with Russia. At 
the same time Russia lost its interest in the CEE region as well. Po-
land remained the only important CEE player for Russia due to its 
special relations with Ukraine and Belarus and owing to the Ka-
liningrad issue.6 But Polish-Russian relations were rather tense 
over these issues. While it used to be a widely spread opinion that 
the CEE decline in trade with Russia was closely connected to the 
loosening political ties, the Polish business success seems to dis-
prove this kind of argumentation. Passivity on part of other CEE 
business circles should have played a major role. 
                                                 
6 Póti (1997). 
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2) Trade relations between the 1998                                 
and 2008-2009 crises 
Although the 1998 Russian crisis had broken out in the financial 
sphere it soon expanded causing a deep decline in production. 
Consequently, together with the impact of the financial crisis, it 
led to the drastic shrinkage in Russian foreign trade performance. 
All of Russia’s trading partners experienced a dramatic drop in 
their trade with Russia. The average shrinkage of Russian import 
reached 18 per cent in 1998 and another 31 per cent in 1999 
compared to the previous year. Hungarian exports to Russia fell to 
their third; and Romanian ones to their quarter by 1999 com-
pared to the pre-crisis level of 1997, while the percentage fall of 
exports for Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria 
were as follows: 55; 63; 41 and 59 respectively. The EU15 faced a 
trend similar to the Russian average of 43 per cent fall in their 
exports in the examined two-year period. The causes of the weak-
ening Russian export performance are well-known: the drop in 
production, the fall in world oil prices (being at the same time a 
reason for the financial crisis as well), with the serious conse-
quences of insolvency on the part of Russian companies, the lack 
of state guarantees, the collapse of the banking system, the dra-
matic devaluation of the rouble being major causes on the import 
side. During these circumstances only those trading partners 
could keep their positions on the Russian market that had strong 
capitalisation and/or possessed state guarantees. In some cases 
barter constructions helped in keeping trade contacts or even in 
breaking into the market. It is not by chance that the USA could 
increase its share in total Russian imports from 7.6 (in 1997) to 
9.4 by 1998 while the EU15 succeeded in keeping their share be-
tween 36-37 per cent.  
However, Russian economy recovered soon, unexpectedly for 
most international institutions and economic forecasters. Russian 
GDP showed an impressive 6.4 percent growth already in 1999, 
when exports also had a modest increase. Imports continued to 
decline in 1999 but this was followed by a 12 per cent growth in 
2000. Given these facts the most interesting question is the fol-
lowing: how did the crisis affect the different trade partners of 
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Russia? What changes occurred in the positions of the individual 
partners, among them of 
the CEE countries?  
According to Table 3 
Russian imports recovered 
by 2002–2003 meaning 
that their value in 2002 
nearly reached the pre-
crisis level of 1997. The 
USA was the only important 
partner country that could 
increase the value of its ex-
ports to Russia in a modest 
way in 1998. The fall in 
Chinese exports was less 
(8%) than that of total Rus-
sian imports (18%) in 1998 
with the EU15 and CIS-
countries being slightly un-
der the Russian average. 
The CEE export decline was the deepest one from among the ex-
amined trade partners of Russia both in 1998 and 1999. Reasons 
are manifold. (Figure 2) Firstly, Central-East European companies 
simply did not have the capital to finance their activities on the 
Russian market during the drastically changed circumstances in-
cluding increased risks of non-payment, while their Western 
competitors could afford to offer more favourable payment terms 
to the Russian partners. Secondly, in some cases they did not have 
the support of the state and without state guarantees they were 
not able to survive on the market. There was a lack of trust on the 
part of CEE states and in some cases these states acted too slowly 
as well. Their Western competitors took the opportunity to ac-
quire new positions or at least keep their old ones. Not surpris-
ingly, EU15 exports recovered already in 2000 while total CEE 
exports reached their 1997 level only by 2003-2004. It is a lesson 
to be drawn from the experiences of the crisis that Russian market 
positions are easily lost while regaining them is extremely diffi-
cult. The very low basis is an important explanation why yearly 
export growth rates for the CEE were a bit higher than the Rus-
sian average import dynamism between 2000 and 2003.  
Table 3 
Time of reaching pre-crisis (1997) 
level in CEE exports to Russia 
 
Hungary 2005 
Poland 2002–2003 
Czech Republic 2002–2003 
Slovakia 2003 
Romania 2005 
Bulgaria 2005–2006 
CEE6 together 2003–2004 
EU15 2000 
Total exports to Russia 2002–2003 
Source: based on Rosstat. 
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Figure 2 
Russian imports in country grouping  
and major partner comparison 
(1997=100) 
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However, there were big differences among CEE countries ex-
port performances on the Russian market after the crisis. Hungary 
was the last to reach the export level of 1997 from among 
Visegrad countries, while Poland and the Czech Republic were 
more successful.7 Romania and Bulgaria were also among those 
lagging behind in this respect. (Table 3) 
Nevertheless, CEE exports showed an imposing dynamism dur-
ing the 2000’s. While there were explanations according to 
which improving political relations were in the background of the 
flourishing export activities (for example in Hungary), this might 
not be the best conclusion. For instance, this was the era of an im-
pulsive Russian economic boom, which had a positive impact on 
                                                 
7 The Hungarian slow recovery can be explained firstly by the fact that the ex-
tent of the fall was extremely large, and secondly by structural factors. Hun-
garian exports had contained a large proportion of food and agricultural prod-
ucts, while the Russian food industry began to develop rapidly after the crisis 
leaving less room for imports. Thirdly, political hesitation or mistrust hampered 
the supplies of Hungarian buses, formerly being traditional Hungarian com-
modities on the Russian market. 
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all trading partners of Russia. Indeed, almost all partner countries 
experienced a high dynamism in their trade with Russia, includ-
ing the results of their exports. (Figure 2) This was the case within 
the CEE region as well, although accompanied with another major 
factor.  
In 2004 eight CEE countries joined the EU. From among them 
the four Visegrad countries constitute the subject of this analysis. 
It seems that EU membership brought significant changes in their 
trade with Russia. Although there were several worries on the 
Russian side concerning the potentially negative impact of the EU-
accession on CEE–Russian trade, the most significant effects in re-
ality were very much different from these concerns. Russian ex-
ports to CEE were not really hit by the new trade conditions; how-
ever, there were remarkable changes on the Russian import side. 
Commodity composition of CEE exports to Russia had been radi-
cally changing with a growing tendency of the proportion of ma-
chinery and transport equipment.  
The dynamism of CEE exports to Russia was above the average 
growth rate of Russian imports in 2006 and 2008, and around 
the Russian average in 2007. The explanation could be given by 
the changed attitude on part of the transnational companies with 
subsidiaries in CEE countries. Although there was a real growth in 
their export volumes and values (backed by the Russian GDP 
growth), an important part of the considerable increase seen sta-
tistically was caused by their intra-firm agreements. In earlier 
years a considerable part of the production (like mobile phones, 
cars, car components, etc.) produced in CEE locations of transna-
tional companies was not indicated statistically as CEE (Hungar-
ian, Czech, Slovakian or Polish) export, but as of other, for exam-
ple, EU origin. After the EU accession of CEE countries this prac-
tice has been gradually, in some cases suddenly changed giving 
an important impetus to CEE exports. A similar tendency can be 
observed in relation to Romanian and Bulgarian EU accession, 
leading to a high dynamism of these countries’ exports to Russia 
recently.8 This change in transnational company behaviour ex-
plains primarily the very positive changes in CEE export composi-
tions in relation to Russia. Table 4 shows this radical change in 
                                                 
8 A short remark on Romanian exports should be made here. In the Romanian 
case TNCs behaviour changed even 1-2 years before the real date of EU-
accession.  
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Table 4 
Commodity structure of Hungarian exports to Russia (SITC classification), 2000–2008 
(per cent) 
 
SITC  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
0 Food and live animals  31.8 31.3 34.0 26.9 20.7 20.6 12.4 7.5 6.8 
1 Beverages and tobacco  1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels  2.0 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.3 
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related ma-terials  0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.4 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes  2.8 1.3 1.2 3.0 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.  29.9 33.2 31.9 30.4 36.6 40.3 27.7 22.1 21.5 
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material  7.4 7.6 10.0 9.4 10.5 10.0 7.6 7.0 7.6 
7 Machinery and transport equipment  18.4 17.7 11.2 21.1 18.6 18.0 46.4 58.0 60.0 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles  6.2 7.1 10.0 8.0 10.1 8.6 4.6 3.7 3.1 
9 Commodities and transactions not classi-fied elsewhere in the SITC  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 
Source: based on Hungarian Central Statistical Office database. 
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the Hungarian example. This phenomenon highlights another 
major feature of present-day CEE–Russian trade links. Like CEE 
exports generally, their exports to Russia are also influenced and 
generated to a great extent by the production of transnational 
companies located in individual CEE countries. In the future there 
interests will decide whether to maintain or not the given level of 
production or the direction of exports with potentially great fluc-
tuations in the volume of trade with Russia as well.  
The 2000’s witnessed an improvement in several CEE–Russian 
bilateral political relations. Although Poland remained a ‘cool 
partner’ of Russia, other CEE countries like Hungary or Slovakia 
took a pragmatic turn and put the aim of improving relations 
with Russia among their foreign policy priorities.1 Since this in-
tent coincided with improving trade figures, trade successes on 
the Russian market were often considered as fruits of improved 
political relations. Indeed, balanced and friendlier political rela-
tions had some positive impact on the economic relations with 
Russia, but as the significant changes in the commodity structure 
of the Hungarian example indicate, the biggest modifications and 
impressive export growth were due to other factors. Moreover, 
Polish exports reached an almost tenfold increase, well above the 
average sevenfold CEE export growth despite the rather cool Pol-
ish-Russian political relations between 2000 and 2007. The evi-
dently worsened political relationship in 2005-2007 had only a 
temporary negative impact on Polish export performance in Rus-
sia.2 Notwithstanding being a ‘cool partner’ of Russia as well, the 
Czech Republic has also reached outstanding export successes on 
the Russian market since 2006. (Figure 3) 
                                                 
1 According to a classification of EU member states by their political-economic 
relationship towards Russia made in 2009 by the Institute for World Economics 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria be-
longed to the group of “friendly pragmatists,” while Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic and Romania were so-called “cool (but pragmatic) partners” of Russia. 
(Ludvig, 2011b) The ECFR categorisation made in 2007 also put the former 
three countries into the category of “friendly pragmatists,” described Romania 
and the Czech Republic as “frosty pragmatists,” while labelling Poland as a 
“new cold warrior.” Mark–Popescu (2007). 
2 Russia introduced embargo on the import of Polish meat in 2005 on supposed 
political grounds. As a response Poland has repeatedly vetoed the launch of nego-
tiations on the new EU–Russian basic agreement for years. Despite the Russian 
veto on Polish meat, other Polish exports could reach approximately 20 per cent 
growth during 2005-2006 and a more than 35 per cent increase in 2007. After 
the end of this Polish-Russian bilateral dispute, in 2008 Polish export dynamism 
on the Russian market was around the CEE average growth rate.  
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Figure 3 
CEE countries exports to Russia 
(2000=100) 
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3) Impacts of the ‘Great Recession’                             
on CEE–Russian trade 
The era of the world economic crisis, recently called the ‘Great 
Recession’, was the third period when CEE–Russian trade relations 
experienced a dramatic fall. The financial crisis had broken out in 
2007 in the USA but soon spread to almost all regions of the 
world and to the real economy. It reached Russia in the second 
half of 2008 leading to almost immediate decline in Russian for-
eign trade turnover. However, for the whole year of 2008 Russian 
foreign trade still had positive dynamics. Moreover, in CEE–
Russian trade 2008 was the peak year both regarding export and 
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import values and with higher yearly growth rates than the aver-
age increase of total Russian exports and imports.   
Figure 4 
Yearly change of Russian exports to  
and imports from CEE6, 2007–2011 
(per cent) 
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The year 2009 already witnessed a radical, more than 35 per 
cent fall both in Russian exports and imports with their rates well 
exceeding the level a world trade decline (-12 per cent). As it had 
been usual in CEE–Russian trade for many years, the value of Rus-
sian exports was determined mostly by the volume and prices of 
energy supplies during and after the crisis.3 However, Russian 
imports from CEE showed a new feature: the extent of the decline 
caused by the crisis was more or less the same as the average 
shrinkage of Russian imports. We assume that the major part of 
the explanation could be given by the dominance of transnational 
companies in CEE exports to Russia. Owing to them CEE exports 
to Russia were and still are not really different from other exports, 
mostly coming from developed economies. Besides, some CEE 
                                                 
3 Perhaps the most significant impact of the crisis on CEE–Russian trade has 
been the intention on part of the consumers of Russian gas, including CEE 
countries to modify the old system of gas contracts and gas pricing. The crisis 
highlighted the advantages of spot markets and spot prices. Several partners of 
Russia made steps to shift to this kind of pricing.  
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companies have been growing stronger for the past decade and 
their internationalisation also provides a better basis for maintain-
ing or even increasing their position on the Russian market. A 
good example is the Hungarian Gedeon Richter Group in the 
pharmaceutical industry.4  
Country-level analysis makes this general picture more colour-
ful. Romanian exports already exceeded their ‘pre-crisis’ level (of 
2008) in 2010. The other new EU member, Bulgaria succeeded in 
achieving this in 2011, but it was only the Czech Republic that 
was able to export more in 2011 than in 2008 from among V4 
countries. As a consequence the share of V4 countries in Russian 
imports decreased from 6.5 per cent in 2008 to 5.7 per cent in 
2011.5 But CEE6 as a country group lagged behind the Russian 
average in measuring the level of exports in 2011 compared to 
the export value of 2008. This can be mainly explained by the 
high basis for them in 2008. According to the newest data, 2012 
witnesses export growth again in four CEE countries, with the ex-
ception of Hungary and Romania. However, we believe that these 
fluctuations can be explained more by TNC’s behaviour and the 
general conditions of the Russian market than by CEE- specific 
reasons.  
Based on the Hungarian example the commodity structure did 
not change to a considerable extent in the past few years. How-
ever, as the crisis and the keen competition hit some TNCs, some 
formerly dynamically increasing CEE exports, including those to 
Russia, may be at risk. A well-known example is the case of Nokia, 
a company that in 2012 decided to cut 2300 job places in its 
Hungarian-located factory, in Komárom and relocate its produc-
tion to other regions. Most probably this will have an impact both 
on the value and the commodity pattern of Hungarian exports to 
Russia in the near future. Nokia earlier made a similar decision 
regarding its site near Cluj-Napoca in Romania. 
                                                 
4 The Richter Group’s sales to Russia in 2008 were almost at the 2007 level 
followed by an impressive growth of 11 per cent in 2009, the worst year of 
Russian foreign trade in the past few years. Richter sales continued to grow 
during 2010 and 2011 as well. Exports to Russia amounted to 37 per cent of 
their total international sales in 2011. (Gedeon Richter Annual Report, 2011.) 
5 V4 share in Russian exports also decreased from 9.2 per cent in 2008 to 8.1 
per cent in 2011.  
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Figure 5 
Yearly change of CEE6 exports to Russia, 2007–2011 
(per cent) 
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Source: based on Rosstat. 
 
 
Table 5 
CEE exports compared to 2008, 2008–2012 
(per cent) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
January to No-
vember 
2012/2011 
Hungary 100.0 71.3 85.2 90.5 91.7 
Poland 100.0 59.7 82.4 94.2 112.3 
Czech Republic 100,0 64.1 80.6 124.6 122.9 
Slovakia 100.0 60.4 83.1 98.8 124.5 
Romania 100,0 86.0 132.2 169.5 98.7 
Bulgaria 100.0 66.2 84.1 107.8 102.0 
CEE6 together 100.0 64.5 85.5 104.5 105.1 
total Russian import 100.0 62.7 85.7 114.3 102.5 
Source: Rosstat. 
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Table 6 
Commodity pattern of Hungarian exports to Russia, 2007–2011 
(per cent) 
 
SITC  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
0 Food and live animals 7.5 6.8 6.6 6.2 6.8 
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
2 Crude materials, inedibles, except fuels 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 0.8 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.0 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
5 Chemicals and related prod-ucts, n.e.s. 22.1 21.5 25.0 21.0 25.2 
6 Manufactured goods classi-fied chiefly by material 7.0 7.6 8.1 7.5 9.2 
7 Machinery and transport equipment 58.0 60.0 56.3 61.5 53.9 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3.7 3.1 2.6 2.0 2.9 
9 
Commodities and transac-
tions not classified elsewhere 
in the SITC 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: based on Hungarian Central Statistical Office database. 
 
 
Nevertheless, the CEE Commodity export structure is still 
dominated by exports of TNCs, just as it was in the pre-crisis pe-
riod. According to figures of Table 7 the proportion of machinery 
and transport vehicles (SITC 9) was rather high in all CEE coun-
tries in 2010, except for Poland and Bulgaria. There is also a re-
markable increase in the shares of this product group in all CEE 
cases compared to the pre-EU accession period. In 2010 Polish 
export structure was most diversified towards Russia, probably 
consisting more ’real’ Polish products than it is the case for the 
other CEE countries. Bulgarian commodity structure also has its 
peculiarity since pharmaceuticals totalled to one third of all ex-
ports to Russia (see figure for 2010 in Table 7).6  
                                                 
6 Pharmaceuticals totalled to 17 per cent of all Hungarian product exports to 
Russia and 11 per cent of Slovakian exports in 2010 indicating a keen competi-
tion among CEE countries. Polish and Czech pharmaceutical export is also sig-
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We believe that 
the state of bilateral 
CEE–Russian political 
relations has no deci-
sive impact on CEE 
export performance 
on the Russian com-
modity market. Ad-
mitting that there is 
more room for im-
pact on other kinds 
of bilateral economic 
co-operation (for ex-
ample, trade in ser-
vices or co-operation 
in investments, etc.), 
product export is 
mostly determined by 
other factors. Trade with Russia, especially export to Russia has 
been correlating with trends of general trade in the CEE region for 
the past years. This can be explained by the growing role of both 
TNCs in CEE foreign trade flows and general impacts of the inter-
national environment.  
4) Conclusions – CEE–Russian trade: politics or 
‘business as usual’? 
When speaking about Russia, politics is a number one issue, often 
preceding economic considerations. Indeed, in the time of search-
ing for new CEE foreign policy orientations during the transition 
period of the 1990’s, Russia seemed to have lost its attractiveness 
as a business partner as well. CEE countries and their leaders fo-
cused on the euro-integration process, sometimes ignoring still 
rich opportunities in the East. Since Russia was also looking for 
Western partners, both political and economic CEE–Russian links 
weakened to a dramatic extent at the very beginning of the 
                                                                                                              
nificant. Most probably this export product group also belongs to those 
branches where TNCs’ performance is substantial.  
Table 7 
Share of machinery and transport vehicles 
in CEE exports to Russia, 2003, 2010 
(per cent) 
 
  2003 2010 
Hungary 21 60 
Poland 15 35 
Czech Republic 51 63 
Slovakia 33 85 
Romania 28 66 
Bulgaria 18 32 
Source: Russian Federal Customs Service (Ta-
mozennaya Statistica Vnyesnyey Torgovly RF, 
2003 and 2010). 
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1990’s. However, whether the decline in economic contacts hap-
pened by political intention or it was just the consequence of 
business attention turning away (and towards the developed 
economies), is still a debated issue. Nevertheless, as the example of 
the politically distant Poland shows, business commitment en-
abled to formulate strong and mutually beneficial trade links with 
Russia even in this period. This has been even more so since then 
and is more valid for commodity trade. We argue that the devel-
opment of political relations and the trends in economic links 
with Russia do not necessarily follow the same path. The Polish 
example of the 1990’s shows that in an area of frosty, but not ex-
tremely worsened, political relations business can flourish be-
tween the two partners.7 On the other hand, improving political 
relations will not automatically lead to outstanding successes on 
the Russian market. As the Hungarian trade experience of the 
2000’s indicates, the positive results, mostly seen by Hungarian 
politicians as direct consequences of political rapprochement, 
were not really remarkable in an international comparison. Im-
pressive export performance between 2003 and 2008 was rather 
due to general good conditions of the Russian market than to po-
litical intentions. Nevertheless, the turn of several CEE countries 
towards pragmatism with Russia, instead of the former ideological 
approaches, also has its advantages in business. It can support 
their success in big Russian state purchases or other large-scale 
business where the state has its influence, but general business 
goes on in accordance with strict economic considerations. How-
ever, political factors and political will may matter when provid-
ing state guarantees or other kind of state support to companies 
doing business in Russia.  
As a second major conclusion of this analysis we may state that 
CEE exports are usually more vulnerable to Russian market devel-
opments; Russian crises have had a deeper negative impact on 
their performances than on their Western competitors’ ones. As a 
general trend CEE export decline periods are deeper and longer 
on the Russian market than Russian average trade fall. It is be-
                                                 
7 Naturally, a dramatically worsened political relationship with Russia would 
have an immediate and drastic impact on economic relations, including trade. 
This was the case between Russia and Georgia during the second half of the 
2000’s when Russia introduced embargo on the import of Georgian wine and 
mineral water as a response to Georgian foreign policy, which Russia consid-
ered to be anti-Russian. Afterwards Georgian exports to Russia decreased dra-
matically. 
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cause CEE companies often do not have enough capital to survive 
during a crisis and in hard circumstances, especially without the 
necessary guarantees from the state, while Western firms grab all 
opportunities to strengthen their position. Nevertheless, these dif-
ferentiations between CEE and Western opportunities have been 
diminishing for the past years. The impact of the third examined 
crisis of the Russian economy in the years 2008–2009 seem to be 
not so long-lasting in the CEE region than the previous ones. As 
an explanation we can state that CEE exports to Russia are already 
very much similar to Russia’s other imports given the fact the 
TNCs are the most significant partners of Russian companies in 
both cases. The push of TNCs in CEE exports to Russia has been a 
side effect of CEE EU-memberships both in the V4 countires and 
in the Romanian and Bulgarian cases. We may conclude that 
TNCs’ strategies are now major forces in determining CEE export 
performances in Russia instead of both the state of bilateral politi-
cal relationships or national economic policy goals.  
Russia is an important and big market generating keen compe-
tition among exporters. Due to historical reasons and geographi-
cal location Russia had been a most important economic partner 
for the CEE countries for decades. But for the past twenty years 
they seem to be superseded by their Western and Chinese com-
petitors. The Russian market has other peculiarities as well: as the 
examples of the last two economic crises in Russia show, crises 
are extremely deep but end earlier and more ‘easily’ than ex-
pected. This is another reason for making efforts to maintain one’s 
market positions in the country.  
Russian economic crises have another feature: they are usually 
in close connection with low world market energy prices. This has 
a special consequence on CEE–Russian trade since CEE countries’ 
major problem in their trade with Russia remains the same: they 
face huge trade deficits. Not surprisingly, these deficits usually 
decrease during Russian crises, since Russian economic problems 
usually coincide with or are amplified by low oil (and gas) prices. 
In post-crisis periods the normal way to decrease these deficits in 
CEE countries is by increasing exports.  
 
* * * * * 
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INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN UKREINE: DO 
INSTITUIONS REALLY MATTER?  
Ievgen L. Cherevykov 
Introduction 
Many international economic studies prove that poor infrastruc-
ture impedes the development of the national economy and dete-
riorates its international competitiveness.1,2,3 Infrastructure pro-
jects have high public significance and the amounts invested an-
nually into infrastructure by the public sector are vastly exceed-
ing investments made by the private sector.4 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) has become a popular instru-
ment of implementing public investment projects across the 
world. In contrast to a dominant international approach to PPP’s 
                                                 
 Research report on the Project “Public-private partnership as a component of 
the strategy of state cooperation with international organizations and transna-
tional corporations” (2012-2014). Institute for Economics and Forecasting of 
the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. 
1 World Bank Reports (2005–2006). 
2 Calderón – Servén,(2004). 
3 Mantega (2003). 
4 Delmon (2011). 
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definition, we consider PPP not only as a contractual but as an in-
stitutional relationship between public and private entities aimed 
at improving infrastructure and public services. Many govern-
ments have been using PPPs partly to implement and realise in-
vestment projects concerning highways, railways, airports, power 
plants, water sewage plants, hospitals, schools, and other fixed 
assets. Instead of paying for the asset from budgetary funding, 
governments engage in a contractual arrangement with private 
firms that will finance the design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance of the project. In exchange, the government makes a 
commitment to provide necessary funding to the firms to cover 
the expected costs not only for the initial design and construction 
of the asset but also for the subsequent operation and long-term 
maintenance of the project in addition to an anticipated level of 
profit.  
PPPs allow governments to leverage private capital, deferring 
public outlays without deferring the benefits. PPPs have become 
particularly attractive to governments with annual budget re-
strictions, which expect less restriction or control on incurring 
liabilities in the future.5,6  
Additionally, PPP can be considered as a powerful tool of pub-
lic regulation in context of investment, innovation, fiscal, compet-
itive, social and regulatory policy.7,8,9,10  
1) PPP as a socio-economic institution 
We offer a new concept of PPP as a socio-economic institution. 
The common use of the term “institution” makes it possible to 
consider PPP as an institution in five aspects: behavioural, cogni-
tive, associative, regulatory and constitutive.  
                                                 
5 Perrot – Chatelus (2004). 
6 Hemming (2006). 
7 Revilla–Sarkis (2003). 
8 Blankenburg (2000). 
9 Silva–Rodrigues (2004). 
10 Sawyer (2009). 
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According to the behavioural aspect, at the level of the national 
economy PPP should be regarded as an institution of strategic in-
teraction between the public and the private sector to address so-
cially significant competitive challenges of socio-economic devel-
opment. At the micro level, such a strategic interaction is mani-
fested in the investment project implementation. In our opinion, 
the relationship that forms the PPP institution can be found in the 
framework of rational choice institutionalism based on the game 
theory as a set of equilibrium repeated outcomes in the standard 
co-operative game. 
According to the cognitive aspect, PPP is directly connected 
with the institutions of public confidence and social responsibility, 
which are the integral parts of the social partnership mechanism. 
The development of the social partnership in Ukraine requires the 
formation of the partnership ideology, in which the leading role 
belongs to the state. 
In the associative aspect, PPP can be seen as an institution to 
reconcile private and public interests based on communitarian 
paradigm and effective mechanisms for the involvement of busi-
ness elites in the process of providing public goods. At the same 
time, according to the regulatory aspect, PPP defines the parame-
ters of partnership between the state, businesses and civil society 
expressed in the objectives, forms and results of their interaction 
at all levels. Instrumental PPP capabilities are fully revealed dur-
ing the implementation of the national anti-crisis policy of creat-
ing jobs, introducing tax privileges, simplifying business envi-
ronment for small enterprises, providing financial support for fi-
nancial institutions and so on. 
The constitutive nature of PPP is carried out through a system 
of state guarantees, which serves as a key factor in ensuring fair 
behaviour (the behaviour that matches the promises issued)11 and 
stable partnerships, secured by the relevant regulations. 
                                                 
11 Brennan–Buchanan (1985). 
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2) Concepts of PPP in Ukraine 
In Ukrainian scientific literature public-private partnership is fre-
quently translated as state-private partnership (SPP) but the term 
“public-private partnership” more precisely reflects the whole 
range of relations within this phenomenon based on the participa-
tion of both local governments and the public institutions. 
 Public-private partnership can ensure additional advantages 
in reducing the prime costs of projects, efficiently distributing 
risks, improving management, assuring a better quality of ser-
vices, and raising the profitability of projects. 
The potential of using PPPs in Ukraine is high due to the big 
share of the public sector in the national economy (37.0% of the 
GDP).12 A considerable part of transportation, housing and com-
munal services, energy and social infrastructure belongs to the 
public property. At the same time, the state of motorways, rail-
ways, seaports and airports is unsatisfactory for a European coun-
try. The depreciation rate of the capital assets of heat and water 
supply and sanitation exceeds 60 per cent, whereas that of the 
urban electricity transport is up to 90 per cent. Neither the state 
nor local budgets have the necessary financial resources for the 
modernisation of the infrastructure, and these resources are un-
likely to appear in the near future. In this situation it is natural 
that the state is focusing on the development of PPPs.  
In Ukraine, the PPP investment potential is underestimated, as ev-
idenced by the figures regarding the implementation of infra-
structure projects with private participation (Table 1). According 
to the World Bank database, private investments in infrastructure 
projects implemented on the principles of PPPs in developing 
countries totaled at USD 588.5 billion between 1990 and 2011. 
At the same time, all investments in infrastructure projects with 
private participation in Ukraine from 1990 to 2011 amounted to 
USD 12.1 billion, of which the telecommunications sector ac-
counted for approximately 90 per cent. Furthermore, among 39 
                                                 
12 Zapatrina (2011). 
Institutional Environment for Public-Private Partnership in Ukraine... 123 
 
 
projects listed below only 18 can be seen as “quasi PPPs”13 and 
were implemented as “Greenfield” concession, management and 
leasing projects. 
Such a trend of attracting private business in the implementa-
tion of publicly important infrastructure projects does not corre-
spond to the priority areas of the development of investment in 
Ukraine’s economy. As defined by President Victor Yanukovych in 
the Programme of Economic Reform for 2010-2014 “Prosperous 
Society, Competitive Economy, Efficient State,” these areas are the 
following: power, new quality of life, infrastructure, design of the 
Olympic Hope-2022.14  
The main reasons why the dynamics of PPP development in 
Ukraine do not accord with the requirements of the economy are 
the following: contradictory and inconsistent legal regulation; in-
sufficient level of political and economic stability; lack of con-
sistent policy and proper management on PPP; no effective PPP 
public support mechanism; complicated and inconsistent tariff 
regulation; low institutional capacity of government entities and 
the private sector in PPP implementation; poor qualification level 
of officials and low awareness of the private sector as regards PPP 
specifics and so on. 
Most of the above mentioned factors, especially legal regula-
tion, political and macroeconomic factors, PPP management and 
contracting, institutional capacity of government and private enti-
ties for PPP implementation have an institutional nature and some 
of them influenced negatively the implementation of the most sig-
nificant “quasi PPP” investment projects (see Table 2 column 
“Problems”). 
                                                 
13 “Quasi PPPs” are public investment projects with private participation, 
which were not classified and adopted as PPPs in accordance with the Ukraini-
an PPP legislation (Law of Ukraine “On State-Private Partnership”, the Decrees 
of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine # 81, 232, 279, 384). There are no fully-
fledged PPPs in Ukraine yet.   
14 The President specified the priority investment projects of Ukraine: 
http://uaport.net/news/ua/go/UN10082559152 
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Table 1 
Infrastructural investment projects with private participation in Ukraine, 1992–2011 
 
Year of 
onset 
of project 
imple-
menta-
tion and 
financing 
Sector of PPPs implementation 
Power Telecommunications Water supply and sewage Total 
Number of 
projects 
Investments 
USD mln 
Number of 
projects 
Investments 
USD mln 
Number of 
projects 
Investments 
USD mln 
Number of 
projects 
Investments 
USD mln 
1992 - - 1 11 - - 1 11 
1993 - - 1 72 - - 1 72 
1994 - - - 10 - - - 10 
1995 - - - 18 - - - 18 
1996 - - 3 317 - - 3 317 
1997 - - 2 187 - - 2 187 
1998 6 - 1 331 - - 7 331 
1999 - - - 242 - - - 242 
2000 - - 1 206 - - 1 206 
2001 6 160 3 255 - - 9 415 
2002 1 - - 186 - - 1 186 
2003 - - - 370 1 - 1 370 
2004 - - - 738 - - - 738 
2005 - - - 1407 - 100 - 1507 
2006 1 24 1 865 - - 2 889 
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Year of 
onset 
of project 
imple-
menta-
tion and 
financing 
Sector of PPPs implementation 
Power Telecommunications Water supply and sewage Total 
Number of 
projects 
Investments 
USD mln 
Number of 
projects 
Investments 
USD mln 
Number of 
projects 
Investments 
USD mln 
Number of 
projects 
Investments 
USD mln 
2007 1 83 - 1346 - - 1 1429 
2008 1 100 - 1364 1 102 2 1566 
2009 - 121  934 - - - 1055 
2010 4 89  413 - - 4 501 
2011 3 343 1 1607 - - 4 1950 
In all 23 920 14 10878 2 202 39 12001 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, Ukraine (without the transport sector). 
http://ppi.worldbank.org/explore/ppi_exploreCountry.aspx?countryID=97 
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Table 2 
Most significant “quasi PPP” investment projects in Ukraine 
Name of 
Project 
Responsible 
Agency 
Type of 
Project Location 
Year of 
Inception 
Year of 
Completion 
Capital Value 
of Project Outcome Problems 
Green Co – Group Regional 
Council 
Waste re-
covery 
Kyiv 2003 - - successfully 
concluded 
- 
Lviv-Krakovets Ministry of 
Transporta-
tion, State 
Road Agency 
“Ukravtodor” 
 
Highway Lvivska ob-
last 
1999 2044 UAH 1.6 bln. aborted after 
signing of 
contracts 
(2010) 
Pilot project: 
lack of fund-
ing and ex-
perience; 
political fac-
tor 
Vanko International Cabinet of 
Ministers of 
Ukraine 
Oil and gas 
production 
Black Sea 
shelf 
2005 2013 (tenta-
tive term) 
USD 15.0 
bln. 
(0.33 bln. – 
preliminary 
stage) 
aborted after 
signing of 
contracts 
(2008) 
Political fac-
tor, faults in 
contracting 
Luhanskvoda-
Rosvodokanal 
Regional 
Council 
Water sup-
ply 
Luhansk 2007 2031 UAH 0.75 
bln. 
successfully 
started 
Abuses of 
public pro-
curement 
procedures, 
tariffs were 
raised by 2.5 
times in 
2008 
   
127 
Source: prepared by the author. 
 
Odessvodokanal-  
Infoxvodokanal 
Regional 
Council 
Water sup-
ply 
Odessa 2004 2052 - successfully 
started 
Breach of 
investment 
plan, tariffs 
were raised 
by 2.0 times 
in 2007 
Artemivskteplomere
zha 
Regional 
Council 
Heating 
supply 
Artemivsk 2007 2046 UAH 90.0 
mln. 
successfully 
started 
- 
“Kirovogradvodoka
nal”-“Vodne 
Gospodarstvo” 
Regional 
Council 
Water sup-
ply 
Kirovograd 2006 2054 - aborted in 
2008 
Problems 
with debt 
and water 
supply 
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3) PPP legislation and practice in Ukraine 
Generally, Ukraine’s legal framework governs the economic rela-
tions between public and private sectors through a number of 
laws and regulations, among them the Economic Code of Ukraine, 
the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Budget Code of Ukraine, the Law of 
Ukraine “On Leasing State and Communal Property,” the Law of 
Ukraine “On Concession,” the Law of Ukraine “On Concession 
for the Construction and Operation of Motor Roads,” the Law of 
Ukraine “On the Administration of State and Communal Proper-
ty,” the Law of Ukraine “On Financial Leasing,” the Law of 
Ukraine “On the Peculiarities of Lease or Concession Facilities of 
Centralised Water-supply and Sanitation that are Municipally 
Owned,” the Law of Ukraine “On Peculiarities of Lease or Conces-
sion of State-owned Fuel and Energy Complex,” the Law of 
Ukraine “On Local Government” etc. 
Among the special legislations regulating the state’s interaction 
with the private sector within the framework of PPP, we should 
single out the Law of Ukraine “On State-Private Partnership” (PPP 
Law) that is of a framework nature, and the Concept of the Devel-
opment of Public-Private Partnerships in the Housing and Munic-
ipal Economy (approved by the Cabinet of the Ministers of 
Ukraine). The PPP Law specifies the following PPP forms: conces-
sion, joint activity and others. 
The PPP Law contains many indirectly referring regulations. 
Choosing a particular form for the PPP project implementation, 
stakeholders should examine numerous pieces of legislation that 
may not be in sync with each other. Both the large number of 
laws that regulate the PPPs and the contradictions between them 
make the PPP implementation in Ukraine rather difficult. In addi-
tion, at the local government level investment projects are regu-
lated by numerous local acts as well, which are also not always 
consistent with the regulations of the PPP Law. 
In view of the existing contradictions in the legislative and 
regulatory base and the actual impossibility of fast implementa-
tion and the harmonisation of the Law of Ukraine “On State-
Private Partnership” with other special laws, it is necessary to de-
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velop PPP on the basis of PPP Law, which should serve as a 
framework law. It requires the following: 
1) improving the PPP Law to ensure a clearer outlining of the 
competences of the authorities that become involved in PPPs at 
all stages at both central and local levels; more accurate for-
mulation of PPP characteristics as regards delegating the func-
tions and competences of the government to the private sector 
related to infrastructure development and public services; im-
proving the list of PPP application areas; introducing the possi-
bility of institutional partnership, including the creation of a 
‘special purpose company’;15 
2) harmonising regulations of the PPP Law with the special laws 
that regulate the contractual relationship between the state and 
the private sector in the field of concession, joint activity, lease 
and so on;  
3) introducing tools of methodological support for PPPs by con-
tractual forms;  
4) legal regulation of issues of assets created under PPPs; 
5) improving the mechanism of settling disputes arising out of 
any PPP agreement with the participation of a non-resident or 
an enterprise with foreign investments; and  
6) further legislative efforts to introduce stimulating tariff regula-
tion.  
4) Problems of PPPs at local level 
The activity of local authorities to involve the private sector in the 
PPP implementation remains extremely low due to the institution-
al causes while the main potential of infrastructure development 
and improving the quality of public services is at the local level. In 
Ukraine weak local PPPs are associated with the shortcomings of 
current legislation, low awareness of local government entities 
and private business of PPP features, lack of qualified staff in local 
governments for the PPP preparation and maintenance. The pri-
                                                 
15 A Special Purpose Company is a project company which usually acts as a 
general contractor in a PPP project. 
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vate sector’s willingness to participate in infrastructure projects 
remains quite low, as evidenced by the results of the survey con-
ducted under the auspices of USAID.16 Only 3 per cent of the sur-
veyed businesses have been involved in “quasi PPP” projects. 
However, only 39 per cent of business respondents are interested 
in participating in PPPs. At the same time, such a share of local 
government entities totals 62 per cent. 
The key task of developing PPPs at the local level is to ensure 
the implementation of pilot projects via a unified algorithm of se-
lection, examination, agreement, and by the involvement of ap-
propriate experts. 
PPP projects at the local level should involve financial re-
sources both from oblast and municipal budgets that are respon-
sible for constructing, operating and maintaining local infrastruc-
ture projects. The new legislative regulation of the relationship 
between local government bodies and the PPP unit (Department of 
Investment and Innovation Policy in the Ukranian Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade) will provide the right of local 
government bodies to make independent decisions on PPP expedi-
ency and implementation. 
5) Conclusions 
In order to improve the PPP management system in Ukraine, the 
government should establish relations with international institu-
tions and promote more intensively the formation of national in-
stitutions whose activities should be oriented to the priorities of 
innovation-based modernisation of the national economy, using 
modern risk management approaches. The establishment of insti-
tutions should be carried out by observing the financial sustaina-
bility, resource diversification, investment risks minimisation, 
administrative pressure and corruption risks elimination re-
quirements. 
The role of financial institutions (special banks, state corpora-
tions and leasing companies, innovation funds, regional develop-
ment funds and agencies, etc.) will be providing financial, adviso-
                                                 
16 Besedina–Nizalov–Semko  (2012). 
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ry and information support for PPP projects. Non-financial insti-
tutions (techno parks, industrial parks, business incubators, spe-
cial economic zones, research centers, centers of technology 
transfer, and others) will advance the development of business 
infrastructure within the PPP framework, improvement in the 
qualifications of state officials and integration of PPP issues into 
the academic programmes for specialists prepared by state au-
thorities and local government bodies. Training sessions, seminars 
and roundtables on PPP should be organised as well. 
The necessity and effectiveness of co-operation between public 
and private sectors are determined by institutional factors associ-
ated with the level of economic freedom. Further PPP development 
requires an active participation of the community in the prepara-
tion and implementation of PPP projects, especially at the local 
level. Moreover, PPP as an institution in Ukraine needs to fix its 
principles in national and regional strategies for socio-economic 
development, the creation of institutional environment, improve-
ment of its legal framework, and the introduction of public en-
forcement of contractual obligations by all partners. 
 
* * * * * 
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ENVIRONMENT, SUSTAINABILITY                           
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE – THE CASE                
OF THE NORTHERN ARAL SEA REGION 
Alpár Sz×ke 
1) The ‘topic’ of the Aral Sea 
The Aral Sea region is the perfect example to show how negative 
externalities and mismanaged natural resources resulting in an 
environmental catastrophe can turn a prosperous region into an 
infamous area hit by both an economic and a social crisis. As the 
Aral Sea disaster is one of the most serious man-made environ-
mental catastrophes the world has ever seen it can serve as an ex-
ample for governments and other organizations of the importance 
of environmentally conscious decision-making for the sake of 
long-term economic sustainability. 
 The Aral Sea Basin had been a prosperous region until the 
1960’s when the first signs of an environmental catastrophe that 
later on led to the desiccation of the Aral Sea started to show. This 
has eventually caused huge biological and geographical damage 
and the economy traditionally based on the fishing industry col-
lapsed as well. This process could not be reversed until the early 
1990’s. 
As the issue of the environmental, economic and social crises of 
the whole Aral Sea Basin is too complex the interrelation between 
the ecology and economy will be examined in the context of the 
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‘Little Aral’ region located in Kazakhstan through analysing the 
economic performance of the Aralsk County and the city of 
Aralsk, a major former port of the county. 
Firstly, the study will try to set up and prove the logical con-
nection between the economy and the environment of a region 
with the help of the Aral Sea’s example, by concentrating on its 
northern part, the Little Aral. As a first step it will analyse the re-
gion before the sea started to dry up. Secondly, it will describe 
how an environmentally ignorant economic policy led not only to 
an ecological disaster but social and economic crises as well. 
Thirdly, it will focus on the national and international co-
operation that strived to save the sea and reinvigorate the area. By 
analysing the policies and actions of the period following Kazakh-
stan’s declaration of independence, the study will show the effects 
that the environmentally conscious policies had on the economy 
of the Little Aral’s region. The research comes to the conclusion 
that the Little Aral region cannot prosper without a stable envi-
ronmental background, which in this case would be provided by 
the sea. The study shall attempt to prove the following hypothesis: 
the performance of a region’s economy is dependent on the qual-
ity of the environment surrounding it. 
This topic has been widely dealt with internationally, especially 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hundreds of biologists, ge-
ographers, journalists and other professionals travelled from 
across the globe to have first-hand experience on this unique ca-
tastrophe. They have published numerous research papers, essays 
and articles about their findings. Even though these papers often 
mention the social and economic impacts that the crisis had on 
the area the number of articles thoroughly studying the economic 
impact of the catastrophe on the everyday life of people living 
around the sea is limited. For this reason the study will try to ana-
lyse the economic and social consequences of the environmental 
change. 
In order to have a better understanding of the events that oc-
curred in the region over the last 50 years and gather primary 
data the author made a field trip to the Northern Aral Sea and in-
terviewed community leaders and chief officials. Some of them 
had been in senior positions since the Soviet era. There were di-
rectors, owners of fish processing factories, heads of the local 
government and other leading personalities from the community 
of Aralsk among the interviewees. With the help of all the infor-
mation gleaned from the interviews the study will show how a 
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prosperous region turned into an infamous area and began to re-
cover during the last decade thanks to the impact of governmental 
and foreign activities aimed to save the environment. 
2) The history of the Aral Sea Basin 
The Aral Sea is located in Central Asia and it is bordered from the 
north by Kazakhstan and from the south by Uzbekistan. Its water 
supply comes from two major rivers of the region, the Amu Darya 
(2,600 km, draining 692,300 km2) and the Syr Darya (2,212 km, 
draining 493,000 km2) with a combined average annual flow of 
115.6 km3.1 It used to be the fourth largest inland body of water 
on the planet. Before the 1960’s it had a surface area of 68,000 
km2, its mean water level was 53.4 m and it contained 1,090 km3 
of water.2  
People living on the banks of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya 
had been growing crops for several millennia and the area under 
irrigation was growing constantly until the end of the Soviet era. 
From the second half of the 19th century Central Asia came under 
the influence of the Russian Empire. The Russian leadership set its 
sights on transforming the area into a large agricultural and cot-
ton producing region from the very beginning. This desire grew 
even stronger during the Soviet Union when initially Stalin’s five-
year plans and later on Khrushchev’s “Virgin Land” project in the 
1950’s demanded and forced the expansion of cotton production 
in the area.3 Their ultimate aim was to transform the Soviet Union 
into the world’s leading cotton producer.  
An initial step in the realisation of the project was to take the 
control over water management away from regional level and to 
transfer it into the hands of the centralised leadership. The sus-
tainability of the irrigation system was destroyed when the small 
                                                 
1 McKinney (1997).  
2 Glantz (1999). 
3 In 1956 the Moscow leadership decided the “irrigation and reclamation of 
the virgin lands of the Golodnaya Steppe in the Uzbek S.S.R. and Kazak S.S.R. 
for increasing the production of cotton.” Matley (1970) 342. Large-scale ‘Vir-
gin Land’ projects originally and basically aimed at increasing Soviet grain 
production.  
Alpár Sz×ke 136 
local farms were organised into large collective farms and a new 
irrigation system was created that demanded higher quantities of 
water. In order to satisfy the increased demand for irrigation, the 
flows of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers were diverted. 
This was essential for making the vast steppes and deserts of Ka-
zakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan fertile.  
The two major feeding rivers of the sea originate from the 
mountain areas of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. How-
ever, most of their flow is consumed by the two downstream 
countries, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.4 The Amu Darya feeds 
the sea from the south and flows through Turkmenistan and Uz-
bekistan while the Syr Darya flows through Uzbekistan and 
Southern Kazakhstan thus feeding the sea from the north. As the 
Aral Sea is no longer a coherent body of water it is more precise to 
say that the Amu Darya became the feeding river of the Southern 
Aral and the Syr Darya became the feeding river of the Northern 
Aral (or Little Aral).5  
The following table shows the growth in cotton production 
over time in the Uzbekh, Tajik and Turkmen SSRs. These data are 
relevant since exactly these three countries became the major 
producers of cotton in Central Asia. Figures also give an explana-
tion why the extent of water withdrawal from the two rivers was 
constantly and necessarily increasing. While the Kazakh SSR had 
also increased its output of cotton it never became as influential as 
its neighbours. Table 1 clearly shows that the Uzbek SSR was by 
far the major producer with roughly two-thirds of the whole So-
viet production. Over the 75 year period presented in the table 
cotton production increased around 12-fold from the level of the 
beginning of the 1900’s to the amount measured at the end of the 
Soviet era. 
 
                                                 
4 Spoor and Krutov (2003).  
5 As a consequence of the diversions of the two rivers the Aral sea first split into 
two lakes, the Northern Aral and the Southern Aral. On the territory of the 
once united sea a desert called ’Aralkum’ (Aral Sands) had been formed. Later 
on the Southern Aral Sea had also split into eastern and western lobes that re-
mained connected at both ends. (http://euroheritage.net/sovietcollectivizat-
ion.shtml and NASA Earth Observatory at http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ 
Features/WorldOfChange/aral_sea.php) 
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Table 1 
Cotton production in the Soviet republics, 1913-1988  
(in thousands of tonnes of raw cotton) 
 
 Tajik Turkmen Uzbek USSR 
1913 32 69 517 744 
1940 172 211 1,386 2,237 
1953 390 308 2,432 3,853 
1956 415 334 2,857 4,332 
1960 399 363 2,949 4,289 
1963 609 553 3,904 5,662 
1970 727 869 4,495 6,890 
1975 836 1,079 5,330 7,864 
1980 1,011 1,258 6,245 9,962 
1985 935 1,287 5,382 8,755 
1988 936 1,341 5,365 8,689 
Source: Craumer (1992): 144 
 
As a result of the increased agricultural activity in the 20th cen-
tury the territory under irrigation in Central Asia increased from 
3 million hectares (1900) to 5 million hectares (1960) and later 
to 6.5 million hectares (1980). Irrigation did not have a major 
effect on the sea until the 1960’s but from that point onwards the 
sea level started to sink due to the ever increasing amount of wa-
ter (132 km3 by 1980) withdrawn from the two rivers.6 The So-
viet cotton production plan was clearly unsustainable from an 
environmental point of view.  
With the expanding agricultural projects the two rivers could 
not satisfy the increased demand for water anymore and the 
quantity of water reaching the sea gradually decreased. Approxi-
mately half of the two major rivers’ flow reached the Aral Sea be-
fore the increased agricultural activity. By the 1980’s their supply 
of water stopped entirely on several occasions. This led to the 
gradual shrinking of surface water levels, higher salinity and 
growing pollution. The once 68,000 km2 sea shrank step by step 
to a quarter of its original size. As the water retreated fishing vil-
lages were left several kilometres away from the sea. Due to the 
high salinity level all the indigenous fish died out (more than 20 
species) leaving a large per cent of the local population, formerly 
                                                 
6 Micklin (1988). 
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engaged by the fishing industry, unemployed and the economy in 
ruins. Besides unemployment the society was left to cope with the 
damages caused to the environment affecting their everyday life.  
 In 1990 the water split into two parts.7 Since then the south-
ern part situated in Uzbekistan is called the Big Aral and the 
northern part located in Kazakhstan is called the Little Aral. Today 
the Northern Aral Sea (Little Aral) is a lake of 3,306.7 km2 in ter-
ritory and 28.2 km3 in water volume.8 It is situated in the Kyzy-
lorda region of the country under the direct jurisdiction of Aralsk 
County. The biggest town of the county is Aralsk, a former seaport 
that now is surrounded by a desert-like area and lies around 20 
km away from the closest bank of the sea.  
3) Theory and practice – environment                         
and economy in the Northern Aral Sea  
3.1.  Mismanaged natural resources 
In order to understand the underlying reasons that led to the dis-
aster of the Aral Sea it is worth studying environmental theories. 
In the case of the Aral Sea natural resources are at the centre of 
attention, which are usually divided into the following three 
groups: renewable (e.g.: water, wind), non-renewable (e.g.: min-
erals, fossil fuels), and partially renewable (e.g.: timber). 
According to Sándor Kerekes the requirements of Sustainable 
Development with regard to these elements can be summarized in 
the following three points:9 
(1) The rate of consumption of the natural resources must not 
exceed the rate of renewability; 
(2) the rate of waste generation by human activity should not ex-
ceed the capacity of nature to absorb these waste materials; 
                                                 
7 Fletcher (2007). 
8 The Aral Department of the Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries LLP . 
9 Kerekes (2007) 32. 
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(3) the use of non-renewable natural resources should be con-
ducted in a wise and regulated way, at a timely pace so that 
their benefits could be maximised over a longer time span 
and they could be substituted with renewable resources after 
depletion. 
Kerekes states that should the above-mentioned three criteria 
not be met it will lead to a shortage of resources if:  
(1) The natural resources in question are necessities for the eco-
nomic system; 
(2) the natural resources cannot be substituted with human capital; 
(3) the depletion of natural capital cannot be outbalanced by 
technological innovation.10 
The above-mentioned requirements were not applied in our 
case when the rate of the consumption of a natural resource (i.e. 
water) exceeded the rate of its renewability and the rate of waste 
generation (i.e. pesticides) by human activity (i.e. agriculture) ex-
ceeded the capacity of nature to absorb the waste materials. As 
Kerekes explains if the natural capital in question is a necessity 
for the economic system, which cannot be substituted with hu-
man capital or outbalanced by technological innovation, it will 
lead to a shortage of resources like it did in the Aral Sea region as 
water became scarce.  
Before the new irrigation system was implemented the Soviet 
leadership tried to assess the possible effects it might have on the re-
gional environment. Naturally the reduced water flows reaching the 
sea through the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya were foreseen by eve-
ryone, however, the results that this would cause created some de-
bate. The general belief was that even though the sea level would be 
substantially reduced this is a ‘worthy’ trade-off as one cubic meter 
of water brings more value when used for irrigation than it would 
bring in the Aral Sea. The calculation was based “on a simple com-
parison of irrigated agriculture against tangible economic benefits 
from the sea”.11 Many experts shared the opinion that the shrinkage 
of the Aral Sea is not only inevitable but desirable in order to use the 
water to increase the economic gains from agriculture. Only a small 
number of scientists warned against the serious effects of the Aral 
Sea’s desiccation while others argued that this would have almost no 
effect on the region’s economy or its environment. Even the obvious 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 32.  
11 Micklin (1988). 
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assumption of large quantities of salt from the bottom of the dried-
up seabed being blown onto the adjacent agricultural fields was 
dismissed.12  
Contrary to these reports and opinions the consequences of the 
partly dried-up sea on the region’s environment were far-
reaching and serious. Huge, previously unheard of storms had 
been reported in the area since 1975, and the climate of the re-
gion became more extreme with winters becoming colder and 
summers becoming hotter and extremely dry. The salt and dust 
from the dried-up seabed has been blown all over the place by the 
wind, causing major damages in the cultivated lands. Traces of 
salt have been found as far as 1000 km away from the sea. In ad-
dition, more than 20 fish species disappeared from the sea as wa-
ter levels dropped and salinity increased 2.5-fold.13  
3.2. The lack of sustainability 
The above-mentioned evidence clearly shows that regarding the 
water management of the Aral Sea Basin the principles of sustain-
able development – i.e. “development which meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” – were completely neglected.14 Soviet deci-
sion makers have clearly put short-term development ahead of 
long-term consequences, thus hugely damaging the environment 
and transferring this damage to society and the economy as well. 
They not only decided to use the water resources of the Syr Darya 
and the Amu Darya for irrigation purposes but they did so in an 
extremely inefficient manner as well. The watering of vast cotton 
and rice monocultures was badly organized thus allowing huge 
amounts of water to run off from the cultivable territories instead 
of nourishing the plants. Moreover, the large quantities of fertilis-
ers that had been used to improve the productivity of these lands 
were washed back into the rivers and were carried into the sea. 
This was an additional element that compromised the quality of the 
sea water. Even if the decision makers in Moscow controlling the 
events did not anticipate the problems beforehand that were trig-
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 UN (2010) 2. 
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gered by their actions they must have realised them afterwards 
when the evidence was visible. However, even at that stage they did 
not alter their plan to become a cotton-producing superpower even 
at the high cost of destroying the environment.  
In a study published in 1998 by D. Pearce and G. Atkins a 
quantitative formula was introduced to measure sustainable de-
velopment. With the help of this formula it is possible to analyse 
the performance of the implemented governmental projects in the 
Aral Sea region from the point of sustainability. The formula im-
plies the following three variables: man-made capital (KM), hu-
man capital (KH) and natural capital (KN), where (KM) stands for 
the goods produced by humans, (KH) represents the knowledge 
and skills possessed by mankind and (KN) refers to both renew-
able and non-renewable natural resources.  
These variables have to satisfy the following equation in order 
to meet the definition of sustainability: 
dK/dt  0, where K = KM + KH + KN15 
This implies that “the change of aggregate assets at any point in 
time must be at least zero in aggregate.”16 This correlation stands 
for a so-called ‘weak sustainability’ as it suggests that the different 
forms of capital are interchangeable as K stands for the aggregate 
asset stock. According to the weak sustainability a decrease in natu-
ral capital can be outbalanced by an increase in human capital. 
This means that even the effects of a major natural disaster could 
be outweighed by improvements in the other factors. 
In response to the critiques that natural capital cannot be 
traded off for other forms of capital, the theory of ‘strong sustain-
ability’ has been formed.17 Strong sustainability does not neces-
sarily dismiss ‘weak sustainability’; rather it supplements it by 
stating that the stock of natural capital should not decline: 
dK/dt  0  and   dKN/dt  018 
                                                 
15 The change of capital (dK) over a period of time (dt) has to be greater or 
equal to zero. Where total capital (K) is the sum of the following three varia-
bles: (KM), (KM), (KN). 
16 Pearce and Atkinson (1998) 6. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Strong sustainability (SS) requires both equations to be true at the same time: 
The change of capital (dK) over a period of time (dt) has to be greater or equal 
to zero while the change of natural capital (dKN) over a period of time (dt) has 
to be greater or equal to zero as well. 
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By stating that natural capital should not decline, ‘strong sus-
tainability’ does not require renewable and non-renewable re-
sources to remain constant. KN is a heterogeneous form of capital 
that can be measured by adding a monetary value to the stock. 
However, the valuation of resources is constantly changing and 
no one can predict what a barrel of oil or a km2 of forest would be 
worth ten years from now. In other words we cannot know what 
value today’s trade-offs will hold for future generations.  
In addition, Pearce and Atkinson list a couple of reasons why 
strong sustainability is favoured: 
(1) Trade-offs between natural capital and other forms of capital 
should be treated carefully until we do not have the perfect 
knowledge about the operation of the ecosystem. In this case 
it is better to conserve natural capital than to do some irre-
versible harm. 
(2) The asymmetry between the reversibility of different forms of 
capital is also a reason for favouring strong sustainability. 
While harm done to man-made capital is generally reversible 
this is not the case with natural capital. 
(3) The uncertainty about the scale of effects that are caused by 
the loss of some form of critical natural capital. For example, 
there is a broad disagreement over the magnitude of harm 
done by global warming.19 
If these aspects are not considered carefully they may lead to 
environmental catastrophes just like in the case of the Aral Sea 
where the theories of both strong and weak sustainability were 
neglected. Even though strong sustainability states that natural 
capital cannot be traded off for other forms of capital, this was 
exactly what Soviet politicians intended to do, claiming that “a 
cubic meter of river water used for irrigation would bring far 
more value than the same cubic meter delivered to the Aral 
Sea.”20 Nonetheless, if we carefully examine this claim which in 
itself would satisfy the theory of weak sustainability, “the change 
of aggregate assets at any point in time must be at least zero in 
aggregate,”21 it is clear that not even the requirements of weak 
sustainability were met albeit the plans of the Moscow leadership 
were successful and the cotton and rice production have multi-
                                                 
19 Pearce and Atkinson (1998) 15. 
20 Micklin (1988).  
21 Pearce–Atkinson (1998) 3. 
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plied due to the extensive irrigation introduced along the two riv-
ers. In order to have a look at this we have to take the equation 
based on weak sustainability, introduced above, showing the in-
terrelation between the different forms of capital as K = KM + KH 
+ KN. The increase in cotton output can be accounted as a posi-
tive change in man-made capital (KM) but looking at the change 
in natural capital (KN), the losses and the damages have been 
huge. It is difficult to make a cost-benefit analysis based on exact 
calculations, due to the methodological limits of this study and the 
difficulties of collecting precise data from the Soviet era when the 
numeric results of economic actions were altered, hidden or mis-
reported many times only to please the central leadership. That is 
why this article will only list some of the major environmental 
damages that had or still have a negative influence on the econ-
omy. Since the 1960’s there were obvious signs of the deteriora-
tion of the environment and until the early 1990’s the following 
phenomena have been observed. The water level of the sea has 
dropped 14 meters, its surface has shrunk by 40 per cent, its wa-
ter mass has dropped by 65 per cent, its salinity level has in-
creased 2.5-fold and the sea has retreated in some places more 
than a 100 km from its original shores.22 As a result of these 
changes in the living habitat of fish all species (more than 20) be-
came extinct in the Aral Sea23 that “previously yielded 7 per cent 
of all fish caught in the former USSR”24 and made up a reported 
commercial catch of 48,000 metric tonnes (in 1958). As a direct 
result approximately 60,000 people, who used to be directly or 
indirectly employed by the fishing industry, lost their jobs.25  
The former seabed became uncovered over an area that ex-
ceeds 2 million hectares. The dust and salt from this land is now 
carried to the former agricultural lands by windstorms making 
cultivation impossible. Agricultural activity is further hindered by 
the climate change that caused long, dry and extremely hot sum-
mers followed by long and extremely cold winters. 
The environmental changes did not leave society unaffected. 
The overall mortality rate doubled between 1970 and 1990,26 
acute respiratory problems became high in number, just like liver 
                                                 
22 Lipovsky (1995). 
23 Micklen (1988). 
24 Lipovsky (1995). 
25 Micklin (1988). 
26 Lipovsky (1995). 
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and kidney diseases from the contaminated water.27 It is hard to 
define the cause of each type of disease that made the population 
suffer but the pesticide-contaminated water sources, the dry, 
dusty and salty air together with the extreme climate are all to 
blame. “The people in the area clearly suffer from the effects of an 
environmental health crisis.”28 The health deterioration of the 
population had a negative effect on the economy by increasing 
healthcare expenses and decreasing the value of human-capital 
(KH). Going back to the capital equation again (K=KM+KH+KN) 
it is obvious that natural-capital (KN), together with human-
capital (KH) suffered a huge blow. While it is hard to accurately 
determine the monetary value of the agricultural benefits from 
the extensive irrigation or the losses suffered by the fishing indus-
try, the economy and society around the Aral Sea, it can be as-
sumed that not even the principles of weak sustainability were 
met and the overall stock of capital (K) suffered a great loss dur-
ing the period in question. 
Even if in many cases it is hard to determine the monetary 
value of the environment, as regards the Aral Sea the harm done 
by the deterioration of the natural-capital is so great that it is 
clear the Soviet leadership had not estimated the costs and bene-
fits correctly before undertaking the project. Looking back on the 
theory of strong sustainability Pearce and Atkinson list a couple of 
reasons why strong sustainability should be favoured. Their 
warnings consider the lack of perfect knowledge that humans 
have about the ecosystem before undertaking a project and the 
irreversible damage that this might cause which is exactly what 
happened in our case when the prognosis about the effects of the 
irrigation project were overoptimistic. Unfortunately, this is not 
the only warning that turned into reality in the case of the Aral 
Sea as the scale effects caused by the loss of some form of critical 
natural capital, in our case the sea, were also underestimated 
when Soviet experts played down its role in the climate and biodi-
versity of the region. While the harm done to man-made capital 
might be reversed over time, the natural capital (biodiversity) of 
the region will never be the same.  
 
                                                 
27 Wilsh–Wilson (2002). 
28 Ibid. 
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3.3. The Northern Aral Sea region 
As already mentioned, the tragedy of the Aral Sea will be exam-
ined through the case of the Northern Aral Sea region. By analys-
ing only a fraction of the Aral Sea Basin it will grant the opportu-
nity to unveil some interrelations between the environment and 
economy in a more detailed fashion. The northern part of the sea 
is situated entirely in Kazakhstan in the Kyzylorda region and it is 
under the direct jurisdiction of the city of Aralsk, the centre of 
Aralsk County. Besides the city of Aralsk there are 23 villages in 
the county with a total population of 72,500 out of which about 
38,000 people live in Aralsk.29 
The fact that the population of the county used to be around 
80,000 people at the beginning of the 1960’s shows the extent of 
emigration from the area due to the dramatically worsened living 
conditions. The region was severely hit by the negative circum-
stances deriving from the extensive agricultural proceedings 
along the banks of the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya.  
The economy of the region used to be stable similarly to the 
environmental and living standards until the 1960’s. The local 
economy was dominated by the fishing industry which made a 
huge contribution to total former USSR’s fish production.30 Fish-
ing activity in the region was co-ordinated by a big industrial 
complex, “Aral Rybprom”. It had 1,500 employees with a proc-
essing capacity of 6,000 tonnes.  
There were nine collective fish-farms under its control31 to-
gether with six fish-processing factories.32 The situation, how-
                                                 
29 Nurgaliev (2012). Sabidzhan Nurgaliev, Head of the Agricultural Depart-
ment of the Aralsk County Office, was approached to provide general infor-
mation about the size and population of the county and its centre, the city of 
Aralsk. He has been leading the Agricultural Department of Aralsk since the 
1970’s, thus he was able to share his first-hand experience about the tenden-
cies that shaped the region since the 1960’s such as employment, emigration, 
the history and the present of the local fishing industry. As a conclusion of the 
interview he expressed his personal opinion on the policies and measures that 
have been implemented since the country gained independence. 
30 Lipovsky (1995). 
31 Nurgaliev (2012). 
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ever, started to deteriorate quickly from the 1960’s onwards as 
the effects of the extensive cotton production started to appear in 
the region. During the 1970’s the activity of “Aral Rybprom” had 
to be cut back and the number of fish-farms had been reduced to 
three. The living conditions in the Aral Sea region had been wors-
ening year by year, thus the previous rate of fishing was impossi-
ble to maintain. According to the data received from the Aral De-
partment of the Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries 
LLP (Table 2) the highest catch in the Aral Sea was recorded in 
1962 at 41,170 tonnes. That particular year the sea level was 
above 53 meters, its territory was 66,646 km2, the volume of wa-
ter totalled at 1,072.6 km3 and the salinity level stood at 10.26 
per cent. Parallel with the shrinkage of the sea territory and the 
decline in water levels the salinity of the water increased causing 
a decline in the number of fish. By 1967 the volume of fish-catch 
went under 20,000 tonnes and by 1976 under 10,000 tonnes. 
By 1984 the industrial fishing activity ceased to exist in the 
whole Aral Sea Basin including Aral County. Most species became 
extinct as the volume of sea water decreased to 320 km3 and sa-
linity level reached 29.6 per cent. Nevertheless, the labour force 
employed by the fishing industry was safe during the Soviet era as 
the regime did not allow unemployment. The central leadership 
decided to transport fish from other parts of the country, mainly 
from the Baltic Sea, to be processed in the factories of “Aral 
Rybprom”.33 Meanwhile the fishermen were transferred periodi-
cally to other lakes and seas within the Soviet Union to continue 
their activities. With these measures “Aral Rybprom” could con-
tinue its activity despite the environmental catastrophe. 
Even though the effects of the environmental disaster on the 
economy and society were toned down by the Soviet regime the 
living standard of the county was rapidly declining. The shrinking 
employment possibilities coupled with the worsening quality of 
life caused a large wave of emigration from the county.34 
                                                                                                              
32 Aimbetov (2012). Adilbek Aimbetov – owner of the “Aral Service” fish pro-
cessing factory and former director of the Soviet fish processing conglomerate 
“Aral Rybprom” – was approached because of his first-hand insight into the 
fishing industry during both the Soviet times and nowadays. He explained how 
the fishing industry operated in the region during the Soviet Union, how the 
sea started to dry up from the 1960’s and what were the responses of the facto-
ries to these changes. He also explained the way he bought and operates now 
one of the former factories to process fish. 
33 Aimbetov (2012). 
34 Nurgaliev (2012). 
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Table 2 
Basic data on the Aral Sea 
(1961–1989) 
 
Year Water level (m) 
Sea territory 
(km2) 
Sea volume 
(km3) 
Salinity level 
(%) 
Fish catch 
(tonnes) 
1961 53.38 67,888 1,092.4 9.90 34,160 
1962 53.12 66,647 1,072.6 10.26 41,170 
1963 52.72 64,935 1,045.2 10.49 39,670 
1964 52.46 63,957 1,026.6 10.76 41,120 
1965 52.26 63,875 1,027.2 10.51 31,040 
1966 52.06 62,244 1,000.2 10.92 25,060 
1967 51.06 61,196 975.6 11.09 21,820 
1968 51.44 60,676 961.8 11.20 16,470 
1969 51.66 59,777 938.6 11.35 18,900 
1970 51.56 60,359 969.6 11.13 17,460 
1971 51.26 60,297 961.8 11.62 14,960 
1972 50.80 59,323 923.6 11.74 16,730 
1973 50.28 58,512 832.3 12.06 16,970 
1974 50.14 58,293 834.8 12.38 15,500 
1975 49.36 57,202 839.6 13.72 13,462 
1976 48.52 56,030 732.2 13.95 9,027 
1977 47.90 55,140 758.6 14.33 6,007 
1978 47.31 54,229 725.6 15.24 4,045 
1979 46.38 53,392 696.0 15.82 2,009 
1980 46.22 52,482 677.0 16.50 2,935 
1981 45.29 50,900 621.2 17.42 656 
1982 44.60 49,680 585.4 19.18 76 
1983 43.82 48,294 544.0 20.29 0 
1984 42.90 46,730 498.0 21.98 0 
1985 42.00 44,400 466.0 23.50 0 
1986 41.45 42,500 424.0 24.74 0 
1987 40.72 41,330 383.0 26.55 0 
1988 39.87 38,665 361.0 27.90 0 
1989 38.80 37,330 320.0 29.60 0 
Source: Aral Department of the Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries LLP. 
Alpár Sz×ke 148 
3.4. The post-Soviet era 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan and Kazakh-
stan became independent countries in December 1991. This 
brought an end to the former large-scale co-operation that had 
been introduced to maintain the activity of the fish industry in the 
Aral Sea Basin and to guarantee employment for the people. Ac-
cording to Adilbek Aimbetov, the former director of “Aral 
Rybprom”, the company faced a severe crisis after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Former collaboration could not be revived with 
the newly independent states and there was a steady wave of mak-
ing workers redundant in an attempt to fight bankruptcy. In 1997 
“Aral Rybprom” had been privatised but bankruptcy still could not 
be avoided and two years later its activity was shut down. 
Besides “Aral Rybprom” further participants of the fishing, 
shipping and other sea-related industries have been shut down as 
governmental subsidies faded. The agricultural sector was also 
seriously affected due to the rising concentration of salt in the soil. 
This resulted in a reduction of crop quality and crop yields. Right 
after gaining independence unemployment soared in the region.  
With Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan now being independent, the 
Aral Sea Basin was divided between the two countries. Since 1991 
the Northern part of the Aral Sea, often called Little Aral, has been 
recognised as a separate part and since then it belongs under the 
jurisdiction of the Aral County. From this point onwards the fu-
ture of the Northern Aral Sea was entirely in the hands of the Ka-
zakh government which was short of resources to do anything 
notable at that time. Foreign journalists, scientists and other ex-
perts started coming to the Aral Sea Basin in increasing numbers 
but their ideas regarding the saving of the region were usually too 
theoretical and far-fetched. Locals tried to revive the northern 
part of the sea by building dykes in an effort to prevent water 
from flowing away towards the south into the vast dried up sea-
bed. Without the adequate resources these dams were too primi-
tive to last more than two years and to withhold the water when 
its level rose too high.35  
                                                 
35 Pala (2005). 
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The 1990’s was a crucial period in the life of the sea. After 
shaking off the burden of centralisation the countries of Central 
Asia could take matters in their own hands. All of them gradually 
realised that their respective water safety requires a certain level 
of co-operation, thus several international organisations have 
been formed (e.g.: the International Fund for the Aral Sea, the In-
terstate Council on the Aral Sea Basin Problems) with the agenda 
of solving the problems of the Aral Sea. Even the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) ap-
pointed a Scientific Advisory Board for the Aral Sea Basin 
(SABAS). However, none of these organisations managed to 
achieve any tangible result except for writing documents and re-
ports about different scenarios.36 After the failure of several or-
ganisations the World Bank together with the United Nations En-
vironment and Development Programs initiated a new pro-
gramme to address the crisis. The Executive Committee of the In-
terstate Council for the Aral Sea was established to take care of 
developing and implementing policies of the World Bank that aim 
to “mitigate the impacts of the environmental degradation, to de-
velop sustainable water management strategies, and to develop 
regional institutions with the capacity to implement the pro-
gram.”37 In addition, since the early 1990’s the economic fortune 
of Kazakhstan has changed considerably. With huge incomes 
from natural resources the Kazakh government has had enough 
capital lately to tackle some of the issues in the Northern Aral Sea 
Region and despite many pessimistic beliefs and forecasts the gov-
ernment of Kazakhstan decided to implement actions that would 
repair the damages done and foster sustainability. 
 A big achievement was reached in 2003 when the World Bank 
and the government of Kazakhstan agreed on a jointly funded 
USD 85 million project that resulted in the implementation of a 
13 km-long, new dam being built on the southern border of the 
Little Aral and included works that reduced irrigation waste along 
the Syr Darya.38 The construction of the dam was finished in 
2005 and it brought instant and visible changes to the region. The 
water level, the sea territory and sea volume have all been stabi-
lised since then making it possible to restart industrial fishing ac-
tivity in the region.  
                                                 
36 Wish-Wilson (2002). 
37 McKinney (1997) 5. 
38 Pala (2005). 
Alpár Sz×ke 150 
It is important to mention that according to some experts this 
new dam hinders the chances of reinvigorating the Aral Sea as a 
whole because it keeps the water away from the Southern Aral.39 
At the same time many scientists argue that if the Kok Aral dam 
were not in place, the water would flow away and spread across 
the dried-up seabed without ever reaching the Southern Aral. 
However, one thing is for certain. The Northern Aral region has 
greatly benefited from the completion of the dam and this 
achievement fuels hopes for further improvements in the future. 
Table 3 shows the important role it played in stabilising the sea 
level and reinvigorating the fishing industry.  
 
Table 3 
Basic data on the Northern Aral Sea 
 
Year Water level (m) 
Sea territory 
(km2) 
Sea volume 
(km3) 
Salinity level 
(%) 
Fish catch 
(tonnes) 
1991 39.0 2650 19.26 33.8 50 
1992 39.0 2650 19.26 28.6 100 
1993 40.0 2,868.9 22.02 22 85 
1994 40.0 2,868.9 22.02 19.4 0 
1995 40.0 2,868.9 22.02 20.1 0 
1996 41.0 3,087.8 25 20.4 650 
1997 41.0 3,087.8 25 20.5 720 
1998 41.0 3,087.8 25 14.5 945 
1999 39.0 2,650 19.26 16 1,050 
2000 39.0 2,650 19.26 17 1,155 
2001 39.0 2,650 19.26 18.6 1,225 
2002 39.0 2,650 19.26 15.1 1,260 
2003 39.0 2,650 19.26 10.7 83 
2004 40.0 2,868.9 22.02 12.4 52 
2005 42.0 3,306.7 28.2 10.3 695 
2006 42.0 3,306.7 28.2 8.9 1,360 
2007 42.0 3,306.7 28.2 6.3 1,910 
2008 42.0 3,306.7 28.2 12.1 1,490 
2009 42.0 3,306.7 28.2 12.8 1,885 
2010 42.0 3,306.7 28.2 11 2,810 
2011 42.0 3,306.7 28.2 9.9 3,520 
Source: Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries LLP Aral Department. 
                                                 
39 See, for example, the NASA Earth Observatory; 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/WorldOfChange/aral_sea.php  
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Table 3 shows how the water level, sea territory, sea volume, 
salinity level and fish catch have been changing from year to year. 
The table also includes the effects of actions done by the local 
communities to revive the sea. From 1991 to 2005 the values of 
the five variables are fluctuating from year to year as a result of 
successful attempts to gain control of the Little Aral. However, 
none of these attempts proved to be of lasting results until the 
completion of the Kok Aral dam that permanently stabilised water 
level at 42 meters, the sea territory at 3306.7 km2 and the sea 
volume at 28.2 km3. Salinity level is still fluctuating; a factor that 
cannot be controlled by a dam or a dyke, but the number of fish 
has been constantly growing at a fast rate, making it possible to 
restart the industrial fishing activity in the region. After the level 
of 83 and 52 tonnes caught prior to 2005 this figure reached 
3,520 tonnes already in 2011. The following figure represents the 
change in fish catch in the Northern Aral Sea over time.  
 
Figure 1 
Fish catch in the Northern Aral Sea, 1991–2011 
(tonnes) 
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Zaulkhan Yermakhanov, director of the Aral Department of 
the Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries LLP40 is confi-
                                                 
40 Yermakhanov (2012). Zaulkhan Yermakhanov was interviewed as he is the 
person who has been leading the institute that regulates fisheries in the region 
and has been replenishing the Little Aral with fish. He explained the effects of 
the intensified irrigation on the Aral Sea and the fish species that used to live in 
the sea. He talked about the past actions that were directed at saving species 
and the current government policies that are in place to control the fishing 
activity and to ensure the reproduction of fish. 
Alpár Sz×ke 152 
dent that the situation will improve. He guesses that the maxi-
mum capacity of the Little Aral is around 6,000 tonnes per year 
that could be reached within 3-4 years. Since the completion of 
the dam more than seven types of fish can be found in the sea 
again. This great achievement is mostly due to the work done by 
the organisation lead by Zaulkhan Yermakhanov. The 15 employ-
ees of the institute regularly monitor the quality of the water and 
the number of fish divided into species. Based on these numbers 
they propose yearly quotas to the government. While the salinity 
levels of the sea were high the organisation introduced a fish 
named Kambala from the Azov Sea that is more resistant to such 
circumstances. Today Kambala is one of the most dominant spe-
cies in the sea. The activity of the organisation ensures that fishing 
remains at a sustainable rate at which the number of fish in the 
sea increases year by year.41 
3.5. Reorganised fishing industry 
In order to ensure that fishing is kept within the sustainable rate 
set by the Aral Department of the Kazakh Scientific Research In-
stitute of Fisheries LLP the government decided to divide the 
Northern Aral Sea into 10 fishing zones and distribute Individual 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs) between several companies. The quo-
tas clearly define the allowed extent of fish catch from the sea and 
guarantee their transferability between parties. So far one tender 
has been held, in 2006, which granted operating permits to seven 
companies.  
With the quota system introduced in 2006 the Kazakh gov-
ernment ensures that the conditions of an efficient ownership sys-
tem described by Kerekes are met.42 The below-mentioned condi-
tions were impossible to meet before due to the nature of the So-
viet economy where public ownership was predominant:  
(1) universality: natural resources are considered to be in private 
hands when all ownership rights are clearly set and defined; 
(2) exclusivity: all benefits and costs arising from the ownership 
and use of a resource affect solely the owner of that resource; 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Kerekes (2007). 
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(3) transferability: the owner has to be in power of transferring 
the property rights of the resource; 
(4) enforceability: the owner has to be protected against the 
forceful appropriation of the property. 
 Nowadays the circumstances are completely different. Univer-
sality is guaranteed by distributing the quotas to private compa-
nies. Rules and regulations such as the limit set on the quantity of 
catch ensure exclusivity. The actual work is delegated to hired 
fishermen (transferability). The laws of the country protect the 
owners against forceful appropriation (enforceability). 
In contrast to the Soviet times the industry has many actors 
now. The companies holding the quotas do not have fishermen on 
permanent payroll anymore. During the fishing season fishermen 
use their own equipment and sell the catch to the companies 
owning the quotas. Many of these companies do not have proc-
essing plants thus they are forced to either sell the catch to facto-
ries or buy their services. The increasing volume of fish created a 
demand for new processing factories which in turn created new 
jobs. “Atameken Rybprom” was established in the city of Aralsk in 
2009. It is owned by a Kazakh investment group called “Atame-
ken Holding” that had acquired the services of a Korean company 
to build the factory and equip it with modern technology. Their 
capacity permits them to process 6,000 tonnes a year which is the 
potentially maximum capacity of the Northern Aral Sea. This is 
why nowadays they intend to process fish from other parts of the 
country as well. Currently they process between 1,500 and 2,000 
tonnes a year and they employ between 65 and 95 people de-
pending on the season. This quantity already permits them to ex-
port globally with their target markets being the EU, Canada and 
the CIS countries. They plan to find new partners to buy fish from, 
either from the Aral Sea or the Lake Balkhash or the Caspian Sea. 
As soon as they achieve their aim they will have to double the 
number of their employees and start working in two shifts thus 
providing even more jobs for local people.43 
                                                 
43 Abdulaiev (2012). Shukirbai Umarovich Abdualiev – the director of the fish-
processing factory “Atameken Ribprom” – was chosen for interviewing because 
of his up-to-date insight into the reorganised fishing industry. He talked about 
the investments made in the region; he explained the business model practiced 
by his company and by their competitors, the quota system introduced by the 
government to control fishing activity on the Little Aral and their plans for the 
future. 
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The example of “Aral Rybprom” is not unique. One of their 
competitors is Aral Service, a factory that is situated in one of the 
former “Aral Rybprom” buildings. Adilbek Aimbetov, the former 
head of “Aral Rybprom” that controlled fishing activity during the 
Soviet Union, decided to acquire what was left of the old factory 
building, renovate it and restart its activity. Today it operates un-
der the name of Aral Service, it employs more than 40 people and 
has a capacity of 4,000 tonnes out of which it uses 200 currently. 
The fish processed in this factory are sold only in Kazakhstan yet 
but they are planning on entering the European markets.  
The main reason behind the low utilisation rate of the two fac-
tories is the quota tender that was organised in 2006 prior to their 
establishment. The new tender will be held in 2013 when a new 
division of the sea is expected after which these factories would be 
able to increase their activity. 
The future seems bright for these factories as the amount of 
fish in the Little Aral Sea has increased at a yearly rate of 25 per 
cent, 50 per cent and 25 per cent between 2008 and 2011 (see 
Table 3). Furthermore the 3,520 tonnes of fish catch, registered in 
2011, is expected to double in the next few years.44  
As a down-side of the newly introduced capitalist structure of 
the fishing industry at the Northern Aral Sea it does not provide 
any protection or support for fishermen. The companies owning 
the fishing quotas expect them to use their own ships, equipment 
and shelters during the season. They are paid after the amount of 
their catch and they are not offered any other support. While 
during the Soviet regime they had been working as permanent 
employees of “Aral Rybprom” using the equipment provided by 
the company, now they have to cover everything for themselves 
and make a living for their families from what they receive for 
their catch. In 1998 a non-governmental, non-profit organisation 
called “Aral Tenizi” was founded within the framework of a Ka-
zakh-Danish fishery project entitled “From Kattegat to the Aral 
Sea.” It aims at supporting the growth of fish catch, improving the 
living standards of people and decreasing unemployment. They 
support fishermen by building camps where they can live in mo-
bile houses during the fishing season and by supplying them with 
the necessary equipment. They operate five camps currently for 
their 500 members. Each of them has to pay a yearly member fee 
in return for the support. The number of members has been in-
                                                 
44 Yermakhanov (2012). 
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creasing by 50 on average each year. The organisation tries to at-
tract donors from around the world to fund its operation. Since 
2009 their activity has been co-funded by the World Bank with 
support also coming from a Japanese group.45 
3.6. Environmental improvement, economic growth,              
rising social standards: the role of the state 
In the last twenty years many of the principles listed in the docu-
ment called “Caring for the Earth” (IUCN) have been realised in 
the Northern Aral Sea Region.46 The Kazakh government has 
“created global alliances” (IUCN) with several international or-
ganisations and started co-operating with neighbouring countries 
in order to restore the environmental stability of the region. Gov-
ernmental agencies such as the “Barsakelmes” nature reserve of-
fice together with non-governmental groups like “Aral Tenizi” 
work to “conserve the Earth’s vitality and diversity” (IUCN) while 
at the same time promote ideas such as “respecting and caring for 
community and life” (IUCN) in an attempt to change the personal 
attitudes and practices of the local population. This is a directly 
opposite attitude to the one shown during the Soviet era when 
none of the principles were adopted by the leaders of that time. 
However, some of these principles, for example “conserv[ing] the 
Earth’s vitality and diversity,” were clearly violated by the imple-
mentation of extensive irrigation projects.  
 The Aral County Office of the Kazakh Labour Ministry also 
had an important role in the economic improvement seen in the 
region by helping both individuals and enterprises get back on 
their feet. The following employment data draws a clear picture of 
the improvement achieved. In 2000 9,562 people turned up at 
their office asking for help in their job pursuit. By the end of that 
year the office managed to find employment for 8,212 of them. 
                                                 
45 Baimakanova (2012). Aina Baimakanova – director of the “Aral Tenizi” or-
ganization that was established with international help to support the fisher-
men of the region – was chosen for interviewing to find out more about the 
everyday life of fishermen including their social and financial background. 
Baimakanova talked about the activity of the organisation aimed at helping 
fishermen get back on their feet and restart their activity in a capitalist way. 
46 IUCN (1991). 
Alpár Sz×ke 156 
They closed the year with 1,350 active, officially documented job-
seekers which was a 4.7 per cent of the county’s total working-
age population (28,600). The environmental improvements that 
lead to the economic growth of the region can be clearly seen if 
we compare the official unemployment data of 2011 with the one 
from eleven years earlier. 3,145 people registered as active job-
seekers in 2011 and by the end of the year only 212 remained 
without a workplace. With an active population of 35,207 this 
means a 0.6 per cent official unemployment rate.47 
Since the completion of the dam and the revival of the fishing 
industry the rate of unemployment has been steadily decreasing. 
This has been enhanced by nationwide programmes designed by 
the government that help both individuals and enterprises in an 
attempt to decrease unemployment. The latest national pro-
gramme is called “2011–2020”, with the aim of decreasing the 
national unemployment rate from 8.5 per cent to 5.3 per cent; it 
offers to finance a registered job-seeker’s salary for a certain pe-
riod once they have found a job. Thanks to this, enterprises such 
as the newly established fish-processing factories around the 
Northern Aral Sea may employ registered job-seekers for a 
KZT54,000 (about USD 370) monthly salary and pay only 50 per 
cent of their salaries in the first 6 months, 25 per cent in the next 
3 months and 15 per cent in the last 3 months. The Aral County 
Office of the Labour Ministry has been collaborating with three 
fish-processing factories where they delegated 40 workers in 
2011 and already 30 in the first quarter of 2012.48 The revived 
activity of the fishing industry has clearly had a strong positive 
effect on employment which has been fostered by governmental 
projects as well. 
The World Bank’s involvement in saving the Aral Sea had a 
strong effect on the domestic policies of Kazakhstan. The policies 
of sustainable development and the findings of the “Development 
and the Environment” report, published by the World Bank in 
1992, are clearly reflected in recently adopted policies and ac-
tions of the government. Unsustainable irrigation schemes have 
not been subsidised since the country gained independence and 
the quotas were distributed in 2006 to ensure the sustainability 
and transparency of fishing on the Northern Aral Sea. Actions 
were also taken to provide access to sanitation and raise the level 
                                                 
47 Kazakh Labor Ministry’s Aral County Office. 
48 Zhaimakov (2012). 
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of education in the remote areas of the region. The children of 
Aralsk County benefited from the “100 schools, 100 hospitals” 
presidential programme that raised the level of education in the 
area by establishing four new schools.  
The living standards and the economy of the region have been 
continuously improving in the recent years due to the environmen-
tally and socially conscious policies introduced by the government. 
The high state revenues guaranteed by the abundance of natural 
resources are likely to provide enough capital for the government 
in the future to carry on implementing policies that protect the en-
vironment and foster growth and development in the region. 
Furthermore, the president of the country is determined to 
bring back the sea to the former port of Aralsk which would re-
quire the construction of an even bigger dam that would further 
raise the territory and the volume of the sea. This would not only 
give an extra boost to the fishing industry but to agriculture as 
well and it might contribute to restoring the former climate of the 
region and putting an end to the fatal illnesses that claim many 
victims every year.  
4) Summary 
The case of the Aral Sea is one of the biggest environmental catas-
trophes the world has ever seen. Unlike many others this has been 
an entirely man-made disaster that was brought about by the de-
sire of economic gains coupled with irresponsibility, ignorance 
and short-sightedness. The irrigation schemes designed and im-
plemented by the Soviet leadership in Central Asia, mainly in Uz-
bekistan and Kazakhstan, starting from the middle of the 20th 
century caused the desiccation of the Aral Sea while the excessive 
use of pesticides in an attempt to enhance the output of cotton 
monocultures has permanently damaged the soil quality in the 
region. It is a good example of a government-implemented project 
where questions related to the environment were completely 
overlooked and most of the principles of environmental econom-
ics known today were violated, such as sustainable development, 
caring for the Earth, efficient use of resources, etc.  
As a result of the extensive irrigation projects the water level of 
the Aral Sea has started to gradually shrink from the early 1960’s 
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onwards. Eventually this resulted in the desiccation of a major 
part of the sea and the division of it into two parts: the Southern 
Aral and the Northern Aral, the latter being the main focus of this 
paper in an attempt to prove the connection between the per-
formance of the economy and the state of the environment.  
The effects of a strong human intervention in nature started to 
manifest themselves since the 1960’s when the water level began 
to drop in the sea basin. Simultaneously, the salinity level started 
to rise causing the gradual extinction of more than twenty fish 
species living in the sea which later proved to be a major blow to 
the region’s economy that had been overly dependent on the fish-
ing industry. However, the effects of the destruction were success-
fully mitigated during the Soviet era when there was a possibility 
for a wider interregional co-operation between fisheries.   
The drop of sea level has also resulted in the desertification of 
the area, making agricultural activity almost impossible. The salty 
dust and sand carried by the wind from the dried-up seabed has 
been causing high numbers of respiratory and other illnesses un-
seen before in the region. The damages done to the environment 
of the Northern Aral Sea region left a strong mark both on the 
economy and society.  
This trend has only reversed after the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion when Kazakhstan gained independence. The opening up of 
the borders made it possible for the world to learn about the ca-
tastrophe which started an influx of foreign scientists and experts. 
International organisations like the different branches of the UN 
and the World Bank started gradually to deal with the issue. So 
far the biggest achievement has been the completion of the Kok 
Aral dam within the framework of a co-financed project of the 
World Bank and the Kazakh government and it restored hope to 
the region. Since the completion of the construction of the dam in 
2005 the territory and seal level of the Northern Aral Sea has 
been slowly stabilised and this let fisheries replenish the sea and 
restart economic activity. This has already created hundreds if not 
thousands of jobs but the future is even brighter with the newly 
established fish-processing plants planning on operating interna-
tionally in the short run which is expected to bring along increas-
ing growth and development.   
The Kazakh government has instantly stopped subsidising the 
harmful irrigation projects after gaining independence but they 
did not have the financial sources needed to deal with the prob-
lem until the last decade. With the help of the World Bank they 
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managed to complete the new dam and implemented several gov-
ernmental projects in order to support the local economy and the 
society. Not only has the fishing industry been benefiting from the 
stabilisation of the Northern Aral Sea but to the whole region as 
well as it has had a good effect on the climate and biodiversity. All 
in all, the economic situation of the region has started improving 
only after the activities harmful to nature stopped and the gov-
ernment adopted an environmentally friendly policy targeting 
sustainability. As long as the central leadership ignored the state 
of the environment and considered only promoting the industry, 
the region of the Northern Aral Sea had been in an economic and 
social crisis. However, after a change in policy which resulted in a 
more environmental friendly way of thinking and planning hope 
has been regained about saving the region and restoring its for-
mer prosperity. Initial results are already visible.  
Even though many experts predicted that neither the economy 
nor the biodiversity of the Aral Sea region could be restored, the 
government of Kazakhstan together with the local population and 
international organisations proved these predictions wrong. Un-
fortunately, their achievements are limited only to the Northern 
part of the former sea at moment. 
This achievement, which is already great in itself, might prove to 
be only the first step in the restoration process of the Aral Sea 
which is a dream for hundreds of thousands of people living in the 
area. However, for this the combined efforts of all Central Asian 
countries would be needed, supplemented by the support of major 
international organisations such as the UN and the World Bank. 
 
* * * * * 
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